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 ABSTRACT 
 
THE NOVEL-MANIFESTO: MODERNIST KUNSTLERROMANE AND THE 
DISCOURSE OF MODERNIST AESTHETIC THEORY 
 
                                                                                  Edward Marks 
 
 
This dissertation proposes the modernist kunstlerroman as a site for 
aesthetic theorizing. Like the aesthetic manifestos that proliferated 
between 1890 and 1939, the kunstlerromane of this period advance a set 
of aesthetic criteria and values. The modernist kunstlerroman’s formal 
qualities—it’s an art object about art—as well as the period in which it is 
written—the aesthetically revolutionary modernist period—provide the 
foundation for reading modernist kunstlerromane as manifesto-like novels. 
Through close reading, three kunstlerromane of the period are explored as 
examples of the novel-manifesto: The Tragic Muse (1890), by Henry 
James; Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916), by James Joyce; and 
The Revenge for Love (1937), by Wyndham Lewis. These novels were 
chosen for two reasons. First, they span much of the modernist period and 
represent what we might call emerging, high, and late modernism. Second, 
the authors have produced important theoretical statements, and their 
positions in the canon mean that each has been the subject of extensive 
critical work. My readings of the three kunstlerromane, then, trace the 
 authors’ theoretical statements and subsequent critical work. Such tracing 
is not to show that the kunstlerromane are novelized statements of the 
theoretical statements. Rather, such tracing shows the kunstlerroman is an 
unrecognized, supplementary site for critical understanding of modernist 
theory. There are at least three important implications for this research. 
First, it introduces a heretofore unrealized source for researching 
modernist aesthetic theory. Next, it provides an underutilized source for 
studying the theoretical ideas of specific modernist writers, and, finally, it 
provides a fuller understanding of modernist aesthetics. To this last point, 
I conclude that for these three canonical writers, at least, theories of 
perception were foundational to modernism, and perception itself was 
being redefined in late-nineteenth/early-twentieth-century literature.       
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                                                                      Introduction: Why the Novel-Manifesto?                                                   
This dissertation reconceptualizes the modernist kunstlerroman. It argues 
that the modernist kunstlerroman, or artist-novel, is an overlooked site of 
theoretical engagement with modernist aesthetic theories and that the 
modernist kunstlerroman contributes to the period’s vigorous, competing 
theories of art by making its own aesthetic claims. The aim here is to 
reconceptualize the modernist kunstlerroman as a novel-manifesto, a 
novel that speaks out its artistic principles. Convention categorizes 
manifestos separate from art, and where the conventional line blurs, it 
blurs in favor of calling a manifesto “artistic,” not in calling an art work 
“manifesto-like.” Ascribing manifesto qualities to a novel seems 
disparaging: “novel-manifesto” sounds like a didactic piece of 
propaganda, an overtly tendentious position thinly couched in narrative 
form, a novel wagging its finger prescriptively at its cultural or political 
moment (think Atlas Shrugged)1. Indeed, the Latin origin for “manifesto,” 
manifestus, can be roughly translated as “obvious,” and a conventional 
manifesto asserts its positions explicitly. The conventional manifesto is a 
                                                 
1 In a recent New York Times Sunday Magazine piece discussing this kind of “political art” (“Much Obliged”), 
Lauren Oyler objects to using the adjective “necessary” to describe works of overtly political art. 
“Necessary,” she says, is intended as a compliment, to suggest importance, that the object reviewed 
presents, in the mind of the reviewer at least, “right minded views” (12). Oyler says that this, however, 
reduces art to a political position: “When applied to bad art with good politics, ‘necessary’ allows the 
audience to avoid engaging with a work in aesthetic terms, which tend to be more ambiguous and difficult. 
When applied to good art with good, or even ambivalent, politics, it renders aesthetic achievement 
irrelevant. Not only is that depressing, it also nullifies the political argument in favor of art in the first 
place: Why write a novel when a manifesto will do?” (13). 
2 
non-fiction, expository genre. It attempts a direct connection to what is. 
Novels, on the other hand, are narrative fiction, and meaning in a narrative 
mediated by fiction is always more oblique. Narrative fiction is “one 
remove” from non-fiction: it begins with what isn’t. The novel, therefore, 
is not a platform for obvious, direct declarations. However, my position is 
not that the kunstlerroman is making an obvious aesthetic claim, but rather 
that it uniquely contributes to a theoretical discourse of aesthetics in a 
period rife with manifestos.  
In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969), Foucault defends this 
kind of previously unrecognized contribution: “beneath the persistence of 
a particular genre, form, discipline, or theoretical activity, one is now 
trying to detect the incidence of interruptions” (4). The modernist 
kunstlerroman interrupts the discourse of modernist aesthetic theory 
through what Foucault calls “recurrent redistributions: Recurrent 
redistributions reveal several pasts, several forms of connexion [sic], 
several hierarchies of importance, several networks of determination, 
several teleologies, for one and the same science, as its present undergoes 
change” (5). The modernist kunstlerroman is an unacknowledged form, 
connected with modernist manifestos in the work of aesthetic theory. 
Furthermore, in Poetry of the Revolution: Marx, Manifestos, and the 
Avant-Gardes, Martin Puchner argues that in the Modernist moment 
“manifestos intrude onto artworks and are in turn absorbed and assimilated 
by them” (6). Puchner is exploring the relationship between manifestos 
3 
and the avant-gardes, the influence that manifestos had on the tone of the 
avant-gardes. However, his argument for the absorption and assimilation 
of manifesto qualities is evident, too, in modernist kunstlerromane. The 
manifesto’s intrusion is not tonal but theoretical, but unlike a conventional 
manifesto’s positions, the kunstlerroman’s positions are presentations, not 
declarations.  
The modernist kunstlerroman performs its position not as 
exposition but narratively. However, to be read this way requires 
contextual preconditions. In J. L. Austin’s How to do Things with Words, 
Austin describes performative statements thus: “the uttering of the 
sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action, which again would not 
normally be described as saying something” (162). Austin outlines the 
requirements that make performative statements, not true or false, but 
felicitous or infelicitous. The requirements for felicitous performative 
statements are contextual. The participants, intentions, and procedures 
must exist in appropriate, conventional social conditions (166)2. The 
modernist kunstlerroman exists in a context that pushes us to read it 
manifesto-like, and it does so for three reasons. First, the kunstlerroman is 
an ekphrastic text; however, unlike texts that have ekphrastic moments, 
the kunstlerroman, as an “artist novel,” is the ekphrastic moment: the art 
                                                 
2 Derrida’s rejection of performative statements appears to be based on the incompleteness of any utterance: because 
all statements are at play and indeterminate, they can’t “perform” (do) anything. However, Austin’s 
assertion of performatives is much narrower and contextual: performative statements may not “perform” 
(do) completely, but they still do. Performativity describes a specific circumstance, a social function of 
language that doesn’t require fixed totality.  
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object about art is necessarily self-referential. Second, the modernist 
kunstlerroman is unique among kunstlerromane because of the period in 
which it emerged. Because the modernist period was a revolutionary 
aesthetic period, the art that was produced in this period must be 
historicized in a revolutionary condition. Lastly, because it’s in the unique 
position of being an ekphrastic work in an extraordinary moment of 
artistic revolution, the modernist kunstlerroman should be approached as a 
possible destabilization of the conventional rigidity between manifesto and 
art object, a destabilization of what the reader expects from these texts. 
The Kunstlerroman as Ekphrasis 
The initial assumption here is that a novel with an artist hero is a novel 
uniquely “about” art. This isn’t to say that the kunstlerroman is about art 
in the way that, say, the bildungsroman (the “education novel) is about 
education. The kunstlerroman is unique in that it is an aesthetic object that 
constructs an aesthetic object. The kunstlerroman as an ekphrastic text. 
And as the novel itself is art, the kunstlerroman’s form is, in part, an 
ekphrastic presentation: the art object explicitly representing, performing, 
and describing art, artists, and the conditions of artistic production. The 
kunstlerroman is a self-referential discourse whose form invites another 
layer of interpretation. However, unlike traditional ideas of ekphrasis, the 
ekphrasis of a kunstlerroman is not a digressive moment in a larger work: 
the kunstlerroman is the ekphrasitic moment. The very existence of the 
kunstlerroman, its essence, is a presentation of aesthetic principles. It 
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doesn’t declare aesthetic principles in the way a manifesto does, but 
through its presentation of art within art, such principles emerge. 
Ekphrastic moments outside of kunstlerromane are conventionally 
understood as moments in which one artistic medium depicts or describes 
another. The oft-used example is the detailed description of the shield of 
Achilles, from The Iliad. In Mack Smith’s Literary Realism and the 
Ekphrastic Tradition (1995), Smith says that the Greek term from which 
ekphrasis comes, ekphrazein, translates as “to speak out” (36). In this 
sense, the term suggests a declaration of some sort. The description of the 
shield of Achilles, then, in this original understanding, is explicitly saying 
something to readers (or the earlier “hearers”). Smith says ekphrazein 
wasn’t solely used to describe artistic depictions of art, but “any elaborate 
digressive description embedded within rhetorical discourse” (10). This 
suggests an earlier understanding of ekphrasis as an added, supplemental 
description of some complexity. Taken together with the idea of “speaking 
out,” the ekphrastic moment is an explicit proclamation, a statement of 
“something else” or “something more,” the kind of statement that, in 
discussions of meaning, used to be considered extra or background or even 
off-topic. Today, however, in questions of meaning, ideas of 
supplementation or digressions are largely rejected as naive. (If there’s 
nothing outside the text, there certainly aren’t “digressions” within.) In 
“The Villanelle Perplex: Reading Joyce” (1998), for example, Robert 
Adams Day compares chapter V of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
6 
Man with and without Stephen’s construction of the villanelle. Far from 
being something “extra,” the villanelle is essential to the section. Still, 
while the idea of supplemental meaning may be gone, the idea of 
ekphrastic “speaking out” has remained. Artistic descriptions within other 
art objects enrich and complicate the production of meaning, and when 
those descriptions are constitutive of the art object, when the art object is 
determined by ekphrasis, the speaking out inevitably is a speaking out 
about art. The shield of Achilles, for example, may reference Greek myth 
and culture, but Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn” has no choice but to make 
an explicit aesthetic claim, which it speaks out at the poem’s end. The 
Grecian urn is constitutive to Keats’s poem in a way that Achilles’ shield 
is not constitutive to the Illiad. The kunstlerroman, which takes artists, art, 
and the production of art not as a momentary flourish, but as a determining 
characteristic, is fundamentally speaking out art, without the manifesto’s 
explicit declarations. 
Aesthetic Revolutions 
What distinguishes the artist-novel of the modernist period, however, is 
that it speaks out in an extraordinary moment of aesthetic revolution, a 
tumultuous period of aesthetic theorizing. And because the kunstlerroman 
is an artist novel in this period, it recommends itself as a site to express 
aesthetic ideas. Indeed, the modernist kunstlerroman is a manifesto-like 
project unlike the kunstlerromane of other periods precisely because of its 
revolutionary moment; the modernist kunstlerroman can be read for 
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manifesto-like claims in a way that kunstlerromane of other periods might 
not. Calling the modernist period “revolutionary” seems self-evident: 
artistic experimentation went beyond, well, experimentation. Along with 
art, the period underwent foundational social shifts in science, technology, 
religion, and politics (hence the profusion of manifestos). In Peter 
Nicholls’ Modernisms: A Literary Guide (1995), for example, Nicholls 
references French linguist Henri Meschonnic as identifying “fifty ‘isms’ 
invented in the period between 1886-1924” (76). These are fifty new 
“isms.” Such prolific theoretical invention suggests a condition of cultural 
and political upheaval, a transitional revolutionary moment fertile for the 
testing of alternative aesthetic forms and ideas. Many “isms,” according to 
Nicholls, disappeared as quickly as they emerged. But “the fashion was 
now for energetic and outspoken expressions of faith and…for 
manifestos” (76). In this revolutionary discourse, this open scramble to 
establish aesthetic positions through manifestos, novels of art get yoked to 
the more expository genre, to the swirl of isms. In the moment of 
destabilized aesthetic ideas, novels of art will necessarily participate in 
artistic theorizing. 
Indeed, all art created during an aesthetic revolution is, in some 
sense, a position; the art about art (the ekphrastic novel), however, speaks 
out such positions. When intellectual and social transformations 
destabilize traditional aesthetic forms and foundations, the novel that takes 
aesthetics as its subject must, in its very essence, be speaking its 
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theoretical position. Its existence in a period of aesthetic transition situates 
the kunstlerroman as an example of its position, even if its form appears 
unrevolutionary. During the revolution, all acts, rebellious or reactionary, 
are revolutionary. The revolutionary period is the period of open 
uncertainty, the suspension of “rules”; everything is up for grabs. In this 
period, all assertions are revolutionary. To embrace any position in this 
moment is to take a position on the future, on the “next,” and therefore to 
shape and create the next, even if what’s next looks an awful lot like what 
came before. 
The profusion of manifestos in this period is evidence of 
revolution, and a revolution is nothing more than an attempt to shape the 
post-revolution. The historical moment that is the modernist revolution, 
therefore, facilitates the kunstlerroman’s intersection with aesthetic 
manifestos. In their introduction to the “New Historicism” chapter of 
Literary Theory: An Anthology (2004), Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan 
describe how history participates in intertextuality, forming common 
discourses with other genres: “History is not some unmediated reality out 
there, some stable background that the literary text reflects or refers to; it 
is not a context. Rather, it is like the literary text itself – a different genre, 
granted, but no less a discourse” (506). Rivkin and Ryan identify history 
as another text, another discourse, and therefore, another site of 
intertextuality. However, genre formation can sometimes obscure 
intertextuality. We create genres by carving out formal distinctions, and 
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genre can suggest that these distinctions  are categorical exclusions. The 
novel genre, for instance, gets excluded as a site for aesthetic theory. The 
moment of social upheaval, of revolutionary discourse, though, is the 
moment when such intertextuality—history/manifesto/artist-hero novel—
is most likely. Modernist kunstlerromane are, obviously, generically 
novels; however, they are artist-novels in a historically revolutionary 
moment, and, as such, they are part of the discourse of aesthetic theory in 
that moment, a discourse largely informed by the manifesto. 
The Structure of Artistic Revolutions (1985), Remi Clignet’s 
extrapolation of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962) presents more specific support for the claim that the Modernist 
period was a moment of aesthetic revolution. Clignet generalizes the 
precepts of Kuhn’s scientific paradigms to include artistic paradigms. 
There are, Clignet argues, enough similarities between science and art to 
understand artistic revolutions in the language of scientific revolutions:  
“As both modes of cultural production [science and art] presuppose 
perspectives that provide the vocabulary for defining problems and the 
tools for solving them, they are equally susceptible to tensions between 
tradition and innovation; and those tensions affect relations between 
practitioners as much as they affect the creative process of each 
practitioner” (40). Clignet argues that the relationships responsible for 
stabilizing scientific and artistic paradigms are also the relationships 
responsible for destabilizing them, for revolutions: the relationships 
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between tradition and innovation. Paradigms take shape when the tension 
between tradition and innovation is stabilized; revolution irrupts when 
innovation destabilizes the paradigm. Destabilization is more than 
experimentation: it’s an institutional upheaval. Like science, art 
inescapably belongs to a tradition to which it adheres and which it also 
inflects. When this tradition is destabilized, as it surely was in the 
modernist period, the resulting condition is revolutionary.  
This is seen more clearly when we consider the structure of artistic 
and scientific paradigms. The tools in both the scientist’s and artist’s 
toolbox are threefold: “Symbolic generalizations, models, and exemplars 
help both artists and scientists to define the puzzles to be solved and the 
techniques or concepts crucial for such solutions” (Clignet 45). Symbolic 
generalizations are the methodological principles that guide the practice; 
models are “heuristic and regulate …the internal grammar of the symbols 
used by each discipline” (44), and the examples are “the concrete solutions 
to the problems they face” (44). When the paradigm is stable, methods, 
models and exemplars refer to one another in a comprehensive whole. 
When that whole breaks down (shifts), and before a new paradigm is 
established, is the moment of revolution. In science, the symbolic 
generalizations are often laws or theorems or rules: symbolic 
generalizations are “the formal or the readily fomalizable components of 
the disciplinary matrix” (Kuhn 182). Kuhn suggests f=ma (force equals 
mass times acceleration) as an example. Importantly, for Kuhn, the 
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symbolic generalizations “function in part as laws but also in part as 
definitions of some of the symbols they deploy” (182). The above 
example, f=ma, for instance, is not only an algorithm for determining, say, 
one of the missing values; it’s also a definition. The equal sign is the 
copular verb “is.” So f=ma doesn’t serve only as an algorithm; it tells us 
what force is (and mass and acceleration, too).  
This distinction between laws and definitions is an important one 
in the determination of revolutions. To qualify as “Kuhnian revolution,” of 
course, a paradigm must shift. This involves more than simply adopting 
new laws; it often requires re-defining long-held symbolic definitions. 
According to Kuhn, because all definitions are tautologies – the definition 
of x is some definitional description of x – “revolutions involve, among 
other things, the abandonment of generalizations the force of which had 
previously been in some part that of tautologies. Did Einstein show that 
simultaneity was relative or did he alter the notion of simultaneity itself?” 
(183). The destabilization of the tautologies, the definitions, are indicative, 
then, of the revolutionary moment.3 In art, according to Clignet, 
“Symbolic generalizations imply the elaboration of rules of 
correspondence between form and content” (42). These rules of 
correspondence can be determined by something as fundamental as the 
physiology of “the relations deemed to exist between the right or the left 
                                                 
3 One need only consider the definitional destabilization of the word “art” that followed the showing of Duchamp’s 
“The Fountain,” in 1917, to see that, in the modernist moment, a paradigm shift was afoot. 
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hand, as far as the piano is concerned” (42). Or the rules of 
correspondence can be “technological innovations” or “the dominance of a 
particular religious or political philosophy” (43). The modernist period, of 
course, underwent fundamental technological, philosophical, and religious 
transformations, and the period’s aesthetic manifestos informed and 
inflected these rules of correspondence. The manifestos are explicit 
propositions of rules of correspondence. In the seminal manifestos on 
Cubism, Futurism, and Vorticism, for example, we see Apollinaire, 
Marinetti, and Lewis struggle to position art in a starkly new technological 
and sociopolitical moment.  
However, while both science and art may similarly define puzzles, 
innovative and new techniques for solving these puzzles emerge in two 
distinctly separate ways: in science, innovations in puzzle-solving 
strategies often displace the obtaining strategies; in art, they absorb and 
inflect the obtaining strategies. And this is an important distinction 
between scientific and artistic revolutions: “Paradigms tend to succeed one 
another within science but to coexist within art” (Clignet 46). Artistic 
revolutions, therefore, might be harder to delineate because they don’t 
introduce zero-sum reversals of the paradigm. Scientists, for example, will 
“immediately discard less efficient paradigms in favor of new versions 
that supposedly explain more fully the phenomena being described” 
(Clignet 82). Art, of course, is different. While forms may change, there 
isn’t a disqualified or “false” form that gets rejected. The implicit 
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assumption is that science has transparency, the transparent explanation of 
what is, and art is phenomenological, the human expression of what is.4 
When science’s explanation doesn’t hold, it must be discarded because it 
no longer transparently identifies what is; however, when human 
expression changes, the earlier form/style/method/rules are not false, but 
merely passé, and as such, meanings change but aren’t “wrong.” When a 
scientific paradigm is no longer effective, or certainly less effective, at 
explaining phenomena, the paradigm shifts. This is not so in art, whose 
shifts are not determined by effectiveness, but rather through larger 
cultural, less well-defined changes. 
Clignet indicates that there are some general progressions that can 
happen in the arts. Perspective in painting, for example, is a method that 
builds on previous techniques to more convincingly produce the illusion of 
depth and three dimensions. But even here, non-perspectival art is never 
“wrong” or “false.” Non-perspectival art is not negated by perspective, 
and in this way art is more like technology than it is like abstract science: 
travel by automobile didn’t make travel by horse “false,” for example. 
Likewise, revolutions in art are not identified by displacing knowledge so 
much as creating what Clignet calls “discontinuities.” Stark discontinuities 
in artistic methods, strategies, themes, or conceptions mark revolutionary 
                                                 
4 There are, of course, arguments against this distinction, arguments that say science, too, is an art that can’t get 
outside of interpretation. However, this debate has greater implications for scientific revolutions than for 
artistic revolutions. The “science wars” of the 1990’s saw science, not art, in a defensive position. As this 
dissertation is not “about science,” it doesn’t engage such arguments. 
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periods, which can give way to new paradigms. The new paradigm, 
according to Clignet, is established, if at all, in two important ways: 
institutionally and retrospectively. Institutionally, artistic revolutions 
refute the dominant, established artistic institutions and, later, are either 
recognized and absorbed by these institutions or spur the creation of new 
institutions. Paradigm shifts, by definition, happen on an institutional 
level. The manifestation of any revolution – political, scientific, or artistic 
– requires institutions against which to rebel. Without social organization 
of the activity, there can be no revolution. Artistic revolutions, though, are 
expressions of, and contributors to, cultural change. Because of this, 
artistic revolutions are often recognized (arguably created, certainly 
defined) retrospectively. Indeed, the duration of aesthetic revolution is 
determined only from the vantage point of the stable paradigm that 
emerges. The moment of revolution, according to Clignet, is an “open 
class of events” that later historians see as “belonging to a closed series” 
(86). So while the moment of revolution can be determined by 
discontinuities, its “beginnings” and “ends” are determined 
retrospectively, the openness is the revolution, the destabilized moment in 
which possible stabilizing theories are put forth, tested, rejected, accepted, 
perhaps rejected again until some stability emerges.  
The Modernist Revolution 
 “If…you wish to use ‘revolutionary’ in the wider and more 
intelligent sense which I generally give it here, then there is a form of 
15 
artistic expression that has attempted something definitely new; something 
that could not have come into existence in any age but this one” 
   Wyndham Lewis, Time and Western Man (1927) 
Lewis’s idea about revolution applies, he says, to a very small 
segment of the art community, but that it does qualify as revolutionary and 
it is unique to its period. The periodization of literature is, of course, a 
murky business. The rationales and evidence for staking out any period 
change over time, periodization being as much a creature of the current 
moment as it is the moment periodized. In Fredric Jameson’s The Political 
Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (1981), Jameson sees 
periodization as a false sense of essence. He likens periodization to 
Althusser’s description of “expressive causality.” Expressive causality is a 
structuralist idea that a “whole” might be phenomenal expressions of an 
“inner essence” (24).  The inner essence, here, “causes” the phenomenal 
expressions. Jameson argues that class struggle is the inner essence. 
Conventional periodization, Jameson says, falsely implies a similar 
structuralist essence: “[A] historical or cultural period tends in spite of 
itself to give the impression of a facile totalization, a seamless web of 
phenomena each of which, in its own way, ‘expresses’ some unified inner 
truth—a world-view or a period style or a set of structural categories 
which marks the whole length of breadth of the ‘period’ in question” (27). 
The falsity arises, Jameson says, because invariably one of the expressions 
“becomes a master code or ‘inner essence’ capable of explicating the other 
elements or features of the ‘whole’ in question” (28). There is, then, no 
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real inner essence, only the privileging of an expression such that it gets 
misinterpreted as an inner essence. Regarding the modernist period, 
James’s critique seems buttressed by the malleability of the descriptor 
“modernism” itself. It has been pluralized, for example, by Nichols—his 
book is titled Modernisms—suggesting a more various period, one in 
which no single expression gets privileged. Similarly, disagreements about 
the postmodern period—is it a “standalone” period or simply a phase of a 
longer modernist period—seem to support Jameson’s description. What 
Jameson doesn’t consider, however, is that periodization might be more 
akin to Althusser’s description of darstellung, a post-structuralist 
relationship of expressions, absent an inner essence. As the expressions 
are refined over time, so, too, is the period. The period’s signifier 
(“modernism,” for example), in fact, gets defined/redefined as the 
expressions shift, which they invariably do. And this seems to be more 
reflective of the way periodization works in the academy. The rules for 
periodization are, on one hand, contentious and debated, and, on the other 
hand, stubbornly resistant to change or removal. Medieval, Renaissance, 
Romantic, Victorian, Modernist, Post-Modernist are period terms 
frequently criticized and redefined, but nonetheless ubiquitous5. 
                                                 
5 In “Modernism and the Issue of Periodization,” (2005), Leonard Orr says there are, 
broadly, four ways to periodize literature: cyclically (“birth-maturation-death” for example), by 
qualities (“Realism and Naturalism”), by arbitrary chronological markers (“centuries and 
decades”), or historically (“Elizabethan, Restoration, or Victorian”) (2). A conflation of the four 
seems to be the way that periodization works today. (The exception might be cyclical 
periodization, which I can’t recall seeing anywhere but Northrup Frye’s theories of modes.) 
Periodization by qualities, though, seems to be the way most designations develop. The qualities 
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Modernism is remarkable in that its periodization is determined not 
only by a set of distinct expressions, but it is also a revolutionary literary 
period. It requires an art that has qualities that are more than just 
“different” from preceding and succeeding moments. Clignet uses the term 
“discontinuities” to signal a cultural paradigm shift, but this word doesn’t 
quite convey the rupture of the modernist moment. As stated in the 
previous section, the sheer proliferation of “isms” and manifestos in the 
Modernist period is one marker for a revolutionary moment. But it’s not 
simply the number of “isms” and manifestos; it’s the use of the manifesto 
itself. While a profusion of propositions for what the “new” ought to be is 
certainly an indication of a stark cultural shift, defining that “new” through 
manifestos and “isms” indicates a revolutionary turn toward 
intellectualizing art. Modernism produced founding documents. 
Manifestos don’t stand only as competing propositions for a new sense of 
art. They are mission statements, declarations of principles. And the 
profusion of rule-based foundational documents indicates a more 
theoretical-based art, an art of ideas. The Modernist period saw the 
deracination of many foundational Western ideas, destabilizing traditional 
conceptual paradigms. In Modernism: A Very Short Introduction, 
Christopher Butler summarizes some of the, what he calls, “stresses and 
                                                 
redefine even those periods that were originated by arbitrary historical markers, performing a 
quality/meaning coup over a previously established designation. Unstable definitions are the 
inevitable result of periodization in the same way that all meaning has been destabilized.  
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strains”: “the loss of belief in religion, the rise of our dependence on 
science and technology, the expansion of markets and the 
commodification brought about by capitalism, the growth of mass culture 
and its influence, the invasion of bureaucracy into private life, and 
changing beliefs about relationships between the sexes” (1-2).  The force 
of these changes is described in Tim Armstrong’s Modernism: A Cultural 
History: “At the beginning of the twentieth century, the shock of change is 
intensified. Indeed, for a variety of reasons modernity is increasingly 
viewed in terms of crisis” (1). While all narrative history and periodization 
are constructed series of changes – the popular, tongue-in-cheek 
expression is that history is just one damned thing after another—the 
changes occurring in the modernist moment are the deep, penetrating 
changes that suggest revolution. “Stress,” “strain,” “shock,” “crisis”: these 
are terms indicative of a culture in need of foundational theoretical 
documents. a period so tumultuous that we read its kunstlerromane 
manifesto-like. 
Michael Bell’s “The Metaphysics of Modernism” (2011) outlines 
some of these deep conceptual shifts that occurred in the modernist period, 
the kinds of shifts that are, in the terms of Kuhn and Clignet, 
“definitional.” Bell argues that the modernist period may not have begun 
until 1910, but the intellectual preconditions began with the thinkers 
whom Paul Ricoer would later say ushered in a hermeneutics of suspicion: 
“[Modernism’s] peak period in the Anglo-American context lay between 
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1910 and 1925 while its intellectual formation encompassed a coming to 
terms with the lines of thought associated with Marx, Freud, and 
Nietzsche” (9). What these three do, Bell says, is turn “human life into a 
fundamentally hermeneutic activity” (9). This suggests a paradigm shift in 
perception. Human life may have long been a hermeneutic activity, but the 
shift Bell describes is one of recognition, one that acknowledges a new 
hermeneutic quality and makes it explicit. Hermeneutics overlay what was 
previously considered “natural” or “preordained.” The emergence of self-
conscious hermeneutics, of self-conscious interpretation, undermined the 
stability of traditional modes of thought and expression. This 
destabilization is the revolutionary moment, and this moment of 
explanation and interpretation trammels up all human activity, including 
artistic expression, (maybe especially artistic expression). In the period of 
self-conscious hermeneutics, yoking human expression (art) with the 
explanation of human expression (artistic manifesto) seems unavoidable. 
The art of the period will bend toward explanation, and the artist-hero 
novel of the period will bend more so. 
The modernist period, though, was more than a period of 
explanation and interpretation. The human mind could rationalize and 
control, but the human mind itself, human perception, ceded a measure of 
autonomy and became its own obstacle: “it is not just that the external 
appearances, and the common-sensical or rational means of understanding 
them, are limited and fallible. It is that such appearances and reasoning 
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may be actively disguising contrary truths to which, by definition, there is 
no other access” (Bell 10). The modernist period experienced the most 
fundamental shift in understanding: that understanding itself was 
deceptive. This second-guessing of human understanding emerged across 
disciplines. In science, for example, the obvious transformations were 
produced by Darwin and Freud; however, Einstein’s theory of relativity 
and Heisenberg’s theory of indeterminacy “seemed to have an analogical 
application to other, nonscientific spheres” (Bell 11).  Relativity and 
indeterminacy were not only concepts of physics and quantum mechanics; 
they were cultural concepts. They were part of a larger shift that 
undermined fixed, transparent human understanding of the world.  
In 1938, according to Bell, Heidegger looked back on the first 
decades of the century and saw the beginnings of “the age of the world 
picture” (12). Humans didn’t perceive a world; they perceived a human 
world. The world was no longer the object viewed transparently; it was the 
world as humans see it, a human representation. Human understanding 
moved away from observing the object and toward the relationship 
between the subject and object, a relationship mediated by humanness. 
And such a mediated perception of the world requires reconsidering the 
conditions of mediation. Stable, foundational concepts like history, time, 
and thought were now representations of history, time, and thought. Bell 
offers the ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger as philosophies that efface the 
separation of subject and object and, instead, consider the value and 
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mystery of the human world. If history, for example, is always a mediated 
analysis, then it is always a projection of the present, and, indeed, talk of 
the “past” is always the present’s past (or present-past). If, as Clignet 
argues, aesthetic revolutions can be recognized by their discontinuities – 
and the non-representational work in art, the stream-of-conscious work in 
prose fiction, free verse in poetry, and a-tonality in music all demonstrate 
formal discontinuities in art – then we should expect to find that these 
discontinuities occur in the same moment as the cultural displacement of 
many traditional Western conceptions. The shift from “what is” to “the 
interpretation of what is” not only destabilizes the modernist period, but 
it’s the kind of destabilization that necessarily promotes manifestos. What 
other document would more naturally attend the interpretive moment than 
the one that interprets that moment? In this revolutionary moment, the 
kunstlerroman serves as the aesthetic interpolation into theoretical 
engagements. The modernist kunstlerroman is the art object that retains its 
aesthetic value while also declaring aesthetic principles. 
Reader Expectations 
The ekphrastic characteristics of the kunstlerroman and the revolutionary 
moment of the modernist period combine to influence the way one reads 
the modernist kunstlerroman. However, these conditions also require a 
willingness on the part of the reader to approach the kunstlerroman as a 
manifesto-like text. The conventional relationship between aesthetic 
manifesto and aesthetic object is that the former describes the latter; the 
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former prescribes conditions, judgments, or rules for the latter. The 
aesthetic object is the example that adheres to or deviates from those rules. 
Readers of novels, of course, do not expect manifesto-like declarations 
from a novel, and, therefore, they tend not to read the kunstlerroman as a 
theoretical site. This lack of theoretical expectation effaces the 
kunstlerroman’s intrinsic theoretical positions, or at least the reader’s 
recognition of these positions. Reader expectations determine, in large 
part, the meaning of any text, so to recognize a genre transgression like a 
novel-manifesto is to surmount strongly reinforced, long-held reading 
practices.  
In “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1935), Heidegger describes a 
hermeneutic circle that begins with a sense of art, moves to an art object, 
and then cycles back and forth between the two: “What art is should be 
inferable from the work. What the work of art is we can come to know 
only from the nature of art. Anyone can easily see that we are moving in a 
circle” (18). Heidegger argues that, in questions of logic or reason, such 
circles are usually avoided as they are illogical (circular logic); however, 
unlike circular logic, we are, he says, “compelled” to follow the aesthetic 
circle because it’s an act of discovery, not a logical syllogism. Discovery 
seems always to cycle from the general to the specific, with the categories 
“general” and “specific” shifting as we cycle. Similarly, in Validity and 
Interpretation (1967), E. D. Hirsch describes the importance of 
interpretive expectation as a precondition in the production of meaning.  
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Hirsch defines “intrinsic genre” as a “sense of the whole by means of 
which an interpreter can correctly understand any part in its determinacy” 
(22). Interpretation is always circumscribed by a sense of genre, which 
determines the interpretations of individual parts. Sense is made of 
particulars through a pre-judging of the whole. In this way, manifesto-like 
qualities are not a preconceived sense of the whole when approaching a 
novel, and, thus, they might get overlooked. This may help to explain why 
kunstlerromane have not been read as sites of artistic principles (even 
though their self-referentiality would seem to demand it). Furthermore, 
according to Hirsch, the production of a text is circumscribed by the same 
expectations as the reception of the text. The production of the text, he 
argues, is “determined by the kind of meaning [it] is going to complete” 
(23). Textual choices, conscious and unconscious, are determined, in part, 
by the expectations of the genre. Generic conceptions of novel structure, 
then, influence textual creation and interpretation (as do generic 
conceptions of manifesto structure, or any structure for that matter). This 
suggests that genre influences interpretation of the text not only in its 
reception but also in its production. For novels, this dual expectation 
combines to, perhaps, divert any production of aesthetic manifesto-like 
meaning, even for a novel “about” art.  
The categorical horizons of novel and manifesto, however, are not 
inviolable. In fact, the kunstlerroman’s blurring of the divide between art 
and the art manifesto is consistent with the blurring effects of the 
24 
modernist avant-garde and experimental literature. As, for example, a text 
like Ulysses changes how the novel genre is conceived, so, too, do the 
formal qualities of the kunstlerroman perform a reconceptualization. The 
new conception, though, is not so much a formal innovation as it is an 
interpretive recognition. The kunstlerroman may lack the jarring formal 
deviations of a Ulysses, it may not announce its work so starkly, but its 
formal qualities combined with its historical period subtly produce the 
hybrid genre novel-manifesto. In “Toward a Theory of Non-Genre 
Literature,” Jonathan Culler acknowledges “the astonishing human 
capacity to recuperate the deviant, to invent new conventions and 
functions so as to overcome that which resists our efforts” (55). The 
kunstlerroman is clearly not a new convention, but it does comprise an 
unrecognized function: reading the statement of aesthetic theory in 
narrative form. The project of this dissertation, therefore, is not so much to 
bring a “deviant” quality into the genre called “novel”; artist-heroes are 
hardly a deviant (or new) trope. Instead, the purpose here is to 
acknowledge and be open to an unconventional reading. And if, as Hirsch 
suggests, textual production is determined, in part, by genre expectations, 
then the same may be true for tropes. That is, while the kunstlerroman’s 
construction is, in part, colored by the expectations of the genre called 
“novel,” it’s also colored by the expectations of the trope “the artist 
novel.” This dissertation’s purpose is to broaden those expectations. 
Kunstlerromane are not only novels, they are novels about art. And if 
25 
textual production is determined by notions of genre, then these particular 
art novels are determined by notions of art. The intentional fallacy has 
made authorial intent a much more rigorous, specialized endeavor, one 
point in a network of strategies for interpreting texts. Similarly, 
considering that generic conventions are influenced by reader/writer 
expectations, these expectations should be subject to similar suspicion and 
scrutiny. In general, as the reading and writing of texts become more 
interrelated, as each reading is seen as its own instance of writing, readers’ 
predispositions must undergo the same scrutiny as writers’ intentions 
have.  And while a manifesto of art would seem to be a naturally distinct 
discipline from an object of art, like the rules of baseball are separate from 
the game itself, such distinctions become less clear within the horizon of 
aesthetics. In baseball, to extend the metaphor, the action and outcome of 
any individual game doesn’t change the rules of baseball. However, in 
aesthetics each individual performance inflects the understanding of the 
genre; each dancer, as Yeats suggests, in effect, creates the dance.     
Traditional Critical Approaches to the Kunstlerroman 
To be clear, it’s not my argument that the authors of modernist 
kunstlerromane consciously set out to make aesthetic claims in novel 
form, or that they used the kunstlerroman trope to narrate manifesto intent. 
The authors’ aims and intentions are subjects for a different study, and this 
is where this study diverges from most other kunstlerroman work. The 
“encyclopedia” of kunstlerromane studies is Maurice Beebe’s Ivory 
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Towers and Sacred Founts: The Artist as Hero in Fiction from Goethe to 
Joyce (1964).  In it, Beebe compiles a thorough list of kunstlerromane 
titles and conventions in an effort to define the genre. (Beebe calls the 
artist-hero novel a “genre.” I’ve used the term “trope” and will continue to 
do so unless specifically referring to Beebe.) For centuries, he says, the 
artist-hero novel has adhered to an identifiable set of conventions. Beebe 
argues, for example, that the author of an artist-hero novel is often 
recognized in the artist hero of that novel. Traditional kunstlerroman 
criticism often emphasizes the kunstlerroman as autobiography,6 and one 
of the three novels of this dissertation—Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man—certainly contains a good deal of what biographies of Joyce would 
contain. But along with making autobiographical connections, Beebe’s 
analysis also constructs an archetype for the artist heroes themselves. 
Beebe argues, for instance, that, in general, artist-heroes hew to a specific 
set of characteristics: “The person blessed (or cursed?) with ‘artistic 
temperament’ is always sensitive, usually introverted and self-centered, 
often passive, and sometimes so capable of abstracting himself mentally 
from the world around him that he appears absentminded or ‘possessed’” 
(5). And, again, Portrait, as well as other kunstlerromane, have artist 
heroes who neatly fit Beebe’s characterization. While this characterization 
may seem like a bit of ambiguous psychologizing – and Beebe, perhaps, 
acknowledges as much with the quotation marks around “artistic 
                                                 
6 In The Anatomy of Criticism, Northrop Frye calls the kunstlerroman “fictional autobiography” (307). 
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temperament” – it also had the perhaps unintended consequence of being 
the framing idea of the artist-hero genre.  
However, the bulk of Ivory Towers and Sacred Founts is Beebe’s 
formulation of a three-part pattern of the artist-hero’s identity. First, the 
artist hero is a “divided being, man and artist, a historical personage who 
merely serves as the medium through which the creative spirit manifests 
itself” (6). More specifically, the divided nature of the artist hero splits 
thus: “The man [the artist is almost always a man in these examples] seeks 
personal fulfillment in experience [the Sacred Fount], while the artist-self 
desires freedom from the demands of life [the Ivory Tower]” (13). The 
sacred fount is the artist hero’s intense desire for experience: “Because he 
feels more intensely than others, he is tempted to explore the extremes of 
experience” (67). The experience is often sexual, and in the artist-hero 
novel, sex and art seem to be a zero-sum game: a finite amount of creative 
energy means that energy invested in one is energy unavailable for the 
other. The artist must choose. The women – and, again, in Beebe’s 
analysis, most artists are men and their sexual interests are almost always 
women – are in an intellectual, emotional, or artistic sense “below” the 
artist. They lack the artists’ discerning, sensitive nature, and artists must 
reconcile the contrary pulls of sexual fulfillment and artistic creation. 
Against the sacred fount tradition, Beebe suggests the ivory tower 
tradition, in which the artist “resents his carnal appetites and natural 
instincts and yearns for release from human bondage. His Ivory Tower…is 
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often without windows; and if he looks out at all, it is not so much at the 
world as down upon it” (114). The ivory tower is the position separate 
from the world of physical desire, so much so that windows, potential 
vantage points of temptation and desire, are absent. It is in the ivory tower, 
Beebe says, that art is materially produced. The sacred fount/ivory tower 
distinction suggests several structural binaries: active/reflective, 
body/mind, natural/ideal. But Beebe prefers the religious: 
physical/spiritual. He says that “the artist of the Ivory Tower tradition 
seeks annihilation of the suffering, human self in order to free the creative 
spirit that represents the God in man” (171). The artist has abstracted 
himself from human desire and physical want, creating art almost 
indifferently. (One imagines Joyce’s artist/god, removed and paring his 
nails).     
Ivory Towers and Sacred Founts does extensive work in bringing 
together artist-hero novels under the umbrella of a single pattern – divided 
self, sacred fount, and the ivory tower. As a comparative study, it produces 
a set of qualities that very neatly (too neatly?) describes a great number of 
kunstlerromane. Beebe seems to acknowledge the “too neat” regularity of 
his analysis when he compares his work to Joseph Campbell’s The Hero 
with a Thousand Faces (1949): “Indeed, some readers may well feel that I 
have too fully illustrated the artist and his situation, for it is apparent that 
the artist-hero, like the hero with a thousand faces, is always the same man 
and the conflicts he faces are essentially the same conflicts” (299). Such 
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regular, standardized formulations make important connections of 
similarity, and Beebe’s wide-ranging analysis does this, and it remains 
influential. Kunstlerroman studies since Beebe have mostly followed his 
lead and done similar work, focusing on characterizations of what it means 
to be an artist of the sacred fount or ivory tower, or presenting the artist 
figure of the kunstlerroman as a proxy for the text’s author. In 2004, for 
example, volume 150 of Twentieth-Century Literary Criticism was largely 
given over to essays on kunstlerroman studies, and most of these essays 
focused on some aspect of the artist-hero’s characterization – what it 
means to be an artist or the artist’s role in a given culture – or else aligning 
the artist of the novel with the novel’s historical author. 
However, a genre rigorously defined through similarity overlooks 
important differences (like the differences Campbell and other monomyth 
writers are criticized for overlooking). While Sacred Founts and Ivory 
Towers ably groups artists by these general characteristics, it avoids the 
particular aesthetic observations and assertions of the individual work, the 
kunstlerroman itself. Beebe briefly acknowledges that kunstlerromane 
may be “exercises in criticism and esthetic theory” (299), but exploring 
these theories never becomes part of his project. The pursuit of this 
dissertation, then, diverges from other kunstlerroman studies by 
investigating an important subset of kunstlerromane, the modernist 
kunstlerromane, and reading them for the manifesto-like claims they 
inevitably present. These theoretical claims engage with various aesthetic 
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questions of the modernist moment. If, as Nichols says, over fifty aesthetic 
“isms” were invented (and he uses the word “invented”) from 1886-1924, 
then this suggests a moment of instability and change, or at least the 
potential to change; it suggests a moment rife with ideas for how that 
change should look, and a dissatisfaction for how it currently looks. 
Novels about art in this period would be ideal sites for such conversations 
to emerge.  
The Three Kunstlerromane: 
As noted above, the modernist kunstlerroman exists as a novel-manifesto 
because of its controlling trope and its historic moment, not because of its 
author’s stated purpose. However, the three kunstlerromane that I chose 
for this project were chosen, in part, because each of the authors has 
produced textual evidence of aesthetic positions. The works on aesthetics 
are supplemental, but they also serve as guideposts. Also, because the 
modernist period is a revolutionary period, the aesthetic ideas of the 
kunstlerromane address the kinds of foundational concepts that the 
manifestos of the period addressed. Both Joyce and Lewis have, of course, 
contributed non-fiction that engages these foundational concepts. And 
James has contributed prescient theoretical work that senses the imminent 
revolutionary shifts. I will, therefore, use some primary authorial 
assertions on art and the modernist moment, but will in no way try to fit 
perfectly the author’s kunstlerroman with the author’s written aesthetic 
ideas. Instead, I will trace the relationship between the aesthetic ideas of 
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the kunstlerromane with the stated aesthetic ideas of the authors without 
unreflexively conflating the two. 
The first kunstlerroman I investigate is Henry James’s The Tragic 
Muse (1890). In the closing decade of the nineteenth century, Henry James 
acknowledges an important shift in attitude toward English literature. In 
“The Art of Fiction” (1888), James says that English literature is 
becoming more openly discussed, more openly theorized, suggesting his 
sense of the coming profusion of “isms.” Two years after “The Art of 
Fiction,” in this burgeoning theoretical moment, James publishes The 
Tragic Muse, a kunstlerroman that promotes three aesthetic principles. 
First, it presents keen, discerning observation as an important aesthetic 
foundation. The artist, James says in “The Art of Fiction,” must be “one of 
the people on whom nothing is lost” (6). Second, the novel celebrates the 
acceptance of aesthetic experimentation. It reminds us that traditional 
artistic forms are always changing, and it encourages an openness to, or at 
least a willingness to listen to, more radical modernist invention.  If 
modernism is, in part, a revolutionary moment of experimentation and 
change, then one of the establishing preconditions for its prehistory would 
seem to be openness to such experimentation, a cultural willingness to 
consider, if not adopt, aesthetic change. Last, the novel admires but 
ultimately rejects, the late nineteenth-century’s attitude toward 
aestheticism. Muse presents the period’s aestheticism (personified in the 
form of the dandy Gabriel Nash) as formidable and insightful but suffering 
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from ennui. The novel replaces this bored aestheticism with an assertion of 
artistic action, presaging the modernist period’s emphasis on movement, 
progress, and the new. 
The second kunstlerroman is James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man (1916). Portrait presents an archetypal modern artist, 
Stephen Dedalus, working his way out of the fetters that prevent creativity 
and toward the freedom that both artistic creation and reception require. 
Art, like the creation of the artist, is a process, an essentially human 
process that has been blunted by social institutions and physical desire. 
Portrait’s aesthetic position is that stripping away social and material 
obstacles is necessary for engagement with our most human self, our 
aesthetic self. Engaging our natural inclination, the aesthetic inclination, is 
to engage the essence of humanity—Joyce’s uses the word “spirit.” His 
descriptions of the disembodied feel of art, its presence first and foremost 
in the imagination, suggests the deeply religious (spiritual) culture from 
which he comes, and the relationship that exists between religion and art. 
Portrait suggests that the point at which this seemingly disembodied, 
immaterial, imaginative, spiritual essence enters into culture is in myth 
and art. 
The final kunstlerroman is Wyndham Lewis’s The Revenge for 
Love (1937). Revenge presents an eclectic cast of characters around 
London’s artistic/leftist political scene in the period between the wars. A 
satirical novel, Revenge mainly targets the “salon reds,” the “bourgeois 
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bohemian” intellectuals who naively support a politics they don’t really 
understand and to which they can’t really relate. Revenge broadens its 
satire, though, critiquing the whole of English society. It’s a political 
novel, and the politics are foundational: it echoes the claims made by 
Hobbes and Rousseau, and concludes that all social formations create 
repression and distortions. Art is the site for resistance, where the 
individual can push back against social pressure and express him- or 
herself freely. 
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                                                                                          Chapter One 
                                   The Tragic Muse: Unfolding Modernism  
The Tragic Muse, published in book form in 1890, was a commercial and 
critical failure,7 and it continues to inspire little critical interest today. 
W.R. Macnaughton’s “In Defense of The Tragic Muse” (1985) 
acknowledges that Muse is quite likely “the novel by [James] least often 
read and least highly regarded” (5). Reasons for Muse’s poor reception 
and poor critical reputation are various: it’s too long (it’s James’s longest); 
it’s predictable; its un-Jamesian, a thematic and tonal outlier in James’s 
oeuvre; and its claims for artistic freedom are “self-indulgent” 
(Macnaughton 5). Such criticism, however, doesn’t engage the aesthetic 
arguments that the novel makes. Is it long? Sure. Predicable? Maybe. But 
to say that the novel is “un-Jamesian” is to submit to precisely the kind of 
reader-expectation bias noted above, the bias that E. D. Hirsh describes 
and that Jonathan Culler argues against. It may be unique in the James 
canon, but this is different from saying “un-Jamesian.” Furthermore, to 
say that claims for artistic freedom are self-indulgent is to ignore the 
reactionary response that much of the coming experimental modernist art 
endured as well as to ignore the censorship with which important 
modernist works soon had to contend. (Joyce’s struggles publishing 
Dubliners and Ulysses come to mind.). In light of these coming instances 
                                                 
7 After Muse had completed its serialization in the Atlantic, James’s publishers told him, presciently, that they 
doubted the book would sell. They offered him an advance of seventy pounds, not the two hundred fifty to 
which he had become accustomed (Edel 363).  
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of censorship, James’s claims for artistic freedom seem more prescient 
than self-indulgent. 
In the preface to the New York Edition of The Tragic Muse, James 
confesses that he can’t recall the origins of the novel or what prompted 
him to take up its themes. Yet he acknowledges a vague sense, a glimmer, 
that he must have intended to write about art: “To ‘do something about 
art’—art, that is, as a human complication and a social stumbling-block—
must have been for me early a good deal of the a nursed intention, the 
conflict between art and ‘the world’ striking me thus betimes as one of the 
half-dozen great primary motives” (3).  And while much of James’s 
connection to the modernist period emphasizes his later work, the interest 
he claims here suggests not only a theoretical exploration of art in “the 
world,” but also the deeply human importance that such a theme 
embraces: art in the world is one of the “great primary motives.” These 
aesthetic ambitions hint at the aesthetic theorizing to come. And if, as 
mentioned in the previous section, we consider modernism as a literary 
period with approximate beginning and end points, then Muse is of the 
moment that Nichols calls the “prehistory of the various modernisms,” 
what Kolkotroni et al. call the moment of “emergent inflexions of the 
new.” Although we consider modernism as a discrete period, periodization 
is always fluid. However, there is a sense suggested by the above texts, 
that the late nineteenth century was a transitional period; that this moment 
of “prehistory” and “emergence” was a liminal period, an elision into the 
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modernist period, into something “new.” Muse seems to anticipate the 
coming aesthetic revolution in three important ways: it prefigures the shift 
in emphasis from writer to reader by declaring the importance of astute 
observation; it welcomes aesthetic experimentation; and it rejects 
aestheticism, which it suggests is a passive theoretical position, in favor of 
more active theorizing. 
First is the conviction that all art requires astute awareness; the 
artist must be what James calls, in “The Art of Fiction” (1888) “one of the 
people on whom nothing is lost” (6). And while “The Art of Fiction” 
doesn’t say the reader, too, should try to be one of the people on whom 
nothing is lost, Muse certainly does. And in doing so, the novel blurs the 
reader/writer distinction and anticipates the coming emphasis on reader 
response8. Next, Muse advocates for the kind of experimentation that “The 
Art of Fiction” seems to sense is imminent. Muse, for instance, opens at an 
art exhibition, which is praised thus: “There was youth in the air, a 
multitudinous newness, for ever [sic] reviving, and the diffusion of a 
hundred talents, ingenuities, experiments” (20). The exhibition described 
is a late nineteenth century French exhibition, but the description would be 
equally apt for the 1913 Armory Show, in New York. Finally, Muse 
respectfully, even affectionately, puts to rest one of the prevailing 
                                                 
8 In Henry James’s Portrait of the Writer as Hero (1990) Sara Chapman makes a similar claim about James 
prefiguring the later emphasis on reader response. She argues that this is evidenced in James’s Prefaces to 
the New York Edition. During the process of re-reading the novels and writing the prefaces, James came to 
see “the collaborative role of the reader…the writer will require the reader to interpret the experience of the 
fiction for himself” (5). 
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aesthetic positions of the late nineteenth century: the role of the aesthete 
and the art-for-art’s sake. position Muse suggests that the more “passive” 
art-for-art’s-sake position isn’t tenable in the coming shift towards the 
more “active” work of aesthetic theorizing.  
But first, a note of caution. The suggestion that The Tragic Muse 
(or any Henry James novel, for that matter) is explicitly contributing to 
aesthetic theory might, at first, strike some as far-fetched, especially if one 
considers the word “idea” to be a reasonable synonym for “theory.” While 
James was responsible for much literary criticism outside of his fiction, 
there is a lingering suggestion that the fiction itself is a-theoretical, created 
by a painterly mind, painstakingly detailed but without larger “ideas.” This 
critique is given significant purchase in 1918, two years after James’s 
death, by, arguably, the early twentieth-century’s most influential critic. 
T.S Eliot famously characterized James as having “a mind so fine that no 
idea could violate it” (151). Taken out of context, Eliot’s characterization 
reads like a backhanded compliment at best, at worst an insult, the 
suggestion being that James wrote stylishly or elegantly but thoughtlessly. 
However, Eliot had something quite different in mind. His description of 
“ideas” is such that none of us would like to be caught dead with them. In 
his piece on James, Eliot more narrowly defines what he means by “idea”: 
“the political, the emotional idea, evading sensation and thought” (152). 
Eliot’s argument that contemporary ideas are removed from sensation 
echo his notion of the dissociation of sensibility, which he defines later in 
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“The Metaphysical Poets” (1921). There he argues that, regarding some of 
England’s most celebrated poets, “the masters of diction” have a “dazzling 
disregard of the soul” (66). In both the James piece and the metaphysical 
poetry piece, Eliot contends that ideas are fragmented, and as bits of 
ratiocination without feeling or soul, they remain something other than 
fully developed human thinking. And along with the lack of feeling or 
soul, “ideas” also evade “thought,” which suggests that the knowledge 
inhering in these fragmented ideas lacks the kind of intellectual rigor and 
continuity, the comprehensive reflection that, for Eliot, a more complete 
concept would provide9. James, of course, was not a poet. But the 
similarity between the dissociation of sensibility and Eliot’s description of 
James’s lack of “ideas” indicates that, for Eliot, James resists the 
fragmented ideas of his contemporaries.  
However, crediting James with avoiding “bad” fragmented ideas is 
not the same as saying he trucked in “good,” comprehensive ones. But 
Eliot’s strongest praise of James does suggest that Eliot saw in James’s 
novels the kind of comprehensive thinking that he saw in the metaphysical 
poets. James’s novels, he says, don’t present a character or group of 
characters so much as they present “a situation, a relation, an atmosphere” 
(151). This kind of totalizing language suggests a similarity between the 
comprehensive conceits of the Metaphysical poets and the novels of 
                                                 
9 G.K. Chesterton, Eliot claims in the James essay, was exemplary in his production of these kinds of fragmented 
ideas: “Mr. Chesterton’s brain swarms with ideas,” Eliot writes. “I see no evidence that it thinks” (152). 
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James. Eliot says, “The real hero, in any of James’s stories, is a social 
entity of which men and women are constituents” (151). James’s novels 
are not “about” heroes, Eliot claims. James’s stories present social 
relations, the rules, norms, and traditions that inform and are informed by 
his characters. (Art, of course, is the social entity-hero of The Tragic 
Muse.) What made the Metaphysical poets great, Eliot says, was their 
ability to recognize connections, or wholes: “the ordinary man’s 
experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary… [He] falls in love, or reads 
Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to do with each other, or 
with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the mind of the 
poet these experiences are always forming new wholes” (64). If James’s 
great talent was for “social entities,” then it, too, must have been a talent 
for “forming new wholes.”10 The implication seems inescapable: James 
didn’t have “a mind so fine that no idea [or theory] could violate it”; he 
had a mind so fine that only the best (most complete) ideas – as defined by 
Eliot – could inhabit it. And if, in fact, Eliot did see these relations, 
atmospheres, and social entities in James’s novels as corresponding to the 
conceits of the Metaphysical poets, then Eliot might be suggesting that 
James was a happy accident, a pleasant aberration, a return to a time when 
thought and sensibility were united.  
                                                 
10 Eliot’s discussion of the relationship between fragments and wholes prefigures Heidegger’s later discussion 
(mentioned earlier in this piece) of a hermeneutic circle. Indeed, the relationship between fragments and 
wholes is a consistent theme of modernity and post-modernity—Marxist ideas of totality and post-
structuralist ideas of fragmentation, for example. Critical theory in modernity seems to be a matter of how 
subjects position themselves in identifying and re-defining fragments and wholes.  
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James, then, is not a figure for whom aesthetic theory would be 
anathema; indeed, he’s a writer who sees such theorizing as essential for 
literary development. His reviews of other literary works often make such 
literary claims. In his assessment of Flaubert, for instance, James argues 
that the writer “must be present in his work like God in Creation, invisible 
and almighty, everywhere felt but nowhere seen,” an image later echoed 
by Joyce (Chapman 2). And in “Henry James and the Invention of Novel 
Theory” (1998), Dorothy Hale says that “Henry James’s literary critical 
essays, especially the Prefaces that he wrote for the New York Edition of 
his fiction (1905-7), have generally been regarded as the foundational 
documents for Anglo-American novel theory” (79). But the prefaces, 
reviews, and essays are not fiction, and James’s aesthetic theories have 
been located outside the fiction. Indeed, according to Hale, James’s 
theoretical work has been criticized for being strictly formal, that “his 
study of fictional technique is embedded in a larger aesthetic theory that 
values artistic form to the exclusion of other sorts of meaning” (80). 
James’s theoretical position, Hale says, is that life is limitless relations; the 
novel circumscribes an arbitrary boundary on those relations, puts a frame, 
as it were, about some section of life (80). The implication is that the 
novel is detailed, keenly observed reportage. It is not a site for theory, but 
merely canny observation. Hale allows that James “sometimes describes 
novel writing as a process of self-expression and other times as a process 
of reporting” (85). However, the self-expression often feels more like 
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empathy, not the expression of the artist but the artist penetrating an 
object. This understanding of James’s insistence of form over meaning, of 
canny empathy, can lead to a reading bias against aesthetic declarations in 
James. The Tragic Muse, however, as noted above, is an art object about 
art, written at the beginning of a revolutionary explosion of aesthetic 
theorizing, and it can’t help but make aesthetic claims. The “other sorts of 
meaning” that Hale says are absent form James’s non-fiction studies of 
fictional technique emerge in his novel-manifesto.  
Aesthetic theorizing and the people on whom nothing is lost 
In “The Art of Fiction” (1888), Henry James’s essay promoting artistic 
freedom, James acknowledges that “only a short time ago it might have 
been supposed that the English novel was not what the French would call 
discutable. It had no air of having a theory, a conviction, a consciousness 
of itself behind it—of being the expression of an artistic faith, the result of 
choice and comparison” (1). James recognizes here a new emerging 
aesthetic sensibility regarding the English novel, a theoretical sensibility. 
There is always, he says, a “latent core of conviction” in any work of art, 
but the new moment is bringing this latent core to the surface, and 
theoretical ideas are more openly discussed (1). For James, theorizing 
art—recognizing and exploring the “conviction” and “consciousness,” 
making theory explicit—has recognizable consequences for the art of the 
moment: 
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[T]he era of discussion would appear to have been to a certain extent 
opened. Art lives upon discussion, upon experiment, upon curiosity, upon 
variety of attempt, upon the exchange of views and the comparison of 
standpoints; and there is a presumption that those times when no one has 
anything particular to say about it, and has no reason to give for practice 
or preference, though they may be times of genius, are not times of 
development, are times possibly even, a little, of dullness. (1)   
The nascent theorizing of this emerging modernist moment will re-
animate art, according to James, because such theoretical discussion is 
essential to the very life of art. Whatever else it may be, art is 
fundamentally another voice in ongoing social conversation. When these 
conversations about art become more prominent, the art itself must surely 
become richer. James recognizes that a new period of development and 
more innovative art has begun, and the increase of active aesthetic 
theorizing is instrumental for, and essential to, the discourse of aesthetic 
innovation. 
This kind of communal, discursive thinking about art might seem 
conventional today, but it was by no means conventional in 1888. Michael 
Inwood’s Introduction to Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics 
(2004), for example, argues that Hegel, along with other nineteenth-
century German aesthetic theorists, felt German art could not rise to the 
level of classical art precisely because of the intense critical discussions in 
early nineteenth-century Germany: “Reflective thought is inimical to 
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artistic creation and impairs the art into which it intrudes. And Hegel’s age 
was above all an age of criticism and of reflective thought about art” (xi). 
For Hegel, Inwood says, ideas were the combination of concepts and 
reality. The soul (concept) and the body (reality), for example, made man 
(the idea). The work of art, too, is an idea. It is the combination of a 
concept and materiality (paint and canvas, for example). The problem for 
art, according to Hegel, is that it declines as a mode of ideas when, say, 
philosophy or theory, more direct modes of expressing ideas, ascend. 
While “The Art of Fiction” clearly claims, as opposed to Hegel, that art 
improves when ideas of art flourish, James may very well have felt that 
the proper site for these ideas was the philosophical treatise, the manifesto, 
not the novel. However, in this emerging, revolutionary moment of new 
theoretical discussion, at the same time he was valorizing aesthetic theory, 
James was serializing The Tragic Muse, a kunstlerroman with three artists 
at its center. Both the essay on art and novel are participating in the 
discourse of this newly opened era of aesthetic discussion. 
The Tragic Muse opens at a French art exhibition, and it’s 
significant that in an artist’s novel, this one begins with artists as viewers. 
The opening moment is observational, not creative. And it’s here that 
James’s foremost aesthetic injunction is expressed: the artist needs to be 
one of the people on whom nothing is lost. We are introduced to the 
novel’s three artists: the budding painter, Nick Dormer (his name suggests 
the sleeping artist who needs to awaken); the writer/dandy, Gabriel Nash; 
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and Miriam Rooth, the budding actress and tragic muse of the novel’s title. 
The novel’s introduction to the three artists, however, is not as artists at 
work, but artists as readers or audience. And, in fact, at this opening 
moment, none of the three is a working artist: Nick and Miriam are 
aspirants, and Nash is a “retired” writer of one novel who is now 
determined to live his life as a dandy and flaneur. 
However, the three are not presented as mere observers at an 
exhibition: they are astute observers. The contrast between the discerning 
and the unobservant is made early when Nick takes his youngest sister, 
Biddy, to see the art more closely. His disapproving mother, Lady Agnes, 
watches Nick walk away until “she lost sight of him; he wandered behind 
things, looking at them all round” (18). This willingness to observe details 
from all perspectives separates Nick from his disinterested mother—not 
only does she lose sight of him, but she also never “sees” the objects about 
her, dismissing the art objects as so many “horrors” (15). Nick’s 
appreciation for careful analysis, which he tries to impress on Biddy, 
marks him as one of the people on whom nothing is lost. And this is the 
case, too, of the retired author Gabriel Nash. While taking his observant 
turn around the exhibition with Biddy, Nick encounters Nash, a former 
schoolmate from Oxford. The first description of Nash comes from the 
perspective of Biddy—who, we’re told, is “quick,” which is to say she 
perceives quickly, and who later makes her own attempts at sculpting—
and it’s Nash’s manner of speech that Biddy first notes: “[His manner of 
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speaking] had in truth a conspicuous and aggressive perfection, and Biddy 
was sure no mere learner would have ventured to play such tricks with the 
tongue. He seemed to draw rich effects and wandering airs from it—to 
modulate and manipulate it as he would have done a musical instrument” 
(21).  Nash’s very speech is a work of art, and it serves to help construct 
his identity as a self-declared work of art. Also, the precision with which 
Nash speaks mirrors the precision with which he observes. Throughout the 
novel, he is a canny judge of character, art, and circumstance. He is the 
linchpin between the novel’s two budding artists, Nick and Miriam Rooth. 
Miriam, along with her mother, is with Nash at this initial reunion with 
Nick, but she isn’t properly introduced to Nick or Biddy because she has 
drifted toward a painting. Biddy watches her as Nick and Nash get 
reacquainted. Along with signs of Miriam’s reduced social standing, 
Biddy notices that Miriam has “largely-gazing eyes” (21). These are not 
large eyes that gaze, but instead voracious eyes that work to take in 
perhaps more than the eye can hold. If Miriam isn’t yet one of the people 
on whom nothing is lost, these largely gazing eyes suggest that she will 
work tirelessly to become one. (And she does.) This opening scene 
introduces the reader not only to the three artists at the novel’s center, but 
to their shared appreciation for the importance of close, detailed 
observation. 
That these three observant artists should be spectators at an 
exhibition emphasizes Muse’s valuation of discernment, but their being in 
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France is significant, too, to the observational quality of the novel. In 
Martin Jay’s Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-
Century French Thought (1993), Jay presents this period in French art as 
one of shifting emphasis on how art is observed. Impressionists, for 
example, “left their work seemingly unfinished, their brush strokes still 
evident, the contours of their forms blurred, their colors often juxtaposed 
rather than smoothly blended” (154). Clear, distinct lines were less 
important to the impressionists than was color. This contrasts not only 
with the generation of artists who preceded them, but also with much of 
the history of Western art. Post impressionists followed hard on the heels 
of impressionists. Pointillists and symbolists, for example, retained clarity 
in their lines (and points) and re-emphasized the object. Jay argues that 
post impressionists, such as Cezanne, rejected the impressionist “naïve 
belief in unmediated perception, seeking instead to rediscover the objects 
they [impressionists] had dissolved” (158). What’s at stake here is the 
value of one’s perception: for the impressionists, perception is primary; 
for the post-impressionists, the relationship between perception and object 
is primary11.  
The aesthetic function of perception that James addresses in “The 
Art of Fiction,” and that scholars like Dorothy Hale say are present in the 
Prefaces, also are prominent in The Tragic Muse, which proves a rich vein 
                                                 
11 This is a question at least as old as Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781): does subjective experience provide 
access to the things in themselves, or is subjective experience only influenced by them and, thus, 
“separate”? 
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for mining James’s ideas of aesthetic perception. The impressionist/post-
impressionist divide, which I’ve simplified here, translates to the novel 
thus: Is novel writing self-expression or reporting? What is the 
relationship between artists’ perceptions and the world around them? Is 
the novel authorial impressions or authorial observations? For Muse, the 
answer seems to be an insistence on observation, on empiricism. Like the 
post-impressionist insistence that objective reality guides perception, so 
the novelist concedes that individual perceptions are circumscribed. One’s 
perception of people, events, objects, and concepts should be an active 
engagement, a discovery more than a feeling. This isn’t quite the same as 
saying painting, or a novel, should aspire to the kind of verisimilitude that 
predominated in the nineteenth century. Rather, it’s an assertion of 
observational engagement. That nothing is lost on the artist and reader 
suggests a penetrating observation, an understanding that transcends the 
obvious and superficial. The modernist painting and literature to come—
cubism or stream-of-conscious technique, say—might be characterized in 
the same way: they are more penetrating, detailed engagements with the 
world rather than mere impressions of the world.  
In “Visual Art Devices and Parallels in the Fiction of Henry 
James” (1961), Viola Hopkins makes a similar claim. Descriptions in 
James, she says, often mirror the way we might analyze a painting. We 
begin globally, then focus on details, and then on the emotions the work 
may evoke. It is a “progression from description to evocation and 
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symbolization” (566). Muse’s characterizations are often structured this 
way, and the opening paragraph is an excellent example. It begins thus: 
“The people of France have made it no secret that those of England as a 
general thing are to their perception an inexpressive and speechless race, 
perpendicular and unsociable, unaddicted to enriching any bareness of 
contact with verbal or other embroidery” (13). The description begins with 
an account of one nation’s (race’s) generalized account of another. The 
paragraph narrows its scope to inside of the exhibition, and then to the 
four English figures who seem to exemplify this French stereotype: Nick, 
his two sisters, and his mother. It’s not merely a shift from global 
observation to detailed analysis; it’s also the evocation of emotional 
response. The English in general, and Nick’s family in particular, have the 
aura of “security and persistence…which excites, according to individual 
susceptibility, the ire or the admiration of foreign communities” (13). Not 
only does this opening paragraph exemplify Hopkins’s idea that James 
often describes in the manner that one reads a painting, but the paragraph 
itself repeatedly invokes readerly concepts: the French “perception,” the 
salon’s “spirit of observation,” the general “solicitation of the eye.” The 
reader takes in the scene the way she would a painting, while the scene 
itself declares the importance of being a reader.    
While Muse’s adherence to penetrating the superficial may 
intimate the modernism to come, the novel’s firm conviction in empirical 
reliability—the importance of being one of the people on whom nothing is 
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lost—also distances it from the modernists to come and places it in the 
more familiar position of nineteenth-century realism. Where the coming 
modernism became suspicious of sensual perception, such perception 
grounds Muse. Jay quotes British art historian T.J. Clark’s assertion that 
the modernist aesthetic was very much about doubting its own ability to 
“see” the world: “Doubts about vision became doubts about almost 
everything involved in the act of painting; and in time the uncertainty 
became a value in its own right: we could say it became an aesthetic” 
(159). The aesthetic to which Clark is referring is, according to Jay, “what 
we call modernism” (159). Suspicions about our ability to discover truth, 
as well as suspicions about truth itself, are common themes in the 
modernist aesthetic. On the threshold of this coming skepticism about the 
value or validity of what can be “seen,” Muse retains the empiricist’s 
insistence on unmediated subjective truth that is associated with realism. 
In her essay on The Bostonians—"Realism, Culture, and the Place of the 
Literary: Henry James and The Bostonians” (1998)—Sara Blair says that 
“The Bostonians, like James’s writings of the 1880’s at large, intently 
engages American literary realism” (151-2). Blair argues that while James 
did not subscribe to the progressive project that American realists like 
William Dean Howells pursued, the James of the 1880s did see himself as 
a “realist historian” (154), suggesting the sense of truth that James felt 
realism produced12. In describing James’s characters, Eliot says that they 
                                                 
12 Blair says that James’s “novels and criticism throughout the 1880s and early 1890s pointedly but unevenly 
consider the role literature will play as a cultural force in this ‘age of new revelations’” (154). Again, 
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are “[d]one in a clean, flat drawing, each is extracted out of a reality of its 
own, substantial enough; everything given is true for that individual” 
(151). This kind of scrupulous adherence to a nineteenth-century notion of 
empiricism, which closely ties realism with truth, is a notion that 
modernism will soon challenge. However, the discipline required to 
excavate this truth hints at the coming skepticism. Neither James nor 
future modernists trust the surface, and reality in Muse is not an obvious 
surface perception. It requires penetrating attention to detail. Jay says that 
“the Naturalists [of this period] relied on a vision that privileged the raw 
description of surface appearances over the more penetrating gaze 
revealing deep structures preferred by Realists” (173). Muse’s Realism 
requires penetrating surface appearances to get at the real. Poised in this 
way, penetrating empiricism casts a modernist doubt on surface 
appearances, but such doubt falls short of the doubt that would be 
modernism’s more intractable skepticism of empiricism itself. 
In Muse, the three artists share this ability to penetrate superficial 
surfaces. Nick Dormer is caught between a practical, remunerative 
position in politics and a less practical, less remunerative career as an 
artist. The social forces pushing him into politics are almost comically 
manifold: His well-born but poor family is financially relying on him; his 
intended, Julia Dallow, is rich and desperately wants him to run for a seat 
                                                 
“revelation” suggests a truth that is hidden from superficial observation, yet still accessible, and his sense 
of the age of new revelation indicates, again, James’s sense of being on the threshold of something starkly 
new. 
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in her district (a run she will finance); his deceased father (who was a 
politician) has a wealthy friend, Mr. Carteret, who has promised Nick a 
sizable inheritance if Nick takes a job in politics; and Nick has an easy, 
almost uncanny knack for the political game. But, alas, his real desire is to 
be an artist. It’s noteworthy that his first pushback against this array of 
forces pulling him toward politics is that it’s superficial humbug. Speaking 
to his patron/girlfriend, Julia, Nick rejects the cliched boilerplate of the 
hustings, a language, he ruefully acknowledges, he can speak fluently: 
“[A]nd that’s what I’m ashamed of. I’ve got the cursed humbugging trick 
of it. I speak it beautifully…It has nothing to do with the truth or the 
search for it; nothing to do with intelligence, or candour, or honour. It’s an 
appeal to everything that for one’s self one despises…to stupidity, to 
ignorance, to density, to the love of names and phrases, the love of hollow, 
idiotic words, of shutting the eyes tight and making noise” (54). Nick’s 
negative description of political language implies his understanding of 
what the proper strategy for pursuing truth would look like: it would 
require intelligence and candor and honor, of penetrating beneath the 
superficial. Truth is not found on the surface. And his closing metaphor is 
a visual one: if humbug requires closed eyes, then the truth requires open 
ones. 
Likewise, the novel’s other two artists, Gabriel Nash and Miriam 
Rooth, are also keenly observant, Nash effortlessly so and Miriam 
doggedly so. When Nash is first reunited with Nick at the French art 
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exhibit, without any prompting from Nick at all, Nash intuits his friend’s 
career predicament and offers his service: “Ah, it was high time I should 
meet you—I see. I’ve an idea you need me” (22). The visual metaphor in 
the middle of these sentences emphasizes Nash’s almost preternatural 
ability to penetrate the surface. He sees (understands) without being 
shown. In a crowded, busy exhibition, without any prompting from Nick, 
Nash intuits his friend’s distress. Indeed, Nick’s reply—“Upon my word I 
think I do” (22)—suggests Nash knew Nick’s need before Nick did. And 
this is a large part of Nash’s characterization throughout the novel. His 
predictions about future events are almost unfailingly accurate, and he’s 
by far the novel’s most astute character. Miriam Rooth, too, is one of the 
people on whom nothing is lost, but hers is a hard-earned insight (an 
important virtue in Muse). She first speaks in the novel at a drawing-room 
recitation for the renowned French stage actress Madame Carre. Miriam 
hopes to get an assessment from Madame Carre and possibly be taken on 
as an acting student. Miriam has had little formal training, and the 
recitation goes poorly. Still, in this early moment in the novel, despite 
being the youngest and most vulnerable person in the room, Miriam shows 
flashes of cutting directness. When Madame Carre’s opinions vacillate, 
Miriam intuits the truth: “You think me actually pretty bad, don’t you?” 
(66). And when Madame Carre, who is French, advises Miriam that she 
would do better with an English-speaking teacher, Miriam says, “Madame 
Carre listens to me with adorable patience, and then sends me about my 
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business—ah in the prettiest way in the world” (67). Miriam sees through 
the courtesies and niceties, despite what must be an overwhelming urge to 
be convinced that she does have talent. She is positioned perfectly to be 
self-deluded but refuses. Instead, she commits herself to work tirelessly, 
which ultimately pays off: she masters being one of the people on whom 
nothing is lost, and she becomes a widely praised actress.      
Miriam’s success suggests that the skill of observational acuity is 
not only for the elect who are born to it (Nash, for instance), but for any 
who are willing to work at it. James expresses this belief in “The Art of 
Fiction,” in which he proposes that art is not a product genius so much as 
it is a product of diligence. “The Art of Fiction” is structured as a response 
to an earlier essay by the British critic Walter Besant. Besant’s is a more 
prescriptive essay, setting out what he feels novels ought to do. One 
prescription, a cliché today, is that writers of fiction should write what 
they know, and what they know is a matter of experience. For example, a 
young country woman, Besant says, should avoid writing about “garrison 
life” (5), presumably because she has no experience with it. James rejects 
this reasoning, arguing for one’s imagination as part of one’s experience: 
“The young lady living in a village has only to be a damsel upon whom 
nothing is lost to make it quite unfair (as it seems to me) to declare to her 
that she shall have nothing to say about the military” (5). James’s trust in 
keen, penetrating observation can be seen in much of his fiction, and this 
character trait is repeatedly demonstrated by Nick, Miriam, and Gabriel 
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Nash throughout The Tragic Muse. And as we see in Miriam, oftentimes 
what perfecting a skill like this requires is merely effort. Anyone, or 
almost anyone it seems, can improve his or her ability to be one of the 
people on whom nothing is lost. There is a sense of universalism in Muse, 
a democratic aesthetic sense. If the artist’s greatest advantage is to be one 
of the people on whom nothing is lost, and one can work to be one of 
those people, then the artist is neither an exceptional genius, in the 
romantic sense, nor a denizen of the ivory tower or sacred fount, but 
merely one who is willing to roll up his or her sleeves and get to work.  
Invention and Experimentation 
In conventional periodization, Henry James will sometimes be paired with 
a figure like Thomas Hardy as canonical transitional figures, each with 
one foot in nineteenth-century realism and one in modernism. In 
“Modernism and the Issue of Periodization,” Leonard Orr notes H.M. 
Dalesky’s strategy for working with such figures. He looks for “affinities 
between them and the temporally undoubted modernists such as Joyce, 
Conrad, and D.H. Lawrence” (4). The strategy is to comparatively identify 
those moments when a James or Hardy betrays modernist impulses. Muse 
certainly doesn’t exhibit modernist impulses, the kind of aesthetic 
experimentation and innovation that has come to signify much of the 
modernist period; however, James’s later novels, notably The Wings of the 
Dove (1902), do share affinities with modernist texts, the kinds of 
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affinities mentioned in Orr13. Hugh Kenner, for example, begins The 
Pound Era (1971), his exploration of the modernist era, with a brief 
examination of the Jamesian style’s influence on Pound and the Moderns. 
More than just a writer whom modernists like Pound admired, James 
produced a prose style suggestive of the coming imagism in poetry, with 
its emphasis on the object. Kenner says that “James made not stories but 
‘things,’ and did not write them but ‘did’ them” (27). He argues, for 
instance, that James’s sentence construction, especially the sentences of 
the later James, “vanquished the linear rigor of linked sentences” (5). 
Pound, too, according to Kenner, claims that James talked much the way 
he wrote, the lengthy sentences “deferring and deferring climax” (11), 
reaching an unexpected conclusion that often, to use Pound’s metaphor, 
ratcheted up slowly only to come down like “a pile driver” (12).  His 
unique style of sentence construction was, in a sense, a kind of prose 
prelude to poetic imagism. Referring to Eliot’s famous observation about 
James and ideas, Kenner says, “The mind unviolated by an idea holds 
converse with particulars” (18). This, of course, refers to James’s 
emphasis on observation and detail, his unwavering belief in getting to the 
essence of the thing. 
                                                 
13 In “James’s Elusive Wings” (1998), William Stowe calls The Wings of the Dove “a direct progenitor of literary 
modernism and postmodernism, providing a preview of the…willful obscurity of the modernists” (188). 
Stowe says of Wings that the “language is notoriously difficult, sometimes even undecidably obscure; 
sentences wind interminably on, pronouns lack definite antecedents” (188).  
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The often lengthy Jamesian sentences may, at first, seem contrary 
to the tenets of imagism, which promoted spare description, and contrary 
to the Pound-influenced prose of, say, Hemingway, who produced clipped, 
subject-verb sentences. Yet Imagism wasn’t simply a matter of length 
(shorter); it was an assertion of things (nouns). In “A Retrospect” (1918), 
Ezra Pound’s brief treatise on his hopes for twentieth-century poetry, 
Pound’s first monition is that poets present a “[d]irect treatment of the 
‘thing’ whether subjective or objective” (810). In the lengthy sentences of 
James, we often get the full examination of one thing. Such detailed 
analysis doesn’t merely describe the object; it discovers it: “James’s effort 
to articulate such matters within the shape of the formal English sentence 
yielded the famous late style, where the subject and verb are ‘there’ but 
don’t carry the burden of what is said” (Kenner16). This diffusion of 
meaning throughout the sentence, beyond the subject-verb relationship, is 
a way of emphasizing other phrases or clauses in the sentence, which 
Kenner likens to the effect of imagism. These sentences don’t embellish so 
much as observe. They don’t add imaginative flourish but delineate 
inconspicuous detail, overlooked perspectives. 
This style of sentence construction is of a piece with some of 
modernism’s efforts to present multiple perspectives. Cubism, for 
example, is sometimes characterized as a simultaneous presentation of 
multiple perspectives. James’s sentence construction presents a similar 
multi-perspective approach. This isn’t to say that James was a “literary 
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cubist” or even a proto-imagist, sharing in the theories of Pound and 
Gertrude Stein; rather, it’s that James was willing to push formal 
boundaries, to practice the values of experimentation that he preached in 
“The Art of Fiction” and elsewhere, willing to experiment with narrative 
devices even at a later stage in his career14. Muse, of course, is an earlier 
novel, a more conventional novel, but even here one finds instances of the 
packed, multi-perspective sentences more common to later James. The 
opening sentence of Muse, for example, which was noted above for its 
emphasis on reading and observation (the narrator’s observation of the 
French observation of the English), serves as an example: “The people of 
France have made it no secret that those of England, as a general thing, are 
to their perception an inexpressive and speechless race, perpendicular and 
unsociable, unaddicted to enriching any bareness of contact with verbal or 
other embroidery” (13). Instead of simple subject-verb assertions, James 
packs the sentence with multiple perspectives and nine nouns, as though 
the narrator were observing the stolid English through a French lens. It’s a 
sentence not so much about the English or the French as it is about 
perceptions. 
Muse’s promotion of experimental art, though, lies not so much in 
its form but in its attitude toward experimentation. In “The Art of Fiction,” 
James explicitly welcomes increased aesthetic theorizing and 
experimentation, and Muse promotes having readers who are open to, and 
                                                 
14 James was just shy of sixty when The Wings of the Dove was published. 
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supportive of, such experimentation. It’s the novel that defends the coming 
aesthetic experimentation as though it anticipated the reactionary 
backlash. The opening of the novel, as noted above, presents two 
untrained, marginalized artists meeting at an exhibition that has 
scandalized the old guard. In Nick’s one effort to convey to Lady Agnes 
(an admirer of “safer,” more traditional art) his interest in the exhibition 
and its artists, he says, “They try everything, they feel everything…Some 
of them can only taper fort, stand on their heads, turn somersault or 
commit deeds of violence to make people notice them…But I don’t know; 
today I’m in an appreciative mood—I feel indulgent even to them” (17). 
Nick admires the experimental spirt. He concedes that much of the 
experimentation fails, that many of the artists are merely trying to gain 
attention, but it’s the willingness to try something new that has value. It’s 
noteworthy that his indulgence extends even to those whose efforts at 
originality are less inspired and more a strategic device for notice. This 
suggests that motivations matter less than the work. Nick ends his defense 
to Lady Agnes by saying that the artists of the exhibition give him the 
impression of “eager observation” (17). His closing remark, again, makes 
the reader/viewer central to the work itself and implicitly tasks all readers 
to show the same indulgence that he shows.  
So while Muse’s style will never be confused with the kind of 
revolutionary experimentation seen in some strands of modernism, or even 
in a novel like The Wings of the Dove, James was quite accepting of the 
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more daring experimentation he saw around him. It supported his 
conviction that art needs experimentation to develop.  In 1884, James had 
been spending time with a small group of writers at the home of Alphonse 
Daudet, in Paris. In a letter to William Dean Howells, James says, “I have 
been seeing something of Daudet, Goncourt and Zola, and there is nothing 
more interesting to me now than the effort and experiment of this little 
group, with its truly infernal intelligence of art, form, manner – its intense 
artistic life. They do the only kind of work, today, that I respect; and in 
spite of their ferocious pessimism and their handling of unclean things, 
they are at least serious and honest” (28). If we compare James’s 
observation here to Nick’s first pushback against a career in politics, in 
Muse, we can see some interesting connections. In his outburst, Nick 
argues that politics has nothing to do with “intelligence, candor, or honor” 
(54). These virtues can, however, be found in his desired career, that of an 
artist, and it appears that James finds these exact virtues in these 
experimental French artists: they have “infernal intelligence,” are 
“honest,” and the work is “respected.” Here is James’s candid statement 
for what he feels is important in art: openness to the experimental and 
doing the work honestly. He may not always like what it produces—
perhaps too much pessimism, too many “unclean things”—but this coterie 
of French writers’ willingness to honestly experiment is itself a value, the 
same value expressed in Muse. 
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At the French art exhibition in the opening of Muse, Nick is 
moved, not so much by the achievements of the new art, but by the artists’ 
willingness to try new things. Nick is at the art exhibition with his mother 
and two sisters, and a tender tension arises between his mother, the 
disapproving Lady Agnes, and the inspired Nick. For her the exhibition is 
a failure, a gallery of poor taste, representations of “the murders, the 
tortures, all kinds of disease and indecency” (17). Nick lovingly 
condescends to what he sees as his mother’s old-fashioned, circumscribed 
taste, but he also attempts to make her understand what it is about the art 
that invigorates him: the work, he says, is “full of ideas, full of 
refinements; it gives one such an impression of the artistic experience. 
They try everything, they feel everything” (17). Nick doesn’t defend the 
art so much as the artists’ experimentation—they try everything. He later 
concedes that some of the artists try, in fact, too hard; much of the effort is 
simply to draw attention to itself. But he allows that this is a consequence 
of so many artists vying to be seen. What matters, for him, is the 
willingness to experiment. And while Muse never explicitly engages with 
the exhibition’s artistic ideas—we never get an ekphrastic description of 
any of the exhibition’s paintings or sculpture—the amenable attitude that 
the novel takes toward the “new” expresses an open receptivity to artistic 
experimentation. And Nick’s equally enthusiastic praise of the artists’ 
“ideas” suggests an eagerness to engage aesthetic ideas, as one might in, 
say, a manifesto. 
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The novel’s two beginners, Nick and Miriam Rooth, exemplify 
Muse’s support of the new and experimental. The two share a strong 
artistic desire, but they’re also both non-traditional artists. Neither has 
demonstrated ability in any kind of standardized, institutional way. They 
are outsiders, untrained, and non-traditional aspirants. Nick’s and 
Miriam’s entries into art require the same leap of faith that the later 
modernist experimentation would require. Nick’s natural talent may, in 
fact, be the political stump, not art. Similarly, the brash, low-born Miriam 
doesn’t have traditional artistic or educational pedigree, and her being at 
least half Jewish further distances her from the established cultural 
environment (the English theater) that she wants to enter. Neither Nick nor 
Miriam has been groomed or trained to perpetuate English art and theater. 
They are outsiders certain to bring the kinds of changes to their crafts that 
conservative old guards like Lady Agnes would most likely reject. While 
Nick and his younger sister, Biddy, take a turn around the exhibition, he 
reminds her that “[a]ll art is one…any spark that’s struck in any province, 
is of use and of suggestion to all the others” (17). This democratic view of 
art, while not proclaiming all art “good” or “worthwhile,” does insist that 
all art is welcome, that all ideas should be tried, if for no other reason than 
it supplies potential inspiration for something else. It implies an 
acceptance of new artists like Miriam, and it acknowledges the influence 
that culture has on all art. Nick’s vocational choice is between art and 
politics, and when his choice is ultimately made (art), he has chosen art 
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largely because it is thoughtful and honest, experimental and new. Politics 
in the novel, even progressive politics, remains boilerplate and cliché. 
Muse gives very little evidence of what directions experimental, 
innovative literature ought to take, but it does suggest a methodology for 
getting there.  
The Tragic Muse suggests that the determinative method for 
creating thoughtful, honest, innovative art is effort and perseverance. Art 
is hard work. Muse consistently presents artistic achievement as the 
product of hard work. Art is not so much inspiration and passion as it is 
dogged, persistent effort. (Trying to be a person on whom nothing is lost, 
after all, seems an exhausting task.) A week before writing the letter to 
Howells praising the honest experimentation of Daudet’s group, James 
wrote to Atlantic Monthly editor Thomas Baily Aldrich about the same 
group: “The torment of style, the high standard of it, the effort to say 
something perfectly in a language in which everything has been said and 
re-said—so that there are certain things, certain cases, which can never 
again be attempted—all this seems to me to be wearing them all out, so 
that they have the look of galley-slaves tied to a ball and chain, rather than 
of happy producers” (26). The struggle for these writers reflects the 
unavoidable daily grind that goes into their work. But we also know how 
much James admired this group. Again, his admiration was for their 
inventiveness, their honesty, their willingness to experiment—all qualities 
of method, all qualities requiring hard work. Now, there’s nothing tragic 
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about the The Tragic Muse—Leon Edel calls it “a large cheerful mural of 
English life and art” (352). And never are the artists in Muse reduced to 
looking like tortured galley slaves. However, we do see in Muse hard-
working artists explicitly juxtaposed with less rigorous artists, and quality 
is always determined by making the choice of doggedly hard work. 
Nowhere in Muse is this more evident than in the character of 
Miriam Rooth. As previously noted, Miriam is an untrained, unschooled 
ingenue whose first “audition,” with the French actress Madame Carre, 
goes horribly wrong. However, she greets this initial failure with 
redoubled determination. She doesn’t secure Madame Carre as a teacher, 
at first, but she does get the English critic and statesman Peter 
Sherringham to tutor her. Her second drawing room performance, at 
Sherringham’s home, goes as badly as the first. Still, she persists. Miriam 
repeatedly shows up at Madame Carre’s home, unannounced, just to listen 
to Madame Carre recite to her: “If she doesn’t succeed,” Madame Carre 
says, “it won’t be for want of knowing how to thump at doors” (87). 
Eventually, the actress agrees to take Miriam on as a student. They work 
together for months, until Madame Carre takes an extended trip with her 
children. When Madame Carre returns, Miriam gives her another 
recitation, to which Madame Carre says, “You’ve learned all that I’ve 
taught you, but where the devil have you learned what I haven’t?” (149). 
Miriam replies, “I’ve worked—I have; you’d call it work—all through the 
bright, late summer all through the hot, dull, empty days. I’ve battered 
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down the door” (149). Miriam emphasizes the word “work” by assuring 
Madame Carre, who can be a severe instructor, that when she, Miriam, 
says “work,” she means it the way Madame Carre would mean it: “you’d 
call it work,” she says to Madame Carre. 
Contrary to the example of Miriam’s work ethic is the enigmatic 
Gabriel Nash’s work ethic. Most summaries of The Tragic Muse begin by 
describing it as a novel of two artists, Nick Dormer and Miriam Rooth. It’s 
rarely noted that Nash, too, is an artist, a novelist. And even though he has 
openly declared never to write another novel—and every indication is that 
he won’t—he also sees himself as an ongoing artistic creation. Leaving 
aside the latter creation, his creation of “Gabriel Nash,” which I’ll take up 
shortly, Muse says little about Nash’s novel. It’s first mentioned by Nick 
to his sister Biddy, and he calls it “a very clever book” (23). When she 
presses him on this, he struggles to characterize it. He calls it a “sort of 
novel,” and when she presses further, he says, “Well, I don’t know—with 
a lot of good writing” (23). Nick’s struggle to describe Nash’s novel 
suggests its peculiarity. Nash, evidently, has written something 
experimental, innovative. Later, when Nick suggests that Nash write more, 
that his book was “complicated and ingenious,” Nash responds, “Oh I 
shall never do it again” (25). Nash says that he’s “extremely ashamed of 
that book” (25). At first one might read Nash’s dismissiveness as garden 
variety self-effacement, polite downplaying of his achievement, or even a 
passive braggadocio—suggesting that he’s even better than his friend 
65 
thinks. It might even be that he’s fishing for further compliment. But none 
of these explanations is quite consistent with Nash’s character. He is, if 
anything, candid to a fault, even when his candor makes for awkward 
social situations. What’s more likely is that his dismissive attitude about 
his novel reflects the ease with which the writing came to him. And while 
Nash may have an abundance of wit, acumen, and erudition—and Muse 
consistently reinforces that he has—he lacks the willingness to work at his 
art, a willingness that Muse strongly suggests is necessary for any quality 
art and for the health and development of art in general.     
The Tragic Muse is not the first novel James wrote with artists at 
the center, and it’s worth noting that two earlier works, Roderick Hudson 
(1875) and The Lesson of the Master (1888), also advance this same idea 
of the importance of hard work to an artist. In The Lesson of the Master, 
for instance, the plot turns on the attempt by an older, established writer, 
Henry St. George (the Master), to convince the young aspiring writer, Paul 
Overt, that marriage to Marian Francourt will ruin Paul’s writerly 
ambitions. Marriage, the Master says, will lessen Paul’s ability to work 
hard. When Paul tries to convince St. George that Marian, who has a 
passion for literature, would help his art, the Master replies, “She has it [a 
passion for literature] indeed, but she’d have a still greater passion for her 
children—and very proper too. She’d insist on everything’s being made 
comfortable, advantageous, propitious for them. This isn’t the artist’s 
business” (99).  Marriage and family, the Master claims, take away from 
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the singularly dedicated work required of a writer. Paul follows the 
Master’s advice. He rejects Marian and goes abroad to Geneva, isolating 
himself and writing for two years. And, in fact, he produces his best work. 
However, upon returning to London, he discovers that the Master is 
engaged to marry Marian. Paul is left to wonder, as is the reader, if the 
Master had tricked Paul into leaving so that he, the Master, could marry 
Marian himself. The insult to this injury is the suggestion that the Master 
seems professionally reinvigorated by his much younger bride and that 
marriage may, in fact, revive his stagnant writing career15. Despite the 
ambiguous (and tantalizing) end, the fact of artistic production remains: it 
was hard, uninterrupted diligence that produced Paul’s best work, not the 
muse or passion or genius. 
Similarly, in Roderick Hudson the title character, a young 
sculpting enthusiast, is planning for a career not in art but in the law. Like 
Nick Dormer in Muse, Hudson is poised between a practical, remunerative 
career (being a lawyer) and a riskier, less remunerative career (being a 
sculptor). It’s not until Rowland Mallet, an independently wealthy friend 
of a friend, offers Hudson an educational sojourn to Europe (at Mallet’s 
expense) that Hudson forgoes his law career in pursuit of art. Hudson 
possesses “natural” talent, and Mallet recognizes it immediately. Mallet is 
                                                 
15 Sara Chapman argues that, while the Master is described as reinvigorated, the novel also asserts that he hadn’t yet 
returned to writing, even after having been married for some time. Chapman posits that his lack of 
production suggests “that the requisite discipline is still missing from his character” (42), which again 
indicates the necessity for artists to develop discipline and strict work ethics.   
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first introduced to Hudson after being dumbstruck by a sculpture that 
Hudson had done. Their mutual friend, Cecelia, who received the 
sculpture from Hudson as a gift, tells Mallet that Hudson only “half 
suspects his ability” (23), and he “has had no education beyond what he 
has picked up with little trouble for himself” (22). Hudson appears to put 
no effort into his art or learning his craft. When Mallet later suggests to 
Hudson that, to be a first-rate artist, Hudson need “only to work hard,” 
Hudson replies, “I think I know what that means” (30). His facetious reply 
belies his extreme confidence in his innate talents as well as his 
unfamiliarity with hard work. In Italy, where Mallet introduces Hudson to 
some local artists, Hudson makes an initial splash with two sculptures that 
Mallet arranges to show. Among the artists are the older, established, and 
highly regarded sculptor Gloriani and the young American painter Sam 
Singleton. Though impressed by Hudson’s sculptures, Gloriani questions 
if Hudson can maintain this quality: “He can do it once, he can do it twice, 
he can do it at a stretch half a dozen times. But—but--!” (91). When 
Hudson responds angrily, Gloriani tells him that “passion burns out, 
inspiration runs to seed” (92). At the same gathering, Sam Singleton 
shows two of his paintings. Singleton’s name is often preceded by the 
epithet “little”—he’s little Sam Singleton. However, along with being 
repeatedly characterized as physically small, quiet, and humble, he’s also 
repeatedly characterized as hard working. Looking at Singleton’s two 
paintings, Gloriani predicts, “Oh you…you’ll keep it up” (93). And this, in 
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fact, turns out to be so. Roderick’s importance, as well as his ability to 
create, declines as quickly as it ascended, and Singleton, possessor of a 
“happy diligence,” rises to prominence. Just before his tragic fall (literally 
and figuratively) Roderick notices Singleton as if for the first time. The 
little artist has made his way down a hill, canvas and paints in hand, on his 
way to work. Hudson says, “You remind me of a watch that never runs 
down. If one listens hard one hears you always at it. Tic-tic-tic, tic-tic-tic” 
(357).  Hudson has lost his ability to create, his passion and genius having 
soon been spent, and he has no reserve to fall back on. His situation is 
contrasted with Sam Singleton, the portraitist who lacks Hudson’s natural 
ability but has a doggedly persistent work ethic. 
  James’s belief in the necessity of hard work is not about his 
advancing a Protestant work ethic—put your nose to the grind stone and 
you’ll get ahead—a term Max Weber would coin fifteen years after Muse. 
Instead, it suggests a theory of art’s place in larger social conversations. 
“The Art of Fiction” is structured as a response to a lecture by Walter 
Besant at the Royal Institution, and James takes issue with Besant’s 
seeming to say “definitely beforehand what sort of an affair the good 
novel will be” (4). James, on the other hand, appears to be arguing for a 
theoretical position that won’t prescribe formal or thematic “rules.” He 
doesn’t enumerate the several qualities that ought to make up a novel. On 
the contrary, he seems to be arguing for the omnivorous structure of the 
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genre: one can’t put borders around what a novel should do16. James’s 
injunction, then, that the artist needs to scrupulously observe and work 
hard, taken together with the importance of experiment and invention, is 
not about what a novel should be so much as what a novelist (and a 
reader) should do. This repudiates not only the romantic idea of the artist 
as exceptional genius, but it also rejects an ascendant idea that art is its 
own end, art-for-art’s sake. James promotes both an abiding empiricism 
and an acknowledgement that artists must do, not simply be. “The Art of 
Fiction” is as close as James comes to a conventional aesthetic manifesto, 
and its lack of prescription is conspicuous. He doesn’t lay out specific 
qualities for what constitutes the new. However, in the figures of Nick and 
Miriam, as well as Paul Overt in The Lesson of the Master and the 
eponymous Roderick Hudson, we see the rejection of a romantic notion of 
the artist as passionate genius. Passion and genius matter, but it’s dogged 
perseverance that produces the honest and inventive art that can then 
participate in larger social discussions. “The Art of Fiction” is a manifesto 
of method, and Muse echoes its claims of method. That all these novels 
position artists in relation to social institutions—Nick Dormer/politics, 
Roderick Hudson/law, Paul Overt/marriage, and Miriam Rooth/marriage 
(Sherringham proposes marriage to Miriam on the condition that she give 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that James’s openness to experimentation doesn’t mean that he agrees with every experiment. 
Trollope’s acknowledgements in some work that the work is, in fact, “make believe,” a kind of post-
modern breaking of the fourth wall, is unsettling for James, who likens the novelist to the historian. 
Explicitly stating the fictionality of a work of fiction in that work of fiction is, for James, “a betrayal of a 
sacred office” (2).  
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up the stage. She refuses)—James is putting art in a specific conversation 
with social institutions: if each social institution, even marriage, can 
somehow blunt the freedom and inventiveness of art, then inventive, 
experimental art could offer social institutions a language for becoming 
more inventive and freer. 
Art for Art’s sake 
James knew well the ideas, positions, and proponents of the aesthetic 
movement of the late nineteenth century. However, his investment in 
aestheticist thinking is unclear. On the one hand, he had, according to 
Adeline Tintner in The Cosmopolitan World of Henry James (1991), a 
“Yellow Book phase, during which he contributed three stories to the 
journal” (27). The Yellow Book, of course, was the short-lived (1894-7) 
London journal that published many of the authors associated with the 
aestheticist movement (though not these authors exclusively). Likewise, 
Leon Edel says that James knew “intimately” the work of Walter Pater, a 
central figure of aestheticist thinking, and met Pater in London in 1879 
(224). And In Jonathan Freedman’s Professions of Taste: Henry James, 
British Aestheticism and Commodity Culture (1990), Freedman quotes an 
early assessment of James’s relationship to aestheticism, a 1917 Stuart 
Sherman essay called “The Aesthetic Idealism of Henry James,” in which 
Sherman places James squarely in the aestheticist movement: “One the 
whole,” Sherman says, “there is no better side light on James’s 
‘philosophy’ than Pater’s Conclusion to the Studies in the Renaissance and 
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his Plato and Platonism” (xv). The suggestion is that James’s aesthetic 
philosophy is best understood as aestheticist philosophy. A more 
modulated assessment, on the other hand, sees James as sympathetic to 
some aestheticist principles but suspicious of others. Freedman suggests 
that James has engendered two critical poles regarding aestheticism: he is 
either an “aesthete tout court” or he needs to be “defended from the ‘taint’ 
of aestheticism at all costs” (xiii). Freedman himself provides a more 
nuanced reading of James’s position: “Toward aestheticism, James was 
“alternately critical and celebratory, antagonistic and obsessed, and finally 
deeply, powerfully assimilative” (xvii). This more nuanced position of 
aestheticism is expressed in Muse in the figure of Gabriel Nash, who is the 
aesthete tout court. Through the characterization of Nash, Muse expresses 
strong admiration for the aestheticist position that engaging art, being 
discriminating, and experiencing art emotionally is a critical human 
activity, but it ultimately rejects the passivity that inheres in the 
aestheticist position.  
Reading Gabriel Nash’s thoughts and dialogue, in Muse, can 
sometimes feel like reading a novelized transcription of the “Conclusion” 
of Walter Pater’s The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (1873) 17. 
Pater’s Conclusion was influential for the aesthetic, or decadent, 
movement of the late nineteenth century, and it served as something of a 
manifesto for many of the movement’s adherents, most famously Oscar 
                                                 
17 Freedman calls Nash “James’s fullest representation of the aesthete” (170). 
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Wilde. (Peter Nicholls calls the Conclusion “a gospel for aesthetic 
hedonism” (69).) Pater’s argument proceeds in three general steps, all 
reinforced by Nash in his first extended dialogue. First, Pater asserts that 
“our whole physical life” and our “inward world of thought and feeling” 
are constantly changing, are in flux18. In Muse, Nash acknowledges this 
flux in his first exchange with Nick Dormer. Nick wonders aloud why he 
and Nash, fast friends in college, see so little of each other now even 
though they live in the same time and place. Nash replies, “Ah my dear 
Dormer, excuse me. I don’t live in the nineteenth century” (22). Nash is 
being partly facetious, but he’s also suggesting a more fluid sense of time 
and space, one that corresponds more to the fluctuating sense of one’s 
interior mental life. 
Pater’s next, somewhat contradictory claim is that, within this flux 
of human experience, the human spirit’s only obligation is to capture, 
arrest, observe, and appreciate those moments that excite our passion and 
intellectual curiosity. With a rhetorical question, he concedes the 
contradiction of “arrested moments” in a “fluid experience”: “How shall 
we pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the 
focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest 
energy?” (154). Pater leaves the question unanswered (mostly), but Nash 
presents himself as a possible solution. When Nick asks him how he has 
                                                 
18 Freedman notes Pater’s statement of time and transience: “The value of art, then, lies not in its own static 
perfection, but rather in its ‘frank’ participation in the transience of things” (10). 
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spent his time since college, Nash replies, “I rove, drift, float…my 
feelings direct me—if such a life as mine may be said to have a direction. 
Where there’s anything to feel I try to be there” (22). Nash let’s his 
feelings lead him to interesting moments from “point to point.” He claims 
not to adhere to any external social pressures or directives19. 
Finally, Pater asserts that those philosophies that help us attain and 
appreciate these arrested points of presence are useful philosophies; those 
philosophies that do not help us are formulaic, dogmatic “facile 
orthodoxy” and should be avoided (155). How do we determine which 
philosophies are useful and which not? It’s rigorous independent analysis. 
The error, Pater says, is to simply acquiesce to orthodoxy. Similarly, in 
Muse, Nash derides the “formulas” of politics, the “sides” that political 
discourse invariably requires. These “sides” are exactly the kinds of facile 
orthodoxy against which Pater warns. Nash’s conviction is that the 
aesthete’s thoughts are refined and nuanced to such a degree that even to 
articulate them is to blunt them and generalize them. He calls these 
aesthetic thoughts “shades.” Opposed to the aesthete’s shades are the 
political person’s bulky, generalized positions, or “sides.” Party politics 
forces sides on all its practitioners: Nash says, “[The political figure] sees 
his ‘side,’ his dreadful ‘side’…Poor man [to Nick] fancy your having a 
‘side’—you, you—and spending your days and your nights looking at it! 
                                                 
19 Freedman, again, echoes this when he says Pater’s Conclusion “asks us to embrace a metonymic chain that leads 
us from one perfect moment of intense apprehension to another” (42). 
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I’d as soon pass my life looking at an advertisement on a boarding” (26). 
The emphatic “you, you” at the center of this plea indicates that “sides” 
are more than political positions: they are the practitioner’s consciousness, 
his or her identity. To allow boilerplate political discourse to infect one’s 
consciousness is to degrade one’s identity.  
Because the shades of the aesthete are so refined, because they are 
so nuanced, they can’t be presented even in literary form, which is why 
Nash has abandoned his earlier literary ambitions. Language, of course, is 
the unavoidable medium for literature, and language blunts, generalizes, 
and distorts the refinements of one’s shades. Literature is social, Nash 
argues; it’s for a reader and, therefore, too crude to accommodate the 
refinements of the aesthete’s shades: “But from the moment [a shade] is 
for the convenience of others the signs have to be grosser, the shades 
begin to go. That’s the deplorable hour! Literature, you see, is for the 
convenience of others. It requires the most abject concessions. It plays 
such mischief with one’s style that really I’ve had to give it up” (25-6).  
Nash’s emphasis on the limitations of language strike our twenty-first-
century ears as prescient, if his conviction in the autonomy of subjective 
thinking does not.20 But here, too, in the conviction of the autonomy of the 
subject and the limitations of language, Nash echoes Walter Pater. For 
                                                 
20 Oscar Wilde’s preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, published in 1890, the same year as The Tragic Muse, is a 
short set of aphorisms about art and artists. One set of aphorisms echoes Nash’s distrust of language: “All 
art is at once surface and symbol. Those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril. Those who read the 
symbol do so at their peril. It is the spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors” (3). Indeed, Wilde is often 
conjectured to be James’s model for Gabriel Nash (as is James McNeill Whistler and The Count Robert de 
Montesquiou)  
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Pater, when the mind perceives an object, “[the] object is loosed into a 
group of impressions—colour, odour, texture—in the mind of the 
observer” (153). The individual mind then reorganizes the vastness of 
experience in all its fluctuations. Here, the individual, through “reflexion” 
[sic] conceives objects “not…in the solidity with which language invests 
them, but of impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent” (153). Pater 
argues that impressions of the world reside within each individual mind, 
impressions that become uniquely individualized. When these impressions 
are put into language, though, they lose the flickering quality of 
impressions and become fixed distortions21. 
So what does the enigmatic Gabriel Nash—decadent aesthete, 
Pater-esque writer who won’t write—do in James’s modernist 
kunstlerroman? Throughout the novel, he’s consistently the smartest 
person in the room for every room he enters. His keen observations are 
almost always acknowledged as such, and they lead to predictions that 
invariably come to pass. He is almost a seer, almost an oracle. Early on, 
for instance, after Miriam’s second disastrous “audition,” the astute theater 
critic Peter Sherringham concludes that she just “isn’t any good.” Nash 
concurs, but adds, to Sherringham’s surprise, “Ah but she’ll become so” 
(74). And she does. Nash further intuits a long-term connection between 
                                                 
21 After Miriam masters her craft, Nash comes to the theater regularly to watch her performances. However, he is 
less interested in what she says than in how she says it: “he came to the theatre or to the villa simply to treat 
his ear to the sound…issuing from Miriam’s lips. Its richness was quite independent of the words she might 
pronounce or the poor fable they might subserve” (218-19). Nash’s sentiment echoes Pater’s observation 
that “[a]ll art constantly aspires to the condition of music” (90). In emphasizing the sound of words over 
their signification, Nash (and Pater, too) de-emphasize language’s social (signifying) dimension.  
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Sherringham and Miriam, which, too, comes to fruition—Sherringham 
falls in love with her and proposes marriage. Along with his brilliant, 
almost savant qualities, though, is Nash’s awkward social presentation. 
His social inelegance leads many to suspect he’s merely an eccentric 
humbug. Even Nick, Nash’s staunchest defender and intimate friend, 
wonders at times if Nash isn’t just a clever charlatan. He concludes, 
however, as does the novel, that while Nash is a brilliant aesthete, art for 
art’s sake is a solipsistic position that pulls art away from being the social 
activity that it can’t help but be. 
Nash’s tendency to speak in elaborate metaphors and abstractions 
puts off almost all the characters with whom he comes into contact. This 
verbal indirection gives him a fey, otherworldly quality and, at the same 
time, brings him under suspicion of being a sham, an affected dandy. His 
supreme self-confidence only exacerbates the skepticism with which 
others view him. Julia, Nick’s almost-fiancée, calls him “the odious man” 
and “[i]mpertinent and fatuous” (79); Sherringham calls him “damned 
impudent”; and when Nick tells Sherringham about Nash’s acrobatic 
rhetorical flights back in college, Sherringham wonders, “Mayn’t it be 
simply that he’s too great an ass?” (44). Nick, in fact, entertains this 
possibility. He determines to re-connect with Nash, in part, to investigate 
Nash’s character and ideas. In “The Decadent Movement in Literature” 
(1893), Arthur Symons articulates this ambivalence toward late-
nineteenth-century aestheticism. Symons calls the decadent movement a 
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“new and beautiful and interesting disease” (105). This is, oddly, a kind of 
aestheticist description of aestheticism. That it’s a disease, a harmful 
presence, doesn’t preclude it from being a beautiful presence, and, as such, 
it can prompt the kind of emotional joy that aestheticists sought in 
beautiful objects. This seeming contradiction is present in the character of 
Nash and aestheticism in general. “Disease,” for Symons, doesn’t so much 
mean moral depravity in the sense that the literature is licentious or that it 
contravenes middle-class values—although, of course, some does. Rather, 
Symons sees “disease” in the unwillingness of decadents to make social 
critique, to enter social and political discourse. Decadent work, Symons 
says, is “typical of a civilization grown over-luxurious, over-inquiring, too 
languid for the relief of action, too uncertain for any emphasis in opinion 
or in conduct” (106). Again, this is a moral critique of the lack of action, 
the lack of social or political conviction. It’s the critique that Muse makes 
of Nash. It’s not a critique of the “rightness” of the conviction; it’s a 
critique of not acting on conviction.  
The two positions that Symons describes here are the same two 
positions between which Nick Dormer is poised—a political life of social 
conviction and an interior artistic life, answerable only to the self. At the 
beginning of Muse, Nick enlists Nash as a kind of mentor, the man best 
suited to advocate for the artistic position. (Nick has, as noted above, 
many inducements and arguments for the political position.) And Nash 
proselytizes a radical independence that suggests social indifference, the 
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radical independence of the decadents on whom Symons looks askance. 
When Nick asks Nash about the affirmation of his shades, his refined 
ideas, Nick is thinking about social affirmations: what good are these 
interior shades, these refined thoughts of the aesthete, if there are no 
positive social consequences? Nash responds, “One is one’s self a fine 
consequence. That’s the most important one we have to do with” (25). It’s 
not clear here if Nash advocates for everyone being his or her own end, or 
if he’s arguing that, by solely pursuing one’s own end, one’s very 
existence, one’s being, will serve as a social benefit. However, Nash 
seems wholly disinterested in the effect he might have on others: “Let me 
add that you don’t begin to have an insight into the art of life till it ceases 
to be of the smallest consequence to you what you may be called. That’s 
rudimentary” (25). The term “art of life” is a literal one for Nash, and he 
sees himself, his interior self, as his only consequential creation. How 
others interpret what he’s created is of little or no consequence to him. He 
tells Julia that he’s an artist who “work[s] in life” (73). What strikes her as 
pompous and absurd is, for him, a serious and essential personal 
obligation: to be is his métier.  
However, Nash belies his radical individualism when he attends 
Miriam’s second “audition,” a drawing room performance at Peter 
Sherringham’s home. Miriam’s performance is universally acknowledged 
as bad, but Nash was expecting this. What upsets him more is the vogue 
for drawing room performances at all. Interestingly, his opposition is, in 
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part, that such performances cut off dialogue: “If there’s a thing in life I 
hate,” he says to himself, “it’s this idiotic new fashion of the drawing-
room recitation and of the insufferable creatures who practice it, who 
prevent conversation, and whom, as they’re beneath it, you can’t punish 
by criticism” (64). The practitioners of drawing room recitations, whom 
Nash deems always bad, cannot be criticized; they’re beneath criticism 
itself. The recitations “prevent discussion,” he says. But if his ethos is 
simply to live an interior life of refined thoughts and “shades,” if such 
criticisms lose their refinements when put into language, why does he 
lament the absence of criticism? He should be content with forming his 
own nuanced thoughts on the horrible performance and be done with it. 
Likewise, his interest in helping Nick’s art career might be ascribed to 
their friendship, but why did he take an interest in Miriam’s career? He 
connects her with Madame Carre, a significant introduction for the 
furtherance of her career, an introduction that would seem to have nothing 
to do with Nash’s “shades.”  
Muse’s suggestion here is that even the art-for-art’s sake crowd, 
even the devoted aesthetes, cannot escape the irrepressible urge to socially 
interact around art and the inescapable sociality of art. Art is not separate 
from social engagement; it is social engagement.  For Muse, the inherent 
flaw of the disinterested position of aestheticism is the insistence on 
abstracting art from social engagement. Freedman describes Nash’s long 
stretches of absence toward the end of Muse as his vanishing “back into 
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the empyrean” (190). Such an abstraction, Freedman says, is “understood 
by the novel to be impossible. [Nash’s] Paterian privileging of mere being 
as opposed to rigorous doing simply has no place in either the theatrical or 
the aesthetic spheres that the novel portrays” (186). Art is a social 
discourse, and the richer the discourse the healthier the artistic moment. 
This is what James asserts in “The Art of Fiction”: The times of rich 
aesthetic theorizing are the times of art’s greatest development. 
Sherringham, whose opinion of Nash vacillates throughout the book, 
ultimately envies Nash’s “power to content himself with the pleasures he 
could get”; at the same time, Sherringham remains suspicious of Nash’s 
“unapplied ideas” (219). And the novel does, too. It shows great respect 
for Nash and the aesthetic devotion to art, but it laments the solipsistic 
limits of this devotion. 
Toward the end of the novel, meditating on his time spent with 
Nash, Nick considers the difference between talk and action: “talk 
engendered a sense of sameness much sooner than action. The things a 
man did were necessarily more different from each other than the things 
he said” (236). And Nash, Nick laments, will at best be a man who 
provides only talk, much of which will be talk of the limits of talk: Nash 
“could never surprise [Nick] any more save by doing something” (236). 
And Nash was determined not to do, and only reluctantly to talk. Chapman 
says, “Although James’s interest in the aesthetic issues to which Pater 
addresses himself is undeniable, it is clear in his fiction and criticism 
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about writers that he disapproved of the obsessive aestheticism, the 
essentially passive, self-serving ethic of Pater’s work” (12). She offers The 
Sacred Fount as example but could just as aptly have said The Tragic 
Muse. As noted in the previous sections, James recognized hard work as 
essential to the production and reception of art, and he sensed that a 
moment of aesthetic theorizing and experimentation was imminent. Muse 
amplifies this by contrasting two hard working artists, Nick and Miriam, 
with their more naturally gifted, more naturally discerning counterpart, 
Gabriel Nash. In this otherwise cheery novel, the treatment of Nash is the 
only melancholy note struck, and it’s struck at the end, when the reader is 
left with a sense of the wasted potential that is Nash’s. The suggestion is 
that insular, individual appreciation of art, no matter how talented, is not 
suited for the coming moment of theoretically active, experimental art. 
Conclusion  
A kunstlerroman poised between nineteenth-century and modernist 
literature, The Tragic Muse contributes to the coming profusion of 
aesthetic theorizing in three important ways. First, it encourages writers to 
continue scrupulous empirical observation. The latter half of the 
nineteenth century is a period of great technological innovation22 and 
population shifts to urban areas. However, this period emerges from a long 
period of widespread naturalist observation, of which Darwin is the 
                                                 
22 In “Reading the Fin De Siècle,” Sally Ledger and Roger Luckhurst list “duplex telegraphy, the gramophone, the 
telephone, wireless telegraphy, X-rays, cinematography” as just a few of the period’s many influential 
innovations (xiii).  
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apogee. James remains, at the end of the nineteenth century, very much a 
believer that truth lies in scrupulous observation. His adjuration that artists 
should be among the people on whom nothing is lost is a call to this kind 
of careful, empirical analysis. This is not quite literary realism, which is 
more invested in representing everyday bourgeois life; nor is it literary 
naturalism, which presents the hidden forces (natural and social) shaping 
human thoughts and actions. This is meaning through observation. Leon 
Edel quotes the artist John La Farge saying that James had “the painter’s 
eye” (128), and this certainly suggests the detailed precision of James’s 
prose. However, it’s not mere journalistic observations that James 
produces: it’s observation wedded to imagination—the painter’s eye. In 
his essay “Is There Life After Death” (1910), James argues that, with his 
creative consciousness, he “reach[es] beyond the laboratory brain” (717). 
The eye and brain are the initial, empirical instruments for creating, but 
they are then shaped, through invention, into art. 
And this, of course, is Muse’s second important position: the 
encouragement of aesthetic experimentation. If the coming modernism is, 
in fact, a revolution—and we argue here that it is—then one of the 
establishing preconditions for this revolution would be openness to such 
experimentation, if not universal openness then discrete moments of 
acceptance, pockets of willingness to consider, if not adopt, cultural 
83 
change and to emphasize the valence of artistic invention23. And this leads 
to Muse’s third injunction, the rejection of the solipsism of the art-for-
art’s-sake (Decadent) movement. In “The Metaphysics of Modernism,” 
Michael Bell says, “For Modernism is importantly not aestheticist, it is 
rather a turn against an earlier generation’s aestheticism, but it uses highly 
self-conscious aesthetic means to do so” (26). Breaking from the 
aestheticist position in this way suggests anything but a clean break. Bell 
suggests that some of the conventions of aestheticism are retained in the 
effort to do something new. Muse serves as a precursor to this 
ambivalence. As already noted, Walter Pater’s The Renaissance: Studies 
in Art and Poetry was an influential text for this movement, decadence’s 
own manifesto. The Renaissance, too, is from modernism’s emerging 
moment, and Pater, as James does, encourages openness and willingness 
to experience new and experimental ideas. Pater argues that we are “to be 
for ever [sic] curiously testing new opinions and courting new 
impressions” (154-5). Muse, though, offers an inevitable social dimension 
to art, one that even the decadent Gabriel Nash cannot escape. Art may not 
have realpolitik ends; it may, at its best, be far more suggestive and 
nuanced than stump speeches and party platforms, but it is always a 
political act. It grows and develops, as James says in “The Art of Fiction,” 
through theoretical discourse.  
                                                 
23 At the French art exhibition, Nick says to Biddy, “All art is one…It’s the same great many-headed effort, and any 
ground that’s gained by an individual, any spark that’s struck in any province, is of use and of suggestion to 
all the others” (17). 
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Muse, therefore, is not only demystifying art—placing its 
production not in the hands of the genius but, rather, in the hands of the 
grinder—it’s also democratizing it. It argues for taking art out of the hands 
of select few and putting it into the hands of those willing to scrutinize the 
world around them and do the hard work of expressing and interpreting it. 
Careful, penetrating observation, coupled with persistent, demanding 
effort, will produce the kind of honest, inventive work that other social 
institutions might benefit from. Because art is inescapably a social 
activity, the refined concepts of the interior mind will unavoidably become 
external. Muse acknowledges that there may be some loss of refinement in 
the transition from interior concepts—Gabriel Nash’s “shades”—to 
external presentation, but this loss is an unavoidable and necessary 
component to art. Through art, Muse argues, we pursue important ideas 
like honesty and candor and invention. The conflict that propels The 
Tragic Muse is the tension between the margins and mainstream, between 
the unconventional and conventional, specifically between art and 
bourgeois conventionality. Not only does art win, it presages a coming 
revolution.  
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                                                                                Chapter Two   
   A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: Ineluctable Modalities and 
Intangible Phantoms 
 
James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) 
seems to declare an autobiographical intention in the title—it’s not a 
portrait of “an” artist but rather “the” artist—and the dates, places, events, 
and characters conform to Joyce’s own biography so closely as to make 
autobiographical interpretations unavoidable. As noted earlier, Maurice 
Beebe’s Ivory Towers and Sacred Founts: The Artist as Hero in Fiction 
from Goethe to Joyce (1964) holds that autobiography is a consistent 
feature of kunststlerromane, and he notes that this is especially so in 
Portrait. But Portrait is not a declared autobiography or memoir. It’s a 
novel. And biographies of Joyce reveal several differences in the lives of 
James Joyce and Stephen Dedalus24. These kinds of divergences in 
autobiography or memoir are often attributed to the author’s own biases—
the selective inclusion/exclusion of events and people—or an imperfect 
memory. In an autobiographical novel like Portrait, however, such 
differences are not lapses nor mistakes or misrepresentations. Novels 
                                                 
24 Richard Ellmann’s first revision of his biography James Joyce (1982) notes several such divergences, some of 
which are clearly not memory lapses. Ellman notes, for instance, that Joyce spent the two years between Clongowes 
and Belvedere at the “Christian Brothers’ school on North Richmond Street”; Stephen, on the other hand, spends 
this time in “two years of reverie,” not going to school at all (35). This is not a period of Joyce’s biography that he 
was likely to have forgotten; one suspects, rather, that Joyce shared Simon Dedalus’s disdain for the Christian 
Brothers’ school and chose to spare Stephen the indignity.  
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require no fidelity to fact. As a novel, Portrait, therefore, is not held to 
standards of historical accuracy. Indeed, genre, as has been discussed 
earlier, shapes all writing and reading; the very declaration of fiction 
opens the text to a less “factual,” more interpretive reading that allows for 
a loosening of biographical or historical ties. Calling the text a novel 
allows it to be “loosened” from biography and history, which is a stated 
objective of Stephen’s and an important concept in Portrait25. Even if no 
divergences could be found between Joyce’s biography and Stephen’s 
biography, the novel would still, in a sense, be as separate from Joyce’s 
life as it is from yours or mine. Joyce, for instance, attended a school 
named “Clongowes,” just as Stephen does, but meanings for “Clongowes” 
in Portrait are not dependent on Joyce’s school as much as they would be 
in a declared biography or memoir. Indeed, all the historical/biographical 
points in Portrait point towards and away from their real-world referents. 
Beebe concedes as much when he says that “the novel in which Stephen 
appears is a modern classic partly because Joyce…achieved a detachment 
from self in his treatment of his autobiographical hero” (57). And there is, 
in fact, a “less biographical” way of reading the “the” in Portrait’s title: 
“the” artist may not refer to the historical Joyce, the artist of this particular 
novel, but rather to a type, a type of which the historical Joyce is part. 
                                                 
25 For contemporary readers (like Jameson), fleeing history might seem naïve or, perhaps, romantic. However, 
Portrait’s movement toward imaginative life is suggesting that it’s precisely in the imagination that we escape 
history.   
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Indeed, Beebe reads Portrait this way. He sees it as a type laid 
over the biography of James Joyce: “One way in which Joyce sought to 
detach himself from his hero was to depict not James Joyce, but the 
universal, representative, archetypal artist, the ideal which Joyce could 
achieve only partially in reality” (266). Joyce, Beebe argues, was well 
acquainted with artist-hero stories, and Stephen’s divergences from 
Joyce’s biography might be a way to conform to the more universal ideas 
that a type presents. Ellman, too, notes that, for Portrait, Joyce would 
“draw upon two types of books he had read: the defecter [sic] from 
religion and [the] insurgent artist” (148). If Joyce was dealing in types, 
and this is an assumption on which my thesis is founded, then by 
characterizing the archetypal artist Portrait is making foundational claims 
about art. Portrait is a novel that, like Ulysses, is structured on the 
armature of earlier texts. Joyce loves to layer: Ulysses has whorls overlaid 
onto whorls—Bloom mapped onto Odysseus, the history of literary styles 
mapped onto the events of “Oxen of the Sun,” which is itself mapped onto 
stages of gestation.26  (264). Portrait uses one outline (one of the infinite 
possible outlines) of James Joyce’s biography to structure a portrait of 
Stephen Dedalus, the archetype of the modern artist. However, just as 
Bloom belies many of the heroic qualities of Odysseus to become the 
                                                 
26 Ulysses Annotated suggests that Joyce would have presumed the process of gestation to be ontogeny 
recapitulating phylogeny (408), yet another “mapping” that the “overlayer” in Joyce would surely enjoy. Likewise, 
Ellman notes that in the short story from which Portrait develops, the artist asks, “Is the mind of boyhood medieval 
that it is so divining of intrigue?” (145). The question suggests a kind of individual progression that mirrors 
historical progression. 
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modern hero, so, too, will this new artist type diverge from his 
predecessors.  
From this assumption about Portrait—that Joyce overlays an 
archetypal artist over his own biography to present “the modern artist”—
this chapter will develop the idea that Portrait uses the archetypical 
modern artist to assert aesthetic principles. Stephen serves as archetype, an 
originary symbol of the modern artist. So, too, the novel in which he 
appears presents a similar marker for modern art. Stephen Dedalus’s 
name, of course, originates in myth, and it’s clear that Portrait is 
interested in art’s origins and foundational functions. Myths are our first 
stories, and they’re inextricably entwined with religion, a primary 
preoccupation for Stephen. The argument here is that Portrait defines art 
as the cultural activity that most closely approximates what Joyce might 
call our spiritual state, a state which best finds expression (with some 
limitation) in myth-work. Literature can do myth-work, but it’s work that 
gets distorted by social institutions; the artist’s role is to serve as a means 
of liberation from such control and for reconnecting (almost) to the 
spiritual state, best identified in the imagination. 
The First Entelechy and the Sixth Sense 
Richard Ellman’s biography James Joyce (1982) contains examples of 
Joyce’s earliest literary criticism and Joyce’s defense of art as constitutive 
of something essentially human. In one of his college essays, “Drama and 
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Life” (1899), Joyce defends Ibsen against the criticism of fellow student 
Arthur Clery, who argues for a return to a traditional theatrical repertoire 
of Shakespeare and the Greeks, and who called out Ibsen by name as an 
example of failing to “produce an elevation” (71). Joyce responds to Clery 
first by defending modern literature against a bias for “classics.” Different 
eras produce different styles, Joyce argues, and Ibsen’s realistic style is 
appropriate for this more scientific age: “But the deathless passions, the 
human verities which so found expression then, are indeed deathless in the 
heroic cycle, or in the scientific age, Lohengrin, the drama of which 
unfolds itself in a scene of seclusion, amid half-lights, is not an Antwerp 
legend but a world drama’ (72). In his defense of Ibsen’s realism, Joyce 
asserts a timeless condition: universal human passions. This timeless 
condition “founds expression”; it is the source from which expression (art) 
emerges. When art gets constricted by the social pressures of history, its 
ability to express the fundamental passions is limited. It’s important to 
note the two eras Joyce puts forth—heroic cycles (the era of myth) and the 
scientific age. The literature of today, in the scientific age, can do what 
myths and heroic cycles did before, say, the Enlightenment. There is a 
foundation, human passion, that is deathless, that runs through all eras and 
epochs. 
Ellman notes that in Joyce’s response “[t]he artist is not concerned 
to make his work religious, moral, beautiful or ideal, only to be truthful to 
fundamental laws, whether these are expressed as myth, as in Wagner’s 
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operas, or in realist fiction” (71-2). Joyce seems to acknowledge that ideas 
of morality and ideas of beauty are transient (constructed), but that there is 
something “below” this, something essential, something “fundamental,” at 
which art can get, or to which it can aspire to express. Beyond morality 
and even truth are fundamental laws. We might today call this a naive 
structuralist conviction, mystifying social activity by ascribing a universal, 
timeless immanence. However, Ellman says that in Joyce’s 1901 essay 
“Day of the Rabblement,” Joyce made just such an assertion; Joyce “stated 
once and for all his lifelong conviction that literature was the affirmation 
of the human spirit” [my italics] (96). Joyce’s assertion of a universal 
human spirit recuperates his essay from charges of elitism. The seemingly 
elitist claim of the essay’s title—the “Rabblement” is the mob—is 
qualified by Joyce’s insistence on this timeless immanence: the 
rabblement are not in essence the mob, but they’ve become so through the 
historical forces that distort or occlude the immanent human spirit within 
us all. 
While it’s almost quaint to say that art is timeless or that art deals 
with the “human condition” (as though the human condition were 
timeless), Joyce is saying something more complex with the concept of 
“spirit.” He acknowledges a modality of being outside history, like another 
sense. Such a claim for a transcendental condition of freedom, again, 
strikes our post-modern ears as highly problematic. Post-structuralist 
criticisms of universals see them as merely subject positions; Joyce’s 
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position on human spirit is just that, his position. But this is not quite what 
spirit is for Joyce. It’s a mystery, an energy, the entelechy (Joyce’s term) 
that galvanizes the imagination. Post-structuralists argue convincingly 
against a centered structure of human expression, but it’s precisely this 
limitation—human expression—that Portrait wants to penetrate: art is the 
expression; imagination creates/reads/interprets the art; and the entelechy 
fires the imagination. Portrait presents imagination as an active process, a 
work that has no end (think of the circularity of Finnegan’s Wake, but 
instead of a closed circle, the widening gyre of Yeats’s mythical “The 
Second Coming,” or Constantine Brancusi’s symbol of Joyce, the 
widening spiral that doesn’t close). In Ulysses, Stephen calls gesture “the 
first entelechy, the structural rhythm” (353). If “entelechy” is a 
galvanizing energy, a force both vital and mysterious, then the idea here is 
that gestures, which are of course signifiers, are the first signifiers, the 
primal signifiers, and they point to something that can’t be contained. 
These gestures are produced in the imagination, which is something like a 
sixth sense. 
Stephen often considers the imagination in relation to the senses. 
Earlier in Ulysses, when Stephen is walking with his eyes closed along 
Sandymount strand, he says to himself, “Rhythm begins, you see. I hear” 
(31). Art (rhythm) begins when the eyes are closed. The word “see” is 
both the limitation of vision and the expression for understanding: “you 
see” can be interpreted as “you understand.” The “you see” reads as 
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understanding, Stephen confirming understanding with himself. But it can 
also be read as contrast, two ways of creating rhythm: sight or sound. 
Stephen chooses sound (“I hear”) while you—the reader perhaps or, given 
Stephen’s aesthetic arrogance, the philistines—see. “You” (philistines) 
rely on vision to create your rhythms; I (Stephen, the archetypal artist) 
hear something rhythmic, something more fundamental. Culture, however, 
is sparked in the imagination and manifested in gestures (signifiers), 
which in their interpretive quality point to that which cannot be wholly 
defined, can’t be wholly understood (seen). And art, which declares itself 
symbolic, performs only signs, is closest to our gestural origin. This is our 
imaginative—again, Joyce might say spiritual—condition. The rhythmic 
gesture toward understanding. And in Stephen’s own aesthetic theory, 
based on Aquinas’s description of apprehension, the culmination of the 
three-part process is claritas (after integritas and consomantia), which 
Stephen says is the “supreme quality… felt by the artist when the esthetic 
image is first conceived in his imagination” (231). It’s the “clear radiance” 
that in other contexts Joyce might have called an epiphany. 
The suggestion here is that the musicality of language—the rhythm 
and sound—is the more fundamental aspect, and it is separable from and 
prior to, the content—the signification and the logic. In his introduction to 
Portrait, Seamus Deane says that “the speech of others is listened to 
intensely…The aural dimension in Portrait is crucial because sound is 
physical and yet disembodied. It is through the channels of the ear that the 
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talkative world of Dublin reaches Stephen’s soul” (xxvi). Walter Pater 
famously argues that all art aspires to the condition of music. Music is the 
non-rational, heard and not seen. And in this way music and rhythm 
suggest the spirit. However, music is primarily emotional (as well as 
mathematical). Language, on the other hand, has the fundamental 
rhythmic quality of music, but is also connected to referents and reason. 
It’s a vibrating meaningful medium. Indeed, Levi-Strauss, in “The Naked 
Man,” emphasizes the chanting, musicality of much myth, and he argues 
that “music is a common form into which an unlimited series of significant 
contents can be fitted according to the personality of the listeners” (114). 
This description of myth would serve equally well to describe poetry, of 
course, but also Joyce’s and Stephen’s sense of language itself: a common 
rhythmic form with significant contents. The rhythmic process is 
described in chapter V of Portrait when Stephen is composing in his mind 
a villanelle: “The verses passed from his mind to his lips and, murmuring 
them over, he felt the rhythmic movement of a villanelle pass through 
them. The roselike glow sent forth its rays of rhyme; ways, days, blaze, 
praise, raise” (236). The entelechy is a rhythm and it forms itself in the 
shape of a villanelle, and the rhymes come as a matter of sound, not sense. 
Then later, “The rhythm died away, ceased, and began again to move and 
beat” (236). In “The Villanelle Perplex: Reading Joyce (1998). Robert 
Adams Day argues that this scene shows Stephen’s immaturity. Stephen, 
Day says, practically wakens to declare “I think I’ll write a villanelle this 
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morning,” and the scene shows he’s “thinking in clichés” (60). However, 
Day overlooks the importance of rhythm in the section (and perhaps the 
importance of rhythm to the villanelle). Stephen doesn’t wake and declare 
that he’s going to write a villanelle; “the rhythmic movement of a 
villanelle passed through” his mind and lips. This isn’t the forced, showy 
impulse of an arrogant adolescent—though Stephen has plenty of those—
this is the artistic impulse of the entelechy flowing through a developing 
artist. The rhythm of the poem is itself produced by the entelechy, the 
energy of the imagination, what Stephen calls the spirit, and what we 
might think of today as a kind of sixth sense.   
Joyce’s reassertion of the spirit, the rhythm-producing energy, in a 
scientific age was a primary concern for many modernists. Hermann 
Broch (1886-1951), for instance, was a German modernist who responded 
to Joyce’s work and was also influenced by it. His ideas about the fate of 
spirit in modernity echo those suggested by Joyce. In Geist and Zeitgeist: 
The Spirit in an Unspiritual Age (2002), editor and translator John 
Hargraves has collected six of Broch’s essays on modernist aesthetics. The 
eponymous essay, “The Spirit in an Unspiritual Age” (1934) was, 
Hargraves says, “in part prompted by Broch’s reading of Joyce” (ix). 
Broch shares Joyce’s concern that the spiritual sense is being lost and with 
it an essential cultural concept. Hargraves says that, like Joyce, Broch 
argues that spirit is a fundamental, animating concept, that cultural activity 
is made up of “the Spirit (Geist) and the Logos (‘word,’ or the ordering 
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principle of all human activity)” (x). If the word orders, then one assumes 
that there is some condition to order, some energy or entelechy. The 
ordering of this energy is done through language, but as with any ordering 
it is a constriction of an otherwise free condition. If logos is essential to 
culture, then culture itself is a constrained condition. Hargraves says that, 
for Broch, “Spirit and Logos are the twin driving forces of culture and 
history, both necessary” (x). The best that culture can do, then, is to 
intimate the spiritual, adumbrate it, suggest it without ever realizing it. 
Broch argues that “spirit works through language. The word is nothing 
without the spirit, which can live nowhere else but in the word” (43). 
Broch’s description, here, reads much like Stephen’s description of the 
entelechy.  
Most of European intellectual history, Broch says, has been an 
unfortunate separation of the two—Broch argues that the “classical 
Golden Age and the High Middle Ages” were the closest that Europe has 
come to something like spirit-word unity. The inextricable quality of 
spirit-word suggests an almost utopian intellectual condition of humanity, 
a return to Stephen’s idea of gesture, the rhythmic origin of speech, the 
essence of what it is to be human. The antithesis to the spirit-word ideal 
for Broch is positivism, the misapprehension of fact for knowledge. If 
positivism is the celebration of fact, art is the repository of knowledge. By 
presenting itself as wholly symbolic, never without allegory, always 
straining to cut free the referent, art is our most spiritual endeavor. When 
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Joyce takes a largely autobiographical set of circumstances and stamps 
them with the imprint “Fiction,” he’s attenuating the connection that 
signifiers have on referents; he’s loosening the grip that history has on his 
story. And spirit, an essential way of experiencing the world and creating 
human culture, is seen by Joyce and Broch as tragically at the margins of 
the early twentieth-century cultural experience. Broch’s anxiety over a 
loss of spirit reflects the value that Stephen places on spirit: it’s an 
essential component to humanity. 
Spirit, of course, must be considered in its religious 
denotations/connotations. In “Modernism and Religion” (2011) Pericles 
Lewis argues that, like Broch and Joyce, there was much unease in the late 
nineteenth-early twentieth century about religion’s diminishing but 
persistent cultural place. Lewis says, “The Modernists were not the devout 
secularists that many critics portray; instead, they were seeking through 
their formal experiments to offer new accounts of the sacred for an age of 
continued religious crisis” (181). The death of God, Lewis says, was never 
complete, and many modernist intellectuals “continued to search for an 
adequate account of religious experience, a kind of essence of religion 
without God or church, and this search contributed to the development of 
literary Modernism” (182). Broch seems to lament this more religious 
understanding of spirit, and his The Sleepwalkers (1932) trilogy, which 
begins in 1888 and ends in 1918, traces the attenuation of religious faith 
and the emptiness that follows. Portrait’s spirit, on the other hand, seems 
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more secular. Spirit is the rhythm of the imagination, but its mystery is 
like the mystery of religion: “The esthetic image in the dramatic form,” he 
tells his friend Lynch, “is life purified in and reprojected from the human 
imagination. The mystery of esthetic like that of material creation is 
accomplished” (233). A common criticism of Stephen’s aesthetic theory is 
that it’s the formulation of a clever schoolboy, but not much more, that it’s 
designed to characterize Stephen as ambitiously smart, but not ready for 
aesthetic theory. Cordell D.K. Yee, though, in “The Aesthetics of 
Stephen’s Aesthetic” is more generous: “Stephen’s theory is not so faulty 
as to warrant the suspicion that it is meant to be undermined, and indeed it 
is strong enough to be taken seriously” (79). 
In Portrait, Stephen’s aim is to “discover the mode of life or art 
whereby [his] spirit could express itself in unfettered freedom” (267). 
Unfettered freedom is, of course, an aspiration, not a condition. To 
approach this free condition, artists require freedom, the liberation that 
institutions often obstruct27. But Portrait argues that working to achieve 
more freedom is a fundamental strategy for artistic production, an 
indispensable condition. Stephen’s immediate notion of freedom is 
emigration, exile from his family, the Church, educational institutions, 
Irish politics, and English hegemony. Indeed, Portrait itself is a statement 
of such artistic freedom: fiction’s exile from biography. By hewing so 
closely to, and at the same time fictionalizing, his own biography, Joyce’s 
                                                 
27 This idea is foremost in Wyndham Lewis’s The Revenge for Love, which we’ll see below. 
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novel makes his history symbolic. This kind of novel—fiction layered 
onto specifically detailed historical events, places, and people—wrests 
from us our sense of a fixed real, a fixed present, into the imaginative 
realm of signification, thus suggesting the interpretive quality of all 
history. Art’s unique position wrenches history from claims of fixity. Art 
emphasizes the symbolic in history, the interpretive. It positions history 
closer to art and affirms art itself as the “smithy” most appropriate for 
Stephen’s work of forging the uncreated conscience of his race. In The 
Aesthetics of Dedalus and Bloom (1984), Marguerite Harkness argues that 
Stephen likens this “transmutation” of history into art to the 
transubstantiation of the Church. Stephen describes the artist thus: “A 
priest of eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience 
into the radiant body of everliving life” (46). Stephen makes this claim in 
a fit of pique, a woman he admires—the one for whom he was composing 
the villanelle—is spending time with a young priest. Stephen’s 
characteristic of the artist is telling, though, for more than mere 
comparison. The artist’s imagination is eternal, suggesting that it is 
something universal, something shared over time and space. And while 
Christian theology teaches an everlasting life, the suggestion here is that 
the body may die, but art lives and “everliving life.”   
In “Becoming James Overman: Joyce, Nietzsche, and the 
Uncreated Conscious of the Irish” (2017), Patrick Bixby argues that 
Joyce’s argument for artistic freedom is often expressed in the extreme 
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language of Nietzsche, especially the latter’s arguments for the 
ubermensch, or “overman,” Nietzsche’s “self-affirming individual, 
capable of transcending the slave morality of Christianity and the nihilism 
of modern European society” (Bixby 45). Bixby argues that, while Joyce 
could not properly be called a Nietzschean, he does express his ideas for 
artistic freedom in the language of Nietzsche. Bixby’s essay begins by 
referencing a 1904 letter from Joyce to George Roberts, which Joyce 
signed James Overman (45). It’s clear from this letter and elsewhere that 
Joyce was familiar with, and had some sympathy for, Nietzsche’s ideas. 
Bixby argues that Nietzsche’s overman influences Joyce’s depiction of 
young Stephen Dedalus and his desire to reshape Irish values. At 
Portrait’s conclusion, Stephen famously states, “I go to encounter for the 
millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my 
soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (276). The idea of the overman, 
Bixby says, is instrumental in shaping Stephen’s intention to overturn the 
values of colonial, Catholic Ireland, instrumental “for transvaluing 
communal values, for forging the ‘uncreated conscience’ of a ‘race’” (46). 
However, Stephen’s declaration, and the overman’s influence, 
might be read with less emphasis on the word “conscience,” which Bixby 
reads as “values”, and more on the word “uncreated.” If the overman is the 
“self-affirming individual” that Bixby describes, then the values that the 
overman adheres to could be any; what matters to the overman is that he 
come to these values of his own accord, that they be created by him and 
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not foisted upon him. While it’s true that Nietzsche identified Christianity 
with slavish values, and Joyce, too, had significant misgivings about the 
Church and colonial hegemony in Ireland, Portrait suggests that Ireland’s 
real sin was to have these values thrust on it from outside, that these 
values were not self-created. The worth of the values is open to 
investigation. Stephen Dedalus, for instance, rejects the priesthood as a 
career and the Church as an institution, but when his friend Cranly asks 
Stephen about the divinity of Jesus, Stephen replies, “I am not at all sure 
of it…He is more like a son of God than a son of Mary” (264). Stephen’s 
doubt suggests a dubious rejection of Christianity, as juxtaposed against a 
more certain rejection of the Church. And Stephen’s refusal to participate 
in the Irish revival—the return to pre-colonial Gaelic language (and Gaelic 
football)—that his friend Davin proposes suggests that Stephen’s 
declaration to forge the uncreated conscience is more about the creation of 
values than it is about new values (or in this case, returning to pre-colonial 
values). The Irish revival, for Stephen, is the past’s way of foisting its 
values onto the modern Irish—another instance of uncreated conscience. 
Portrait suggests little about which values are best (a task taken up, 
perhaps, in Ulysses). What is clear, though, is that modern Ireland has yet 
to create its own values in the way an overman would, the way a free artist 
would.  
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Myth and the Novel: Spiritual Expressions 
In the sentence preceding Stephen’s declaration to create an Irish 
conscience, he says that he’s going to gain experience “for the millionth 
time.” Here, again, we see the suggestion that Stephen isn’t speaking for 
himself alone but also for artists in general, for an archetype. As noted 
above, Bixby sees Nietzsche’s overman as the armature onto which 
Joyce’s new mythological archetype is overlaid: the overman, Bixby says, 
“offered [Joyce]…an imported resource for envisioning his personal myth 
of the artist and his relation to his family, his friends, his nation” (48). 
Joyce’s archetype (Stephen) is laid over Nietzsche’s (the overman). 
Stephen’s relation to family, friends, and nation is reflective; after he 
extricates himself from these controls, he contemplates and expresses his 
experiences. Stephen frees himself from the bonds foisted on him in his 
youth, bonds that obscure the purpose of modern art, and he witnesses 
those bonds from a remove. What is this purpose? To reach for the 
fundamental existence, to approach and express the spiritual. This kind of 
extrication allows Portrait to assert the idea that artistic engagement, 
symbolic engagement, is closer to our imaginative (spiritual) reality than 
history’s reality, social reality, or material reality. Bixby quotes Joseph 
Valente as saying that “in Nietzsche’s superman [Joyce] found an 
empowering myth for his struggle against the mind-forged manacles of 
Irish society” (48). 
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Art in Portrait is, then, the effort to extricate from material 
bonds—what Stephen later, in “Proteus”, calls the “ineluctable modality 
of the visible,” and “the ineluctable modality of the audible” (31). It is a 
movement away from the occlusions (“adiaphane” is Stephen’s word) 
toward an unreachable finish line. “Proteus” ends with Stephen referring 
to himself as “[t]oothless Kinch, the superman” (42). Joyce’s Stephen, the 
archetypal modern artist, is laid over a Nietzschean archetype also laid 
over a Greek myth. Stephen thus presents art-work as a spiritual event 
expressed best in myth-work. In Jonathan Culler’s Toward a Theory of 
Non-Genre Literature, he says, “The essence of literature is not 
representation, not a communicative transparency, but an opacity, a 
resistance to recuperation which exercises sensibility and intelligence” 
(53). The tension here is between art as the clear, simple translation of an 
emotion, and an image or description that touches on the emotion in a 
widening, indeterminate way. If the essence of literature requires 
sensibility and intelligence, then it requires thinking, which is processual 
not conclusive. Culler uses the first two lines from Wallace Steven’s “Man 
Carrying Thing” to present this tension: “The poem must resist the 
intelligence / Almost successfully.” The “intelligence” here is the rational 
claim, the claim that a poetic image is understood, with all the 
completeness that “understood” implies. Because the poem is language it 
will always be, in some sense, interpreted (understood), but it will also 
103 
always be pointing to something not understood, something else, 
something that requires constant re-interpretation. 
Culler’s (and Stevens’s) description of art as the site for processual 
mental work of re-interpretation echoes the work of myth. In 
Mythography: The Study of Myths and Rituals (2000), William Doty 
spends a good deal of effort defining myth. The term elicits broad, wide-
ranging concepts and many definitions, which Doty condenses to the 
following: 
Myths are the instruments by which we continually struggle to make our 
experiences intelligible to ourselves. A myth is a large, controlling image 
that gives philosophical meaning to the facts of ordinary life; that is, 
which has organizing value for experience. A mythology is a more or less 
articulated body of such images, a pantheon…Myth is fundamental, the 
dramatic representation of our deepest instinctual life, of a primary 
awareness of man in the universe, capable of many configurations, upon 
which all particular opinions and attitudes depend. (29) 
It’s a comprehensive definition, but worth quoting in its entirety as it 
expresses much of what Portrait expresses. That myth works to “make our 
experiences intelligible to ourselves” indicates that we’re alienated from 
our own experiences because, perhaps, they’re deceptively complete. 
We’re alienated by all the ineluctable modalities—family, culture, 
institutions, and our very bodies—that appear as coherent totalities. The 
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experience is unintelligible because it gets in the way of the unending 
chain of interpretation. Myth attempts to emphasize the indeterminacy of 
experience. It is the cultural work (images and stories) that attempts to 
organize experience (not unlike the way logos, according to Hermann 
Broch, organizes spirit, or the way the language organizes the 
imagination). Myth creates a horizon for philosophy, a world view; 
interpretations of a myth image point to diffuse meanings for everyday 
life. A collection of such images indicates that they are part of a 
continuing, changing world view. Importantly, the myth “gives 
philosophical meaning to ordinary life.” Myth-work cannot, then, be 
conceptualized as separable from aesthetic realism. Myths emerge from, 
and respond to, the real. As the young Joyce says in “Drama and Life,” 
eternal passions underpin both myth and realism. 
The language of Doty’s definition—fundamental, instinctual, 
primary—echoes Joyce’s early articulation of what art should aspire to: it 
is an essential human quality, residing in everyone, including the 
rabblement. The fundamental, instinctual, primary passions of art are not 
only appropriate to the myths and legends of the heroic age, but also to the 
literature and drama of the scientific age. At the intersection of spirit and 
philosophy is where we will find myth. Broch says that “it is the task of 
the philosophical human to answer not so much the question ‘What is the 
nature of the world?’ as the question how one is to conduct oneself in it; 
not so much the question of existing as the question of doing: in short, the 
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ethical question” (56). The question of existing, of what is, of what 
material bodies do under given conditions, is the purview of science. 
These are the facts and information of our understanding. Meaning, 
purpose, and value on the other hand—what Walter Benjamin might call 
wisdom or counsel, and what Doty calls our “awareness of man in the 
universe—is the purview of myth and philosophy and art.  
 The timeless quality of myth and art is seen in the opening of 
Portrait, which begins, “Once upon a time” (3). This folkloric opening is 
the beginning of a children’s story that Stephen’s father tells him, but it’s 
also the beginning of the novel itself. Portrait’s self-introduction is part of 
a long tradition stretching back to the first stories. The traditional 
opening—almost a cliché—yokes the novel genre to its folk roots and 
asserts the novel’s place as part of this tradition. As Joyce says in his 
response to Arthur Clery, the work that art does in realist fiction is like the 
work it does in myth. Portrait’s five sections cycle through the deathless 
passions that Joyce describes in his earlier essay. Each section presents 
Stephen’s encounters with the confinements of history, institutional 
power, social controls, and his own desires. Earlier in the novel, he feels 
that he has escaped these controls; however, the “escapes” of his youth are 
provided by the same institutions that seek to control him: Father Conmee 
clears him of the accusations and injustice of Father Dolan, for instance, 
and the confessional clears him of his sexual “sin.” These escapes are later 
seen for what they really are: temporary and illusory. (Father Conmee, for 
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example, later confides in Stephen’s father that all the priests at 
Conglowes got a good laugh from Stephen’s episode with the sadistic Fr. 
Dolan (76), and Stephen later determines that the “fear” and “shame” to 
which the Church attached his sexual desire were nothing more than 
“cerements, the lines of the grave” (184).) He later acknowledges that his 
earlier champions were really his oppressors in disguise. 
As he matures, Stephen sees that his own escape will be his own 
responsibility, as it would be for any overman. And more importantly, 
escape itself becomes more aesthetic, more imaginative. This is first seen 
at the end of section IV. Stephen has suffered the Church’s terror of Hell 
in Section III; now, while not yet returning to his promiscuous habits, he 
acknowledges that he soon will. Caught between the control of the Church 
and the control of his own desire, he lays down along the shore and closes 
his eyes (as he does on Sandymount Strand in Ulysses, noted above). Here 
“his soul was swooning into some new world, fantastic, dim, uncertain as 
under sea, traversed by cloudy shapes and beings. A world, a glimmer, or 
a flower?” (187). Again, as he does later in Ulysses, he shuts down his 
senses and releases himself from all control, even the control of his own 
body, and retreats to his imagination, the place of the origins of art. This 
state of being that Stephen experiences happens right before section V and 
his determination to exile himself and become an artist. Engaging his 
imagination allows him to disconnect from sensory influence and become, 
in a sense, artistic.   
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   It is this kind of transcendence that mythic work aspires to, and 
Joyce’s work is, if anything, aspirational; it’s constantly reaching for 
something beyond its grasp. This is art (for Joyce, the novel) as extension 
of myth, or more specifically to Joyce, the novel doing myth-work. The 
possibility for conflation of the two genres is suggested by Northrop Frye 
in Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (1957). Frye argues for the overlap 
of generic qualities: “The romance, which deals with heroes, is 
intermediate between the novel, which deals with men, and the myth, 
which deals with gods” (7). In his definition of genres, Frye acknowledges 
relationships between these conventional genres. He says that “a novel 
becomes more romantic in its appeal when the life it reflects has passed 
away” (8). If a novel can be more romantic or less romantic, so, too, can it 
be more or less “mythic.” Claude Levi-Strauss, too, in The Origin of Table 
Manners argues that the novel was “born from the exhaustion of myth” 
(103). Such fluidity of characteristics suggests genre as assemblage; it 
suggests that literatures contain multiple genres but in varying degrees. 
Genre is not fixed in effect or in the work but read into the work by how 
the reader is situated. In discussing the cross-cultural transformation of 
myths, Levi-Strauss, in “How Myths Die” (1971), gives an example of a 
myth that takes on divergent qualities as it passes over cultural thresholds: 
Thus, a myth of Salish origin is first inverted as a myth when it passes the 
linguistic and cultural threshold separating the Salish from the 
Athapascan; it then becomes a romantic tale when it passes from the 
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Chilcotin to the Carrier. When passing another threshold, it undergoes a 
different transformation, this time to the order of legendary tradition, as a 
means of founding certain modalities of an ancestral system. In one case, 
it swings toward the novel, and in the other toward what is certainly not 
history but has some pretensions to it. (111) (Emphasis added) 
As the myth crosses cultures, it gets uniquely shaped in ways useful to 
those particular cultures—from myth to romance to legend to novel to an 
approximation of history. Some of those changes include fundamental 
typological questions: is this a novel or a kind of history? As a given myth 
“dies out,” it doesn’t go away, but instead is reimagined: 
Thus, a myth which is transformed in passing from tribe to tribe finally 
exhausts itself—without disappearing, for all of that. Two paths still 
remain open: that of fictional elaboration, and that of reactivation with a 
view to legitimizing history. This history, in its turn, may be of two types: 
retrospective, to found a traditional order on a distant past, or prospective, 
to make this past the beginning of a future which is starting to take shape. 
(Levi-Strauss 112) 
Stephen Dedalus’s journey, of course, leads to a beginning, an emerging 
future. He rejects reclamations of the past (the Gaelic revival), and like a 
Nietzschean overman (and like his mythological namesake, Daedalus) 
intends a new, self-created beginning. Portrait itself makes this same 
movement twice: it takes a history (Joyce’s) and a myth (Daedalus’) and 
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makes them fictional elaborations, the mythic portrait of an archetypal 
artist. 
Stephen’s and Portrait’s declaration is to work toward the freedom 
of an overman, the freedom of an artist, to push toward the spiritual. 
However, Stephen has emerged from a religious tradition that has defined 
myth and spirit in its own way. Myth and spirit are, of course, constitutive 
of religion. Stephen’s rejection of the Church, however, does not equal a 
rejection of spirit. While the Church may have become a constraining, 
dogmatic institution, spirit is not something that can be constrained. It is, 
as “Day of the Rabblement” suggests, essentially human. And as myth has 
served as spirit’s expression within religion, Portrait suggests that, more 
generally, art can do as much without. Joyce’s defense of Ibsen, noted 
above, affirmed the deathless passions in the “heroic cycles” and the 
“scientific age,” and they can be expressed in myth or realist fiction. As 
we’ve seen, Levi-Strauss makes a similar argument of the fluidity of 
genre. In The Naked Man (1971), he says that the novel emerges “in the 
face of the new scientific knowledge” (116), which he sees as emerging in 
the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries (117). “[W]orks of art,” Levi-
Strauss says, “with the death of religion, are no longer merely beautiful 
but become sacred” (117). In a more scientific age, the mystical elements 
of religion recede, but the spirit remains. Art still expresses the deathless 
passions. Levi-Strauss notes, “Before taking the place of religion, the fine 
arts were in religion” (117). The idea seems to be, for Levi-Strauss, that 
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myth-work was the answer to some questions that science now answers, 
but not all questions. Science doesn’t answer questions of meaning or 
ethics or value—the axiological questions. Science explains only how 
things behave in certain conditions; it doesn’t say what they mean. 
The question of meaning still seems to require myth-work 
speculation and, importantly, imagination. Stephen’s ambition to create 
the conscience of a race, for example, remains the purview of art. The 
meaning of any science or craft is open to aesthetic speculation. The 
epigram to Portrait, for instance, is often translated, roughly, as “and he 
applies his mind to obscure arts.” It refers, of course, to the mythological 
Daedalus, and occurs in Ovid’s recounting of the myth of Daedalus and 
his son’s escape from Crete. However, along with Ovid’s description of 
Daedalus’s art as “obscure,” he also describes it as altering “nature’s laws” 
and as “wondrous” (177). The consequences are mixed of course: 
Daedalus effects his escape but loses his son. The language—“obscure,” 
“unnatural,” “wondrous”—along with the consequences suggest 
something Faustian in Daedalus’s art. And so it is with Stephen’s. The 
creation of a conscience, the creation of secular spirit, requires extreme 
rejection, including the cringe-worthy rejection of his dying mother’s 
desire for Stephen to pray with her. The suggestion is that art and the 
imagination are so separate from nature and science that they’re almost a 
perversion of nature and science. My translation of Ovid uses the word 
“unimagined” instead of “obscure.” Mythological Daedalus’s great gift 
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was to imagine possibilities outside of nature or science, and Portrait 
seems to argue that aesthetic imagination does the same. 
In Sidney Feshbach’s “A Slow and Dark Birth: A Study of the 
Organization” (1998), he argues that Portrait’s creation story, the creation 
of the artist, follows a five-phase process, one in each chapter, and each 
denoted by a cry: the vegetative cry, the animal or bestial cry, the human 
or rational cry, the angelic or intellectual cry, and the divine or 
imaginative cry (132).  Feshbach argues that this “ladder of perfection” 
gives, among other qualities, “a teleology to each category and to the 
whole novel” (138). This teleology, considered in the context of Doty’s 
definition of myth, identifies one of Portrait’s mythic structures. Myth, 
Doty says, is fundamental, “a dramatic representation of our deepest 
instinctual life.” Having one structure of Portrait be a kind of 
phylogenetic development suggests a teleology of art, that the artist needs 
to develop the “imaginative cry.” Doty says that myth provides a “primary 
awareness of man in the universe, capable of many configurations.” If we 
substitute “artist” for man, we can see the how the five phases describe 
separate configurations for the artist. Phase five, of course, is an 
aspiration, in no way is it a destination. The homological structure is 
characteristic of much of Joyce, as was mentioned above, but it is also an 
essential quality of myth. In F.L. Radford’s “Daedalus and the Bird Girl: 
Classical Text and Celtic Subtext,” Radford adduces several instances in 
Portrait that show Joyce’s knowledge, and use, of Celtic mythology, 
112 
despite Stephen’s dismissal of it. But of course Stephen’s dismissal is in 
line with Joyce’s claim in “Drama and Life” that the deathless passions are 
the same in the heroic cycle as they are in scientific age. Myth work is 
done even without privileging the era of mythology or, specifically, Celtic 
mythology. 
Imagination as the Modern Spirit 
         There is no thing that with a twist of the imagination cannot be 
something else.            
                   -William Carlos Williams, Kora in Hell: Improvisations 
(1920) 
In the Williams line above, it’s telling that he writes “no thing” as two 
words instead of the more conventional one, “nothing.” The separation 
emphasizes the thing, makes it a concrete object, and at the same time 
subjects the object (all objects) to the power of the imagination: the thing 
isn’t perceived as something else; it will be something else. In the age of 
myth and epic, myth-work affirmed a cosmogony; it answered the 
questions of science, history, and value (the axiological questions). In our 
more secular age, science has arrogated the cosmological questions to 
itself. It has taken the divine or supernatural out of our stories (a 
circumstance often credited with creating much modernist anxiety). This 
has two important consequences: first, we are left solely to history, and, 
second, our values are our own responsibility. The work that myth-work 
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does today, then, shifts: myth-work (art) no longer explains a cosmogony; 
rather, it positions us in history. As science becomes more responsible for 
answering questions of, say, the origins and mechanics of the universe, 
human experience is more historically situated. What we do with the 
objects (Williams’ things) of the universe, will be determined by our own 
imaginations and the infinite possible permutations our imaginations can 
create. Myth-work becomes the attempt to create value in this new 
situation. In Diana Fortuna’s “The Art of the Labrynth” (1998), Fortuna 
argues that the groundbreaking discoveries of ancient Minoan civilization 
in the early 1900s might have prompted Joyce to structure Portrait on the 
Labyrinth myth. Specifically, though, she connects Joyce’s labyrinth myth 
with a reading of Portrait’s phylogenetic structure: Just as rites of Minoan 
civilization evolve from primitive human sacrifices to the Christian 
sacraments, so the baby’s gestation gradually emerges from a virtually 
amoebic animalistic form to the youth’s accretive shape. The development 
of religion originating in the Cretan labyrinth parallels the individual’s 
physical development” (200). The parallel is compelling, but Fortuna 
stops before it finishes. Portrait doesn’t end at the “youth’s accretive 
shape or the development of religion. It ends with one more phase, in the 
imagination, the epiphanic place where all the preceding phases 
originated.  
In “The Storyteller,” Walter Benjamin discusses the difficulties 
that the novel encounters in doing this imaginative myth-work. The 
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storyteller, Benjamin says, comes from an oral tradition, has counsel 
(wisdom) for his audience, and relates social experiences in a social 
setting. The story lives with (gets repeated and re-shaped by) the hearer 
long after the story concludes, which, in a sense, it never does. The 
novelist, on the other hand, writes in seclusion and provides information 
(something like facts or the news of the day); this information is consumed 
at a distance in seclusion, and offers no counsel. The novel, like a fire, 
burns, consumes, and ends. Benjamin argues, however, that the storyteller 
and the novelist are not entirely separate. Among novelists, he says, 
Nicolai Leskov (1831-1895) is most like the storyteller, insofar as a 
novelist can be. Leskov was a student of the classics and had an epic 
sensibility, which is to say, in Benjamin’s terms, he is more chronicler 
than historian. The historian “is bound to explain in one way or another 
the happenings in which he deals.” The chronicler, on the other hand, 
attempts to display “them [the happenings] as models of the course of the 
world” (96). Leskov, Benjamin says, works to present this kind of 
timeless, epic chronicle of the world. The chronicler uses events and 
causality to create meaningful possibilities for imagining our position in 
history. However, just as the storyteller’s story doesn’t end with the 
telling, but rather lives on in the perpetual re-telling, so too does the 
chronicler/novelist’s novel not end at the last page: it lives on in 
meaningful reading, in the imaginative re-telling of the reader. Benjamin’s 
example of Leskov suggests the possibility for chronicler-novelists, 
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novelists who push beyond the cause and effect of narrative to present a 
site for imagining our historical position in new ways. 
Is Portrait a chronicle-novel? Ellman provides this quotation from 
Joyce to his brother Stanislaus regarding Joyce’s intentions with 
Dubliners: “Don’t you think there’s a certain resemblance between the 
mystery of the Mass and what I am trying to do? I mean that I am 
trying…to give people some kind of intellectual pleasure or spiritual 
enjoyment by converting the bread of everyday life into something that 
has a permanent artistic life of its own…for their mental, moral, and 
spiritual uplift” (163). Joyce famously described the stories of Dubliners 
as epiphanies, sudden realizations of something extraordinary in the 
heretofore ordinary. While we’re rightfully skeptical of authorial 
intentions, it’s noteworthy that Joyce saw his mission as the chronicler’s 
mission, to present new ways of thinking about the events of the day. 
Joyce amplifies this further by saying to his brother, “Do you see that man 
who has just skipped out of the way of the tram? Consider if he had been 
run over, how significant every act of his would at once become. I don’t 
mean for the police inspectors. I mean for anybody who knew him. And 
his thoughts for anybody that could know them. It is my idea of the 
significance of the trivial things that I want to give the two or three 
unfortunate wretches who may eventually read me” (163). If the 
chronicler takes the events, the information, the surface causes-and-effects 
of the day and tries to express them in a more original perspective, to 
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spark a new way of knowing, then Joyce is positioning himself squarely in 
this camp. 
More than this, though, in his example of the unfortunate 
pedestrian and the tram, Joyce is echoing Benjamin’s idea of death and the 
chronicler. Art, Benjamin says, can only exist because there is death. After 
Joyce’s pedestrian is killed by the tram, his life exists only in memory and 
story; it’s no longer living actions subsequent to change, but part of a 
completed narrative, wholly in language and out of nature. Joyce uses the 
word “significance,” presumably, to mean importance. But it also suggests 
significance in the semiotic sense: the death or end of anything positions 
that thing as pure semiotics, pure sign.  Benjamin argues this: “The idea of 
eternity has ever had its strongest source in death. If this idea [eternity] 
declines, so we reason, the face of death must have changed. It turns out 
that this change is identical with the one that has diminished the 
communicability of experience to the same extent as the art of storytelling 
has declined” (93). Benjamin is making a generic distinction: with reduced 
contemplation of eternity, there is reduced willingness, openness to the 
never-ending, shifting, changing story of the storyteller. Death is the 
“strongest source” for the idea of eternity because of its seeming finality: 
if something is gone “forever,” it is eternally gone. Benjamin says, “Death 
is the sanction of everything that the storyteller can tell. He has borrowed 
his authority from death. In other words, it is natural history to which his 
stories refer back” (94). From the position of death or the eternal, one 
117 
“looks back” at natural history reflectively. Benjamin is making the 
argument that modernity has increasingly denied death, shunted it behind 
closed doors and, thus, changed the way we tell stories: we’ve lost the 
storyteller/chronicler (of the eternal) and gained the novelist (of the 
present). 
As the death or passing of the “natural” gives way to the semiotic, 
so art gives way to the imagination. Art identifies itself as representation, 
fiction, symbol—never as the thing itself. Art objects are, of course, 
objects, but unlike any other artifact the art object’s emphasis is to push 
beyond itself as object and toward interpretation. Art, like language, is the 
unavoidable modality through which the urge for immateriality expresses 
itself. It is the imagination made physical. In “Joyce and the Present Age” 
(1932), Broch says that “man can never grasp through ‘natural’ means the 
totality in the innermost part of which he lives (supposing of course that 
such a thing as totality still exists)” (67). Comprehension of totality (or the 
possibility of totality), Broch argues, is only conceivable when the 
moment has passed from nature and become “historical” (68). Today, 
we’re less likely to allow for even the parenthetical possibility of totality 
for which Broch allows, but the precondition he sets for any understanding 
is clear. His use of the word “historical” is different from ours: he 
distinguishes the “historical” is past, and we are in the present. It is only 
the historical, that which has passed, which we can understand. Again, that 
which is out of nature and wholly symbolic (Joyce’s unfortunate 
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pedestrian) can be understood more fully than can the natural. The 
threshold between the two, of course, is death. Death as a marker for entry 
into the semiotic appears in Joyce’s work with regularity: In Dubliners, for 
instance, “The Sisters,” “A Painful Case,” “Ivy Day in the Committee 
Room,” and, of course, “The Dead” are organized around the traces of 
death; the death of Paddy Dignam and Stephen’s mother, too, do much to 
structure Ulysses; and Finnegans Wake, of course, takes its name from 
“Finnegan’s Wake,” a popular Irish ballad of the comic death and 
“resurrection” of Tim Finnegan. 
Portrait is a bit different in this regard, as its central push is the 
development and creation of an artist. Portrait is a novel about education, 
self-awareness, and growth. While the death of Parnell hangs over the 
earlier section, death is absent, explicitly anyway, from the novel. 
However, it’s telling that Stephen’s growth and development meets its 
fruition in exile and transformation, two concepts strongly suggestive of a 
kind of finality. Stephen the artist must first loosen the bonds, social and 
physical, that have informed him. He must leave Ireland to write Ireland. 
And he must loosen the grip of his own senses, as he does at the end of 
section IV in Portrait and on Sandymount strand in Ulysses, in order to 
enter more fully into his own imagination. If Joyce’s position is that death 
makes the natural event a sign, then the imagination—which houses the 
traces of the unfortunate pedestrian and, indeed, all deaths—is pure 
signification. It is, perhaps, spirit. And this is the sense of art to which 
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Portrait takes Stephen: art is not an object, not a novel or painting or piece 
of music. These are the points of intersection of the artist’s and reader’s 
imagination. Art resides in the imagination. Stephen’s progression in 
Portrait is, as noted, toward imaginative life, the life of the artist. An 
important recognition on this progression is his repeated recourse to the 
“intangible phantoms” of his mind (88). In section two, while a student at 
Belvedere, Stephen feels besieged by obligations: his peers want a sense 
of comradery; his instructors want obedience; both his father and his 
country increasingly insist on his loyalty. He rejects them all in favor of 
his intangible phantoms: “he gave them [peers, family, country] ear only 
for a time but he was happy only when he was far from them, beyond their 
call, alone or in the company of phantasmal comrades” (89). What at first 
seems a child’s escape becomes, by the novel’s end, something much 
more serious, much more important. It’s the privileging of the 
imagination, the essence of what it is to be human.  
The narrative of Portrait is a chronology of childhood to 
adulthood, but it also moves from third-person to first, which suggests that 
the tone inverts this chronology. (Children are first-person creatures who, 
later, become “aware” of their third-person possibilities.) There is, 
therefore, the suggestion of another development, beyond the education of 
one boy: it’s the movement into and out of dogma, history, and literal 
thinking, the movement toward imaginative life. The opening sentence of 
Portrait says that    
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 Once upon a time and a very good time it was there was a  
 moocow coming down along the road and this moocow 
 that was coming down along the road met a nicens little  
 boy named baby tuckoo… (3) 
The sentence, as noted earlier, begins a story that Stephen’s father, Simon, 
tells him. This opening sentence is the opening of a children’s story, and 
it’s presented as though being told or read by an adult to a child. The 
reader isn’t provided a setting: there’s no room with an adult, a child, and 
(possibly) a book, and Joyce’s em dash, which he uses to indicate 
dialogue, is absent. The obvious conclusion is that this is an instance of 
free indirect discourse, and the remainder of the first chapter strongly 
suggests that this first sentence is young Stephen’s point of view being 
conflated with a third-person narrator. Free indirect discourse can range 
from emphasis on a character’s perspective to emphasis on the narrator’s 
perspective. However, in the moment of the sentence, the point of view 
can also be read as the father’s, Simon’s. Indeed, the complexity of the 
sentence argues more for the adult’s perspective than the child’s. It’s not 
until the second sentence—“His father told him that story…” (3)—that the 
reader is inclined to remove the father’s perspective from the narrative 
options. So here in this first sentence is an instance of cultural inheritance: 
the boy’s introduction to art is done materially (through language), and it’s 
the art of his father, carrying with it the traditions and history of his father. 
The novel begins with young Stephen’s entry into the material, the 
ineluctable modality. The last person he speaks with before leaving 
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Ireland is his mother. And by the novel’s end, we see that, with his call to 
the father—this time a different father from Simon, his aesthetic father 
(Daedalus)—his artistic journey toward the return has begun.28 He has left 
his material family and entered an imaginative life. In the leadup to 
Stephen’s departure, the last six weeks are chronicled with days and 
months, with typically only a few days separating entries, never more than 
ten. Yet the last two dates and places in the novel, Dublin 1904 and Trieste 
1914, are separated by ten years and a thousand miles. Time and place are 
no longer relevant measures; they’re ineluctable modalities. Through art, 
he will reach for the unattainable: a return to the immaterial from which he 
came.  
This return is expressed in his artistic declaration: “to forge in the 
smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race” (276). What is it 
that gets forged through art? A conscience. And conscience is a concept 
that first gets mentioned in the novel by Fr. Arnall in his introduction to a 
religious retreat: “A retreat, my dear boys, signifies a withdrawal for a 
while from the cares of our life, the cares of workaday world, in order to 
examine the state of our conscience, to reflect on the mysteries of holy 
religion and to understand better why we are here in this world” (117). 
Here, the religious retreat does what Stephen, later, wants his imagination 
to do: take him out of the material, “workaday world” and reach for 
                                                 
28 Joyce hints at death as a return to a previous immateriality in a letter to Martha Fleischmann: “one day I shall 
leave, having understood nothing in the darkness which gave birth to both of us” (Selected Letters 235). 
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something beyond. It can’t be reached, of course, because materiality is 
the ineluctable modality, but art is the best modality for the attempt. Art 
and religion, of course, have been inextricably bound together since at 
least the first myths and the caves at Lascaux. Narrative, poetry, pictures, 
music, and drama instantiate a sense (a longing for?) immateriality and 
transcendence. And, in Portrait, religion is the cultural activity that most 
often expresses the most fundamental human urge beyond the bodily urges 
(nourishment and propagation). Portrait presents the merging of 
imaginative art (literature) and religion through Stephen Dedalus’s 
movement from one to the other; he moves from the literal, dogmatic, 
physical, historical religion of the Church toward the intangible phantoms 
of his imagination. If modernity is a moment when we’re forced to situate 
ourselves solely in nature and history, Portrait is the novel that makes the 
claim for art (and language) as the best means for approaching the limits 
of nature and history. Portrait presents the changing, imaginative, 
evanescence of language as the best mode of outstripping material, 
temporal existence, which, alas, can’t be outstripped. Imaginative work 
(art) is the modality that best strives to get beyond materiality while 
understanding that such transcendence cannot be reached. The analog here 
is the “heresy” that young Stephen is accused of by his English master at 
Belvedere. Stephen’s essay says that the soul’s relationship to god is a 
straining “without a possibility of ever approaching nearer” (83). He is 
accused of heresy because, of course, the Church teaches that one can get 
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closer to god, to “approach nearer.” Stephen defends himself by saying 
that he meant “without the possibility of ever reaching” (83). The religious 
principle and the artistic are, again, closely related. The religious principle 
seems to be that the soul cannot “touch” god, but it can come closer to 
god. Likewise, art (and literature in particular) wants to transcend the 
materiality of human existence, and the straining out of this existence is 
best accomplished through the imaginative creation and contemplation of 
art. However, art, too, is always material and, as such, cannot be the 
immaterial for which it strains. It can’t take us out of body, out of the 
ineluctable modality of the material,  
Conclusion 
In “The Metaphysical Poets,” Eliot famously says that “[the ordinary man] 
falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to 
do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of 
cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new 
wholes” (64). The creation of new wholes (not the singular whole) 
suggests the imagination’s ability to, as William Carlos Williams says, 
have something be something else. The difference seems to be that Eliot 
reserves this ability for the poetic imagination. Williams allows it for all 
imaginations, and Portrait seems to take the side of Williams. Both the 
rabblement and the poet have imaginative essence, the difference being 
that the poet, the artist, has freed him- or herself from the ineluctable 
modalities, the social and material obstacles that stand between us and our 
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spiritual essence. By presenting the archetypal modern artist in an 
historically grounded, quasi memoir, Portrait instantiates a mythic text: it 
makes claims about fundamental aesthetic values in a realistic context 
much the same way that mythological images and texts made fundamental 
claims grounded in specific cultural moments. Portrait’s primary claim is 
for imaginative freedom, freedom not only from social institutions but also 
from material constrictions, the constrictions (distractions?) of the senses. 
In his introduction to Portrait, Seamus Deane says, “It was fear of 
freedom, fear of the body, fear of the complexity of experience that would 
always be in excess of the conventions which attempted to organize it into 
stereotyped patterns that wounded the Irish spirit” (ix). As Stephen 
Dedalus matures and develops, it’s this fear of freedom that he imbibes 
with every breath and from which he must extricate himself. And while 
freedom takes, in part, physical exile, Stephen’s emigration at the novel’s 
close is almost metaphorical. The real liberation comes from wholly 
engaging and participating in his imagination. 
Portrait doesn’t profess a kind of mind/body dualism, but it does 
encourage the idea of art as a mental activity, an ongoing imaginative 
process. This, for Joyce, is the spirit: the mysterious, intangible, 
imaginative phantasms of the mind. It’s where Williams’s “thing” gets 
turned into something else, and it’s the fundamental essence of the human. 
And Portrait argues that art, which never pretends to be more than a sign, 
which celebrates its signification, is our material touchstone for this 
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imaginative site. In a science-driven moment like ours, it might feel quaint 
or passé or even anti-intellectual to speak of the mysteries of imaginative 
life, to call it spirit. But much of our theoretical and even scientific 
thinking about human consciousness lends itself to this characterization, or 
at least to the investigation of this characterization. The access point for a 
possible sense of the spiritual is language. In The Symbolic Species: The 
Co-evolution of Language and the Brain (1997), evolutionary biologist 
Terence Deacon argues that language is the essence of human 
consciousness, and the self-referential quality of language lends to our 
thoughts feeling like they’re unmoored from materiality: “In a curious 
way, this recapitulates an unshakable intuition that has been ubiquitously 
expressed throughout ages. This is the belief in a disembodied spirit or 
immortal ‘pilgrim soul’ that defines that part of a person that is not ‘of the 
body’ and is not reducible to the stuff of the material world” (452). This 
quotation seems closer to continental philosophy than evolutionary 
biology. The qualities of language that Deacon describes—signs (he 
would call them symbols) that refer only to other signs in a network of un-
centered signification—has been described by Saussure (langue) and 
Derrida (differance, trace). Deacon, though, adds that our symbolic 
consciousness lends to our experiencing a feeling of mind/body dualism, 
the feeling of spirit: “We are not just a species that uses symbols. The 
symbolic universe has ensnared us in an inescapable web. Like a ‘mind 
virus,’ the symbolic adaptation has infected us, and now by virtue of the 
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irresistible urge it has instilled in us to turn everything we encounter and 
everyone we meet into symbols, we have become the means by which it 
unceremoniously propagates itself throughout the world” (436). 
Experiencing the world symbolically means we can, to use Williams’ 
formulation, imaginatively turn anything into something else. What 
Williams calls imagination, and what Joyce calls spirit, Deacon calls 
symbolic consciousness, an evolutionary adaptation manifested in 
language and genetically spread from generation to generation. Deacon’s 
investigation into language as an evolutionary adaptation—as opposed to 
the Chomsky idea of a “switch” that got flipped in our collective past—
has led him to see our very consciousness as symbolic, making a 
disembodied sense of spirit unavoidable.         
It is not my contention that Joyce, coming from a traditional Irish 
Catholic background, misidentified symbolic consciousness for that 
background’s more religious sense of “spirit.” But Portrait does suggest a 
link between spirit, imagination, art, and language. (Joyce might more 
explicitly present this in the dizzying wordplay of Finnegan’s Wake.) 
“Day of the Rabblement,” Ellman says, is Joyce’s statement that literature 
affirms the human spirit; in Portrait, Stephen longs for a mode of art that 
allows his spirit to express itself in unfettered freedom, unfettered even by 
his own body; Joyce’s contemporary, Herman Broch, argues that that 
spirit resides only in the word. There is, of course, an argument (the 
linguistic turn) that says at this moment in modernity, language was seen 
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as a material influence on our thinking. And while Joyce is outside the 
intersection Deacon, Saussure, and Derrida, he plainly sees language, and 
by extension literature, as an access point to something that at the very 
least feels spiritual. 
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                                                      Chapter Three 
                                The Revenge for Love: The Aesthetics of Disinterest 
Satire and Individualism 
Wyndham Lewis’s The Revenge for Love (1936) pointedly satirizes 
London’s leftist politics at the outset of the Spanish Civil War. The novel 
targets its most withering denunciations at what Lewis calls the “bourgeois 
bohemians,” London’s intellectual, upper-class fellow travelers, the salon 
reds. However, while Revenge is a political novel that ridicules leftist 
politics, it advocates for neither the Nationalist nor Republican position in 
the coming Spanish Civil War. Its satirical ambitions are much broader. 
All satire, of course, presents inconsistencies, hypocrisies, excesses, and 
exaggerations for purposes of critique, but the critique in Revenge extends 
beyond the political left or right. If we think of satire as the subversion or 
distortion of commonly held assumptions, then the assumption satirized in 
Revenge is that the “correct” social system will produce justice or equality 
or freedom. In Revenge, social justice is always elusive. In fact, the very 
act of social formation produces injustice and inequality and dependence. 
Revenge’s satire stretches beyond specific targets or specific political 
systems. The satire extends to all social systems, implying an unavoidable 
sacrifice in the very formation of a social system or institution. Revenge, 
however, does not advocate for nihilism or anarchism. On the contrary, it 
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sees social formation as a necessary evil29. The problem with social 
formations is the inevitable lost freedom of the individual, the freedom 
relinquished by entering the social condition. The individual’s recourse to 
this condition is to position him- or herself against the institutions while at 
the same time acknowledging their inevitability. Like Portrait’s argument 
that artistic freedom requires loosening the hold that social institutions 
exert, Revenge argues that there is an innate, instinctual individuality that 
social formations can’t help but corrupt.  
For satire to be effective, everyone who comes to the satire must 
share certain assumptions. Readers can’t be expected to identify 
exaggeration if there isn’t first an assumed norm. In Timothy Materer’s 
Wyndham Lewis the Novelist (1976), Materer cites W.H. Auden on the 
social conditions necessary for the production and reception of satire: 
“Satire flourishes in a homogeneous society where satirist and audience 
share the same views as to how normal people can be expected to behave” 
(28). In a more heterogenous society, satire might be less common, and 
the interpretation of a text as satirical might be harder to establish. Auden 
also recognizes that satire often targets human behavior and that the best 
conditions for satire are those “times of relative stability and contentment, 
for satire cannot deal with serious evil and suffering. In an age like our 
                                                 
29 This is not be confused with the principle (popularized by, but not original to, Thoreau) that “that government is 
best which governs least.” Revenge’s position is not on the reach of individual political institutions, nor on 
realpolitik distinctions about, say, regulation or taxation. Rather, it recognizes the necessity and limitations of all 
social systems, all institutions. 
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own, it cannot flourish” (28). Auden made these statements in 1962, and 
an “age like our own” refers to the age of more heterogeneous societies, of 
world wars, and of nuclear threat. In a 1921 interview published in the 
Daily Express, Lewis, too, declares, “Satire is dead to-day [sic]. There has 
been no great satirist since Swift. The reason is that the sense of moral 
discrimination in this age has been so blurred that it simply wouldn’t 
understand written satire if it saw it” (Complete Wild Body 359). Where 
Auden acknowledged suffering and anxiety as a limitation to satire, Lewis 
identifies the problem for modern satire as blurred discrimination: the 
British are unable to make the fine distinctions that satire requires. 
However, what Lewis perceives as an inability might more accurately be 
described as a less homogenous society’s more various discriminations. A 
more heterogenous society will produce more diverse discriminations, 
more diverse distinctions. Without the homogenous norm, satire, perhaps, 
becomes niche. Auden and Lewis seem, then, to be describing the same 
condition but in different ways. Blaming the dearth of satire on British 
dullards, though, allows Lewis to employ the supercilious tone and voice 
of the haughty, cynical kvetch, a role he clearly enjoyed. 
Revenge emerges at the onset of the age Auden describes. It’s 
written before the age of nuclear threat, yes, but in a more heterogenous 
society30, with a revolutionary regime in Russia, and during the rise of 
                                                 
30 The popularity of invasion literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggests not only a more 
heterogenous society but anxiety about this increased heterogeneity.  
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fascism in Italy, Spain, and Germany. Auden and Lewis acknowledge that 
theirs is a culture that shares fewer norms, that exists in an anxious age, is 
not, therefore, suitable for satire. In such a time and place, satire at best 
will produce various “misreadings.” Why, then, does Lewis bother to 
write satire? Indeed, Materer says that Lewis “doubted that his own 
society offered any moral norms, he saw no sure [satirical] way to call the 
fools and knaves into account” (24). This leads Materer to conclude that, 
in fact, Revenge is not satire, that Lewis’s “artistic vision was more tragic 
than satiric” (30). And there is certainly a tragic reading of Revenge. (If, as 
I’ve suggested above, Revenge presents the social condition as both 
necessary and necessarily corrupting, then the individual is always already 
in a tragic condition.) However, Revenge’s cast of laughable characters—
the satyr Jack Cruze, the egregiously mercenary Sean O’Hara, and the 
entire set of deluded bourgeois bohemians—is so clearly over-the-top that 
it’s impossible to deny Revenge’s satirical presentation. Again, though, if 
Lewis regarded satire as aesthetically impotent for the dullards of interwar 
Britain, then why write it at all? I will argue that the satire in Lewis’s 
novel is the essence of his aesthetic position: satire itself, for Lewis, is an 
instantiation of the social condition. Because satire represents 
exaggerations and distortions, it is a “false” representation, and a false, 
satirical position is the unavoidable modern social position. In the social 
setting, the individual is compelled to wear a mask, to present a distortion. 
The individual submits to a confluence of social systems, sacrifices his or 
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her individuality and authenticity to the systems, and wears a mask to 
negotiate the systems’ demands. It is this unavoidable, diminished social 
condition that Lewis can’t help but mock. 
What lies beneath the distorted, masked surface? Revenge argues 
that it’s the free individual. Revenge presents an insistent, romantic kind of 
humanism: the individual’s persistent assertion of his or her individuality 
against the systems that have eroded it, systems that demand the satirical 
mask. As exaggeration and distortion, satire is a “false” presentation, and 
if social formations demand false presentation, then Revenge is the satire 
that satirizes the satirical condition. The novel argues for acknowledging 
and reinterpreting the false position that social formation foists on the 
individual. This position is exemplified in Lewis’s Tyro paintings, smiling 
enigmatic caricatures that Lewis describes thus: “The Tyro, too, is raw and 
undeveloped; his vitality is immense, but purposeless, and hence 
sometimes malignant. His keynote, however, is vacuity; he is an animated, 
but artificial puppet, a ‘novice’ to real life” (Complete Wild Body 359).  
The real life to which the Tyro is novice is the natural individuality that 
has been sacrificed in the social condition. His puppet-like expression is 
the mask that represents our social position. In Wyndham Lewis: Painter 
and Writer, Paul Edwards notes this Lewis description of the Tyro 
paintings: “These immense novices brandish their appetites in the faces, 
lay bare their teeth in a valedictory, inviting, or merely substantial laugh. 
A laugh like a sneeze, exposes the nature of the individual with an 
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unexpectedness that is perhaps a little unreal” (254). The laugh that bursts 
forth like a sneeze is the “nature of the individual,” the natural that is 
suppressed in society, an uncontrolled, unregulated, un-premeditated 
outburst. The Tyro is a novice to his real self, his natural self. The Tyro is 
the social puppet: a representation of the individual, merely a social shell. 
The laughter bursts forth as appetite, animal desire, a kind of involuntary 
muscle, the trace of the individual that social formation has suppressed. 
Nature and the Individual 
Just as satire requires a norm, so does the concept of social distortion. In 
Revenge, this norm that society distorts is the individual outside of society, 
the individual in nature. Revenge presents nature as outside of social 
formation. It’s a theoretical condition of freedom and individuality not 
entirely dissimilar to the now famous (infamous?) description of nature by 
the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes theorizes that the state 
of nature, or more specifically the condition of mere nature, is an anarchic 
condition of all against all. There is no law or right or even morality. 
Everyone merely satisfies his or her appetite. To quit this condition and 
obtain security requires renouncing the pure freedom of the state of nature. 
Social formation, then, begins with renunciation. It is in this way that 
Revenge sees the divide between the individual and the social. The 
emphasis in Revenge, however, is not on Hobbesian anarchy so much as it 
is on intellectual purity. Where Hobbes describes life in the state of nature 
as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short,” Revenge nostalgically laments 
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the loss of absolute freedom to reason and express oneself. Individuality 
and free reign of reason, which are appetites, are lost with the subjection 
of appetite. When speaking of the Tyros, Lewis couples appetite and 
vacuity. Lewis says, as noted above, that the Tyro’s laugh is all appetite. 
The laugh—bursting forth like a sneeze, involuntary and unregulated—is 
the trace of nature that everyone retains. The Tyro’s vacuity, though, is the 
forfeiture of “pure” contemplative intelligence. Now, instead of pure 
thinking, he or she thinks socially: thought has social parameters, social 
requirements. Intellectual expression, including aesthetic expression, is 
replaced by social negotiation, thinking in order to navigate social 
formations. Reason no longer contemplates what something is; reason 
contemplates what it’s socially called. 
Percy Hardcaster is Revenge’s most knowing character, the one 
who understands both the distortions of social formations and their 
necessity. He is a sindicalista, a leftist caught up in the escalating pre-war 
tensions of Spain. The novel opens with Percy, an English revolutionary in 
a Spanish prison, debating his Spanish jailer, Don Alvaro, on the relative 
merits of English and Spanish law. Percy defends the English system by 
saying, “There is a certain amount of justice in my country. Not much. But 
they do pretend” (3). Percy’s best argument for the superiority of English 
law is that it pretends better than does Spanish law. The English political 
system, Percy argues, may not fundamentally be just, but it does, at least, 
approximate something like justice, present the appearance of justice, 
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make motions toward justice. This is the best that capitalist political 
formations have yet provided. And while Percy certainly behaves as a 
committed communist, it’s not at all clear that he believes a communist 
system will provide complete justice and equality. The clarity of nature—
which is a context without the concept of justice—has been relinquished 
for a corruption of social justice. And while social justice under 
communism will be an improvement, it will still be corrupted to some 
degree. In his debate with Don Alvaro, Percy quotes Paul’s epistle to the 
Corinthians: “All things are lawful for me, but all things are not 
expedient” (2). “Expedience” here is widely understood as “beneficial.” 
The idea is that while we may do as we please, that which is beneficial, as 
determined by a god, would be that god’s law. But in a system without the 
fixed, transcendent law of a god, we’re left simply with individual 
determinations of lawlessness—all things are lawful for me. (This, of 
course, is the state of nature.) And while it’s unlikely that Percy is 
advocating a religious position, he does seem to suggest the necessity of a 
higher social law, and communism will provide this higher, more just law. 
Percy’s argument inflames Don Alvaro, who is a former Civil 
Guard, a group notorious for its strict adherence to the laws of state. 
Shortly after this debate between Percy and Don Alvaro, Percy attempts to 
escape. On the evening of his escape, though, Percy has misgivings. One 
of his guards, Serafin, has been paid by the sindicalistas to assist in 
Percy’s escape. Earlier, Serafin suggested to Percy that they go on a 
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different night, that something wasn’t quite right, but Percy dismissed 
Serafin’s suspicions. Now, however, as the hour to escape draws near, 
Percy begins to feel unsure. He attributes some of his misgivings to the 
night itself. It is a beautifully calm evening, yet Percy cannot “support the 
placid night outside! There was not only the fact that Nature was blind to 
the intellectual beauties of the Social Revolution, and deaf to the voice of 
Conscience; there was also the fact that Nature, especially in these 
sumptuous climates, required a Spartan watchfulness” (40). Nature poses 
two difficulties for Percy. First, nature is politically and socially 
indifferent. In this moment of romantic reflection, Percy acknowledges 
that nature is neither helpful or unhelpful, neither just nor unjust. Nature is 
sublimely disinterested. Cruelty, benevolence, justice, right and wrong, 
these are social realities; they do not exist in the state of nature. Nature is 
always only nature. Percy’s second difficulty emerging from this 
particularly serene night is that it might seduce him from the cause, and he 
struggles against this seduction with Spartan watchfulness. The allure of 
nature is its freedom, and because it is a condition of non-law 
(“lawlessness” won’t work here), it is individual freedom that seduces.  
Today we are, rightly, suspicious of the concept of a free, 
autonomous individual. Powerfully persuasive arguments, produced by the 
usual suspects, are adduced in favor of a constructed subject, not an 
autonomous individual: Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Derrida have 
displaced the autonomous individual with a language-based subject; Freud 
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has displaced the autonomous individual with a largely unconscious 
subject determined by drives; and Marxists have displaced the 
autonomous individual with a subject determined by history. Marx is, of 
course, the most relevant to Revenge; as noted above, the novel saves its 
most biting satire for the bourgeois bohemians. However, the novel’s 
critique of social formations and institutions has an unexpected parallel in 
Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970) (a 
parallel that might provide Lewis a modicum of defense against charges of 
Fascism). Revenge’s controlling metaphor, for example, is the “false 
bottom,” the appearance of a foundational concept that is, in fact, merely 
appearance. In Revenge, social formations inherently produce false 
bottoms. Althusser’s concept of ideology, too, is a description of social 
“falseness”: “Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals 
to their real conditions of existence” (691). For Althusser, the relationship 
between individual and social conditions is mere representation because 
it’s a false consciousness. The relationship appears to be that which it is 
not. Likewise, as mentioned above, the controlling metaphor of Revenge is 
the false bottom, the apparent foundation that isn’t a foundation at all. 
Revenge presents these false bottoms as inherent to social formations.  
The duplicity of Don Alvaro is an example of this kind of false 
bottom. Don Alvaro learns of Percy’s planned escape by discovering a 
literal false bottom: he finds a secret compartment beneath the “bottom” of 
a basket that a local woman has been using to bring Percy food. The 
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instructions for the planned escape are hidden beneath. Don Alvaro then 
reveals the false bottom of his own seemingly sacrosanct devotion to duty: 
instead of informing Percy and Seraphin that he knows their plan, he waits 
for them outside of the jail, in the woods. Don Alvaro ambushes them 
both, killing Seraphin and wounding Percy in the leg. Why? He was angry 
that Percy and the sindicalistas had offered the bribe to Seraphin and not 
him. Despite his protestations about duty and law, Don Alvaro would have 
betrayed these seemingly sacrosanct ideas for a bribe—“Everyone has a 
price,” he tells Percy (44). Don Alvaro’s false claims for the inviolability 
of the law echo Althusser’s argument about ideology and justice. 
Althusser argues that if a subject, through the influence of both repressive 
state apparatuses (RSA) and ideological state apparatuses (ISA), “believes 
in Justice, he will submit unconditionally to the rules of the Law, and may 
even protest when they are violated, sign petitions, take part in a 
demonstration, etc.” (696). But of course this relationship to duty would 
be a false one, foisted on the subject through RSAs and ISAs. Our ideas 
are not free-formed, objective concepts. They are “material actions 
inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are 
themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which 
derive the ideas of the subject” (697). This circular process, for Althusser, 
shows how our actions, practices, and rituals produce and are produced by 
the ruling ideology. What, then, to make of Don Alvaro, who defies the 
ruling ideology of justice? Revenge presents selfishness not as 
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participating in the ruling ideology; rather it’s the trace of the individual as 
he or she is in the state of nature: “all things are lawful to me.”   
The distrust of social formations present in Revenge is suggested, 
more generally, by Ivan Phillips as a distrust that Lewis held for groups of 
people. Phillips uses this distrust to defend Lewis against charges of 
racism and sexism. In “Political Incorrectness Gone Sane: Lewis, Race, 
and Gender” (2015). Phillips attempts to defend Lewis from the 
accusations of bigotry that critics, justifiably, level at Lewis. Phillips 
suggests that Lewis is guilty of “an anxious hostility towards what he 
[Lewis] sees as ‘group rhythms’” (122). Group rhythms are defined as “a 
coagulation of individuals into mass units” (122). Phillips argues that 
grouping individuals in this way is an obvious oversimplification that, 
again, might explain some of Lewis’s generalized ideas about race and 
gender. While I’m not sure the idea of “group rhythms” goes far in 
redeeming some of Lewis’s more unpleasant observations—another term 
for “group rhythms” might simply be “chauvinistic stereotyping”—I do 
think Lewis, and Revenge in particular, portrays a distrust of sociality. 
And if Lewis saw women, Jews, people of color, or communists forming 
social and political units around these identities, he might well have seen 
such grouping as just another remove from the clarity of the individual in 
the state of nature. Where an Althusser sees the individual is an abstract—
“Man,” he says, “is an ideological animal by nature” (698)—Lewis sees 
the individual as naturally outside of ideology. It’s not until we start 
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“moving in group rhythms” that a kind of ideology is formed. For 
Althusser, we are always already subjects. For Lewis, we become subjects, 
but never completely. While it’s clear that the individual is always “in 
society,” Revenge asserts a certain essence of individuality that is beyond 
the reach of subject-creation. It’s the trace of a unique individual that is 
“underneath” the mask that social formation demands. In this sense, 
Revenge might be more akin to Sartre’s claim that we are “condemned to 
be free,” with the added caveat that we’re also condemned to be social. 
And therein lies the tragedy. 
Art and the State of Nature 
As noted above, Percy Hardcaster’s initial misgivings before his escape 
from prison suggest the temptation of our natural state. In the moments 
before his escape attempt, the seductive power of nature creeps into 
Percy’s imagination. The seduction of nature is, again, its disinterested 
clarity, its free condition. And it is easy to imagine that Percy’s desire to 
return to nature is motivated by the desire to get beyond political struggle 
and to rest in the indifference of nature. To combat his desire to return to 
nature, Percy maintains a “Spartan watchfulness.” But Percy’s concern is 
more than the temptation of nature. It is also the temptation of art, which 
Revenge connects to our natural state. While contemplating the lure of the 
state of nature, Percy also entertains the lure of art: “If he was not, in 
short, to be lulled into forgetfulness of social justice, he must never allow 
himself to play the artist. And Percy liked playing the artist. Percy the 
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gunman insisted upon Percy the ‘artist’! It had been very awkward at 
times” (40). The artist in Percy is that part of him which is drawn to the 
indifference of nature and, perhaps, that which is natural in the human. 
Like the calm Spanish night outside his prison cell, art is indifferent to the 
social revolution and to social systems. If art is free individual expression, 
then art doesn’t promote social justice. It has no social agenda. It is the 
indifferent expression of individual experience. Percy’s conflicted notions, 
his artistic desires and his political beliefs, are exemplified throughout the 
novel. He is the novel’s most celebrated revolutionary, the novel’s most 
practical and effective revolutionary. Yet he is also the least mercenary 
and the one most aware of the cause’s hypocrisies. One suspects the 
source of his knowledge of the hypocrisies is the same source that inclines 
him to play the artist. During his escape from the Spanish prison, he is 
confronted with the possibility of another escape: the escape from both left 
and right politics, from the social formations that he serves. And it is only 
with great effort that Percy resists this secondary escape into art and nature 
and remains an agent for the left. 
Percy summons the strength to reject the Spanish night and his 
inner artist, and he does so, in part, by recalling a sentiment attributed to 
Lenin: “Did not Lenin say that he hated violinists, because they made him 
feel he wanted to stroke their heads, and all the time he knew that it was in 
fact his duty to bash their brains out?” (40). Lenin, as Percy presents him, 
was just as conflicted as he. Lenin was deeply moved by art but resisted 
142 
this affection in the interest of his social responsibility. The danger of art 
for men like Lenin and Percy is clear: art, like nature, is indifferent to 
social formations (social justice), and the appeal of art and nature is their 
promise of individual freedom. Art is presented here as the autonomous 
individual’s free expression determined only by reason and experience. To 
pursue social justice means repressing this unadulterated expression, and 
to pursue unadulterated expression is to disregard social justice: if art is 
exploration and presentation, then it is this regardless of consequence or 
social concepts of fairness, justice, order, or law. Again, Lewis’s Tyro 
paintings are instructive. He says the keynote of the Tyro is vacuity. The 
Tyro is “an animated, but artificial puppet, a ‘novice’ to real life.” Real 
life is the life before social formation, the complete freedom of the 
individual in the state of nature.   
Fortified by this (apocryphal?) story of Lenin, Percy rebuffs his 
own artistic impulse, his desire to abandon the systems and embrace art, 
and he attempts his escape. Outside the prison, however, when he is 
physically outside the manifestation of Spanish justice and in the woods, 
his artistic sense resurfaces. The escape plan was discovered earlier by 
Don Alvaro, the Civil Guard, who now lies in wait for Percy and Serafin. 
Don Alvaro shoots and kills Serafin, and shoots Percy in the leg. It is here 
that Percy notices the false bottom of Don Alvaro. Earlier in the jail, Percy 
and Don Alvaro had debated the role of the law. And when Percy claimed 
that civil laws could sometimes justifiably be disregarded in the interest of 
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moral laws and expedience, Don Alvaro defiantly repudiated the claim 
and defended the inviolability of the civil law. Now, though, as Don 
Alvaro stands over the dead Serafin and the bleeding Percy, Don Alvaro’s 
true motivations become clear: he had discovered the escape plan and 
could, therefore, have thwarted it without violence. But he was angry that 
he had not been offered money to assist in the escape, and in his rage, he 
chose to ambush Serafin and Percy, killing the one and wounding the 
other, merely out of corruption, pique, and greed: “Why, Don Percy,” Don 
Alvaro says, “did you never propose to me a little deal? Every man has his 
price!” (44). Interestingly, when Don Alvaro makes this confession and 
Percy recognizes the falseness of Don Alvaro, he doesn’t condemn Don 
Alvaro’s hypocrisy as an attribute of the nationalists. Instead, he 
recognizes a oneness of Don Alvaro and his own comrades, the 
sindicalistas. And in Percy’s imagination, all parties of the political 
struggle get subsumed into nature and art: 
[Don Alvaro] had the face of a sindicalista. Percy was damned if he 
hadn’t! – with apologies to the comrades and all that – for this was in fact 
a murderous Civil Guard! But he was not the man he had taken him for. 
And as [Percy] idly examined the stern traditional features under the 
warder’s cap they began to dissolve into the stars around them, and Don 
Percy became one with that vast and beautiful neutral system, of the 
objective universe of things, which cared nothing for the Social 
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Revolution but flattered him into thinking – upon moonlight nights – that 
he was a Beethoven who had been forced into politics by poverty. (45)  
Again, the artistic sensibility gets aligned with disinterested nature, 
outside of ideology and outside of history; both the personal greed of Don 
Alvaro and the singular vision of the artist are traces of the individual in 
nature. The nationalists and sindicalistas are all one. In these moments of 
nature’s seduction, Percy Hardcaster, who has no occupational connection 
to art—before becoming a revolutionary he was a laborer—is associated 
with art, with Beethoven and “dealings with bel canto, and oratorios” (40). 
The artistic sense is presented as constitutive of the natural human animal, 
the pre-civil state of nature where individual freedom is not subsumed by 
social demands. Outside the socially constructed systems is nature, and it 
is here that the novel places art and the artist. Art, of course, can be 
institutionalized, and its telling that Revenge’s most salient art institution 
is a forgery shop: a false bottom. But it is the “purer,” pre-institutional 
form of art that Revenge advocates. The artist in Revenge is not one who 
practices art professionally or even as a hobby. Art, instead, is a condition 
not unlike nature itself, or a sensibility, one that everyone possesses (like 
Joyce’s claim in “Day of the Rabblement,” that art is spirit). Like nature, 
art is constitutive of humankind. Everyone is an artist or has access to the 
artistic. 
In the vorticism manifesto from the first issue of Blast, in 1914, 
Lewis signs off on three propositions concerning art and nature: First, 
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“The Art-instinct is permanently primitive” (293). Here Lewis is stating 
that art isn’t a skill or a craft but an instinct, a human drive. And calling art 
at once an instinct and primitive suggests notions of pre-rational behavior 
in a pre-civilized condition: the Hobbesian state of nature. And like all 
instincts in the state of nature, art is given unfettered expression until 
confronted with competing instincts. Importantly, Lewis claims that art is 
“permanently primitive,” which is to say that civilization doesn’t abolish 
or modify this instinct, only buries it. And the art instinct is poised to 
manifest itself just as the involuntary and inevitable laugh bursting from 
the Tyro. The second proposition of art and nature is this: “In a chaos of 
imperfection, discord, etc., it [the art instinct] finds the same stimulus as in 
Nature” (293). That the chaos of imperfection and discord is imagined 
outside of nature suggests that this is Lewis’s description of civilization. 
The individual’s art instinct is no longer in a natural free state; rather, it’s 
in a compromised social state: civilization. And while we typically 
imagine a state of nature as chaotic and discordant, in the savage state 
brought to order through civilization Lewis sees the reverse. He 
emphasizes the freedom that is inevitably sacrificed in order to secure the 
benefits of civilization as well as the disharmony that collective, 
cooperative organization produces. Finally, Lewis connects art and nature 
by describing the art instinct in modernity, when society is beyond chaotic 
and discordant: “The artist of the modern movement is a savage…this 
enormous, jangling, journalistic, fairy desert of modern life serves him as 
146 
Nature did more technically primitive man” (293). The individual here 
retains the art instinct—as though he could do otherwise—and this savage 
instinct responds to modern life just as the art instinct in the state of nature 
responded to nature. However, the savage art instinct now finds itself in an 
alienated condition. Lewis’s description of modernity—"the enormous, 
jangling, journalistic, fairy desert”—suggests a sprawling, mechanistic 
hodgepodge that a tinkering demigod might have thrown together from 
spare parts salvaged from the garage. This is a far remove from the state of 
nature, the individual’s natural—in every sense of the word “natural”—
condition. 
These three vorticist propositions precede Revenge by twenty 
years, yet taken together they prefigure Revenge’s instantiation of the 
nature-art connection: the painter Victor Stamp. Victor is the natural art 
instinct in civilization. He is Australian, and throughout the novel is 
characterized in terms of the natural, the untamed. For the communist art 
critic Peter Wallace, Victor is a “wild goat of the places of the wilderness” 
(153). The capitalist gunrunner Abershaw calls him “an out-of-door man” 
(282). And Victor himself, when apologizing to Margot, his girlfriend, for 
his unrefined behavior, blames his behavior on his being “a wild 
Australian” (74). At Sean O’Hara’s party, which is attended by artists and 
upper-class communists, Victor is a conspicuous outsider. His ideas, 
manners, and disposition mark him as ill-suited for drawing-room 
company: “Australian Victor, becoming drunk, was finding his nation 
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returning to him out of the thick mists of the alcohol […] who felt the call 
of the quarrelsome blood” (170). Victor is, at best, a mediocre painter, but 
he maintains a serious devotion to the craft. Because of his inability to sell 
his work, he is compelled, reluctantly, to work at Freddie Salmon’s 
forgery shop. Here a handful of painters have been recruited to forge more 
famous painters’ works—Victor is working on a Van Gogh. The other 
forgers justify their crime in various ways: the great artists, too, were 
forgers; capitalist art-for-profit is part and parcel of the problem of private 
property. For Victor, though, the justification is simply financial necessity. 
He needs the money. So even here Victor stands apart from his peers. He 
is  
an animal amongst men, this young giant crouched doubled up where he 
sat, his back eloquently presented to Freddie Salmon should [Salmon] turn 
about to address him. A striking picture of the Odd Man Out. For better or 
for worse these broad and hostile shoulders belonged to Nature, with her 
big impulsive responses, with her violent freedom, with her animal 
directness: unconservative, illogical, and true to her elemental self. He 
subscribed therefore to the larger scheme: the smaller the watertight, the 
theoretic, the planning of man’s logic, he repudiated. Like a camel, he 
must remain a creature of the wild, and never, like the horse wholly 
submit to discipline. (258-9) 
Victor is described here as the creature of the state of nature, as 
Lewis sees it: impulsive, violently free, direct, illogical, elemental. He is 
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all the qualities that the civilized men—not only the corrupt profiteers, but 
also the deluded artists—are not. He is, in short, of the state of nature but 
out of it; he’s now in “civilized” society. And the civilized men are 
deceptive; they rationalize tortuous justifications for their deception, but 
the truth is that they’ve been coopted and corrupted by their various 
systems. Victor has his back to Salmon, who is part of the duplicitous-
gunrunning-racketeering group that includes Abershaw and Sean O’Hara. 
They will dissemble, lie, and forge as a matter of course if there is a profit 
to be had. Victor has joined them, again, solely from financial desperation, 
but he roundly rejects their scheming. Ultimately, he quits the forgery 
shop in spectacular fashion, putting his foot through his “Van Gogh.” 
Victor exemplifies two important ideas about art. First, art is an instinct. It 
is more than skill or technique. It is a human endowment of nature. Social 
pressures can repress the art instinct but not eliminate it. It will burst forth 
like the Tyro’s laugh, irrepressible and authentic. The second is that the art 
instinct must always be resisting social pressure. The individual can never 
escape society—the Hobbesian state of nature is theoretical, not historic—
but the individual must push against social influence to assert as much free 
and independent thought as possible. Art is the outlet for this resistance.  
The artist counterpoint to Victor is his friend, the painter Tristram 
Phipps. Tristram is the more talented painter, but he’s also a naïve fellow 
traveler. He dutifully, unquestioningly absorbs communist propaganda and 
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seems satisfied to let others explain the cause to him31. Whenever art and 
the cause come into conflict, Tristram becomes painfully uncomfortable. 
Revenge presents art and communism as largely at odds, and Tristram’s 
inability to reconcile them distresses him. At Sean O’Hara’s party, for 
example, the Marxist art critic Peter Wallace insists to Tristram that a 
Picasso painting, a print of which is on the wall beside them, “is bourgeois 
art all the same. Its values are capitalist” (151). Tristram tries to defend the 
painting, which he admires, but he’s cowed by the Marxist argument. He 
struggles to maintain his individual artistic sense in the face of the 
intimidating Peter. His childlike obedience to Marxist thinkers butts up 
against his artistic instinct: “Tristy looked very miserable. He could not 
deny the justness of the description. The orthodoxy of the picture was not 
be questioned. And yet he was compelled to sustain an opposite opinion to 
all that he knew to be true, for the reason that there was another 
conscience, namely that of the pitiable thing, the artist. And conscientious 
at all costs he had to be!” (154). Tristram is compelled to maintain the 
artistic opinion because of its instinctual nature. The orthodoxy that he 
rationally knows is a social construct; the artistic conscience that he feels 
is natural. He himself is the pitiable artist, whose art instinct is being 
overrun by social theory. Tristram hasn’t the will to reject Peter’s ideas, 
                                                 
31 Tristram’s name invokes, obviously, Sterne’s equally innocent, naïve Tristram Shandy. This association gets 
tattooed to the reader’s forehead when, in the second paragraph of chapter three, Tristram Phipps is referred to as 
“Mr. Shandy” (102). It’s the only time in the novel that Tristram Phipps is denominated this way, and it reads less 
like free indirect discourse and more like a Lewis having a joke with the reader.  
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and that he is characterized as having to be artistically conscientious 
suggests the instinctual nature of art. 
Tristram knows that Peter is re-stating what noted communist 
writer Carl Einstein says about Picasso, and this makes Tristram all the 
more depressed. Einstein is regarded as a brilliant communist thinker, so, 
Tristram believes, his ideas must be better informed than Tristram’s. 
Victor, however, who is also part of the discussion, has no such political 
reservations, and he’s not at all intimidated by Peter Wallace’s invoking 
Einstein’s arguments: “Carl Einstein’s talking through his hat when he 
says that, Pete” (154). Victor advocates leaving Einstein and Karl Marx 
out of the discussion of art. Peter then accuses Victor of being a decadent 
and trying to avoid that which is unavoidable: “‘You see, Vic, it’s no 
good,’ Pete said kindly. ‘You can’t regard painting as suspended in the 
ether, attached to nothing in heaven or on earth. That’s art for art’s sake. 
You can’t do that” (155). Victor rejects the accusation, denying an 
adherence to art for art’s sake, but he doesn’t articulate a response, mostly 
because he’s unable. It’s clear that Victor sees art as something more than 
an object viewed through a theoretical lens, but he doesn’t say what this 
something more is. And, of course, he can’t. He’s the wild, natural, 
illogical artist. To engage in this kind of theorizing is beyond him. He 
won’t succumb to it as Tristram does, and he won’t meet one theoretical 
reading with another. 
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Today we are, rightly, skeptical of this kind of objective truth, 
gleaned by the naturally free individual. It’s at best naïve and at worst 
chauvinist. (Proponents of objective, a-historical, a-social “truth” often 
claim, probably not coincidentally, possession of this “truth.)  But if we 
allow that the state of nature is more theory than history, and that the work 
toward individuality is really work toward authenticity, an authenticity 
that, like the perfectly free individual, is more theoretical than historical, 
then Revenge’s aesthetic claims seem less dated than they might 
otherwise. We see the theorizing of nature and art in Revenge’s 
presentation of Victor as the “natural man.” A more “literal” reading of 
Victor might interpret him as Revenge’s nostalgic look back to a more 
rural time, a Wordsworthian celebration of nature. But it’s not nature qua 
nature that Revenge celebrates. The vorticist manifesto says, “It cannot be 
said that the complication of the Jungle, dramatic tropic growths, the 
vastness of American trees, is not for us [the English]” (294). Lewis 
acknowledges that England may no longer possess a rural frontier as, say, 
the United States did. But such an absence isn’t important. The artist’s 
physical environment isn’t at issue. The vorticists say, “For in the forms of 
machinery, Factories, new and vaster buildings, bridges and works, we 
have all that, naturally, around us” (294). The idea is that physical 
environment is physical environment. Art responds to what is. Victor 
presents a freer, more authentic response to the environment. Trees or 
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concrete are not important; the real work of art is to push back against 
what Revenge considers the corrupting influence of the social condition. 
Revenge’s position on art, that it needs to be an individual 
expression uncorrupted by institutions or social pressure begs this 
question: Why would Revenge advocate an anti-institutional, anti-social 
position for art, yet found this position on ideas presented in a manifesto in 
a literary magazine (Blast)?  Tyrus Miller, in Late Modernism: Politics, 
Fiction, and the Arts between the World Wars (1999), argues that Lewis 
underwent a significant theoretical “rebirth” around 1926. Miller quotes 
Lewis in Blasting and Bombardiering (1937), Lewis’s autobiography of 
the years 1914 to 1926: “I disinterred myself in 1926, the year of the 
General Strike” (70). Britain’s General Strike of 1926, Miller argues, was 
a watershed moment for Lewis because it demonstrated “the moribund 
nature of British social institutions and revealed the unreadiness of Labor 
to offer an alternative” (70). The failure of social institutions, along with 
the bleak outlook for future institutions, indicts the social condition 
generally. It reveals the social condition itself to be inherently insufficient. 
I stated above that Revenge is the satirical novel that satirizes a satirical 
condition. Miller quotes Lewis, in Men Without Art (1934), as intimating 
just such a role for satire: “Satire in reality often is nothing but the truth, 
the truth, in fact, of Natural Science. That objective, non-emotional truth 
of the scientific intelligence sometimes takes on the exuberant sensuous 
quality of creative art: then it is very apt to be called ‘Satire,’ for it has 
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been bent not so much upon pleasing as upon being true” (97). It’s 
significant that Lewis mentions not merely science but natural science. It’s 
a claim for empiricism becoming art, yes, but what is the value of 
empiricism? Its value is its purported disinterested objectivity. The 
suggestion is that this disinterested objectivity is a fact of nature, our 
theoretical first condition. And nature, like natural science, isn’t about 
“pleasing” anyone. Indeed, it’s not about anything. It wants to be the 
objective investigation of what is. The social condition, on the other hand, 
is the condition that inherently requires such stooping (as Lewis would see 
it) to please. 
Lewis’s purported shift after 1926 was a shift towards greater 
pessimism about social possibilities. And in “Anti-Individualism and the 
Fictions of National Character in Wyndham Lewis’s Tarr” (1994), Paul 
Peppis seems to support this. In fact, Peppis argues that Lewis’s attitude 
toward individualism began earlier, starting to change over the course of 
the war: “In that tumultuous and disillusioning year of war, in fact, 
Lewis’s attitudes regarding Individualism shifted radically” (234). Peppis 
argues that Lewis’s Tarr (1917), through its characterization of English 
and German characters, rejects nineteenth-century ideas of autonomous, 
independently-thinking individuals and, instead, proposes that people 
belong to national types. Tarr does so through it’s almost allegorical 
presentation of national types (228). This would seem to corroborate 
Miller’s, as well as Lewis’s, assertion that after the General Strike of 
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1926, Lewis became disillusioned with social possibilities; perhaps, as 
Peppis argues, Lewis’s disillusionment with social formations extended to 
complete annihilation of the individual, something akin to ideology: one is 
always already of his or her national type. I think, though, that Peppis 
overstates a bit Lewis’s 1926 “conversion.” I take Lewis at his word when 
he says the General Strike had a profound impact on his thinking. But I 
think he was always an individualist; it’s only that his emphasis shifted 
from nationalist social pressures (Tarr) to more localized social pressures, 
e.g. bourgeois bohemians and unscrupulous profiteers (Revenge). Also, his 
later work (Revenge) seems more explicit about the natural individualism 
that social pressures repress. Tarr’s satire of nationalist “types” is not a 
rejection of individualism. It is, rather, a statement about the influence of 
nationalist pressures on individualism. 
In fact, taken together, Tarr and The Revenge for Love present two 
approaches to the same issue: the damage of social pressures is 
emphasized in the earlier novel, and the romantic resistance to these 
pressures in the latter. Peppis argues that Tarr is a response to a literary 
trend in England at the time, a trend “that articulated and idealized the 
Individualist world view” (228). Indeed, Peppis argues that Lewis would 
have seen Stephen Dedalus as an instance of the Individualist world view, 
as Stephen claims to be liberating himself by breaking free from Ireland at 
that novel’s end, and Tarr was serialized in The Egoist shortly after A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Peppis’s says that Tarr can be read 
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as a response to Portrait. Such a liberation as Stephen’s, Tarr argues, 
would not happen. Peppis acknowledges that Joyce viewed the ending of 
Portrait skeptically, but that Dora Marsden, then The Egoist’s editor, 
would have taken Stephen’s proclamation more sincerely, as she was a 
committed Individualist. Peppis argues that The Egoist was a “libertarian 
and anti-socialist journal that promoted the radical Individualist 
philosophy of the German nominalist Max Stirner” (228-9). Stirner, a mid-
nineteenth century philosopher, is most notable for The Ego and its Own 
(1844), in which he argues for the kind of radical autonomy that Revenge 
suggests: “I am owner of my might, and I am so when I know myself as 
unique” (229). Stirner saw autonomy more as self-mastery, the recognition 
of social influence and the strongest possible resistance to it. Stirner 
infamously asserts that his obligation to express himself is wholly 
independent of social consequence, even if his free expression should 
cause the “bloodiest wars and the fall of many generations” (263). This 
position, confrontational to every social consequence, squares nicely with 
Lewis’s self-styled position as “the Enemy.” It seems far more likely that 
Stirner’s ideas are not rejected by Tarr or Revenge but are, instead, 
introduced in the former and amplified through the latter. According to 
Peppis, many of the writers who contributed to The Egoist supported 
Stirner’s individualist position in an important way. They resisted national 
character as a hereditary quality and recognized it as a social pressure: 
“Their distrust of the state and faith in the individual led the Egoists to 
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interpret ‘national character’ as another of the many repressive and 
conventionalizing external forces that persons should overcome in the 
struggle for egoistic liberation” (231). This, Peppis says, rejects the 
dominant nineteenth century idea of “nationality as a hereditary category” 
(231)32. The Egoists, on the other hand, “interpreted nationality as a 
culturally constructed category, the result of the institutional training that 
persons receive in particular national contexts. Such training was 
inherently anti-individual, in their view, because it aimed to 
conventionalize persons, to replace unique characteristics with ‘national’ 
traits validated by the state” (231). However, Peppis doesn’t acknowledge 
that if, as the Egoists believed, national qualities are a matter of training 
and not hereditary, then the possibility of resistance would be more open. 
Tarr, then, may not be a rejection of individualism so much as regret for 
the individual’s inability to retain individualist qualities. 
Representation for Negotiation 
If Individualism cannot hope to overcome national influence or the more 
local influences presented in Revenge, why wouldn’t anarchism be an 
alternative? Revenge seems to take as given the untenable circumstance 
that anarchism presents. Never in the novel is there a suggestion for the 
abandonment of society and a “return” to a state of nature. Peppis, too, 
argues that despite Lewis’s mistrust of national influence, he was not an 
                                                 
32 “Hereditary, Talent, and Character” (1865), by Sir Francis Galton, was an important source for 
this idea. 
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anarchist33. Peppis says, “In Lewis’s dissident view anarchy is not, as the 
Egoists contended, a utopian form of social order that maximizes 
individual liberty, but the defining condition of human identity, a state of 
turbulent and destructive disorder” (241). Peppis argues that Lewis’s 
rejection of anarchy was a break with other Egoist writers; however, he 
also acknowledges that Lewis sees anarchy as “the defining condition of 
human identity” (241). Revenge suggests that this essential aspect of 
human identity is not eliminated in the social formation. So what then is 
the individual’s recourse in this corrupted but inevitable social condition? 
Peppis argues that, because Lewis has rejected individualism altogether, 
he “displaces the Individualist concept of the authentic self with that of the 
theatrical self” (241). Friedrich Tarr, he argues, is not an individualist, but 
wants to be one, so he performs the role (badly). I agree with Peppis’s idea 
of the theatrical self, but I don’t think Lewis means it as a replacement for 
the individual. Instead, Revenge presents representations as outlets for 
individualist behavior and ideas.  Art, performance, and masks are social 
strategies. Art and representation are possible sites of individualist 
expression, reactions to what has been forced on the individual. According 
to Peppis, the writers who were published in The Egoist “were especially 
inclined toward individualism and resistant to restrictions on creativity and 
                                                 
33 While I agree with Peppis’s conclusion that Lewis was not anarchist, the evidence he offers 
doesn’t quite work. He says that the dance, in Tarr, in which Otto Kreisler violates every social 
decorum, disrupting the structure and order of the event, is evidence of Tarr’s rejection of 
anarchism. However, Otto’s erratic, anti-social behavior is his alone; a truly anarchic situation 
would have all participants playing by the same (lack of) rules. 
158 
action” (231). Lewis retains this individualism while also rejecting a state 
of anarchy. Representation is a site for resistance to the inevitable social 
condition. Peppis says that for Lewis “the anarchist goal of a stateless 
society filled with independent egoists is nothing but an illusion” (241). 
Revenge suggests the same; however, it also suggests that everyone—
including independent egoists asserting their individualism through art and 
representation, as well as sindicalistas, Civil Guards, fellow travelers, and 
gun-runners—uses masks and representation to negotiate the social 
condition. 
Revenge presents many instances of art and representation as a site 
of resistance. Victor, for instance, is struggling financially, and he has sent 
three paintings to The People’s Art League, a communist group that seeks 
to promote art – a certain kind of art, anyway – to the working masses. 
The League, however, passes on all of Victor’s paintings. The suggestion 
is that Victor’s art doesn’t hew to the party’s idea of art. The League 
wants propaganda, not individualist expression. The League wants art that 
it can use instructionally (ironically a kind of Althusserian ISA) not the 
individualist expression of “the wild goat” from Australia. Tristram 
Phipps, on the other hand, is having more financial success as an artist. 
Tristram supports his more serious art through advertising – specifically, 
doing drawings of “ladies and gents’ underwear” (96). Tristram produces 
a kind of art that capitalist financial systems require, but he also produces 
more individualist work. On his way to the zoo to paint a toucan, for 
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example, Tristram stops by Victor’s house. He makes clear to Victor that 
no one has commissioned a painting of a toucan, but that it’s something 
he’s doing solely for himself: “It’s not in my professional capacity that 
I’m going to draw the bird. It’s merely as an artist!” (87). Tristram is a 
fervid and sincere communist, and he seems, here, to be acknowledging 
that he’s an artist in a capitalist system. Capitalism obliges him and Victor 
to sell paintings (to sell their labor), but Tristram also sees himself as 
something outside the capitalist system: he is an artist. It’s this latter 
activity that Revenge suggests as place for individualism. The difficulty of 
reconciling his art and politics is sometimes difficult for Tristram, as we 
see in the discussion about Picasso with Peter Wallace. Victor doesn’t 
have this difficulty, but he also can’t succeed institutionally: The People’s 
League rejects his work, and Freddie Salmon’s forgery shop is as skeptical 
of him as he is of it.  
Ironically, the communist Tristram has more financial success in 
the capitalist system than the a-political Victor. At Victor’s house, on his 
way to paint the toucan, Tristram stands for some time admiring one of 
Victor’s paintings. However, when the topic of conversation shifts to a 
party being thrown for Percy Hardcaster, Tristram’s interest in the 
painting vanishes, and Hardcaster and the revolutionary cause take 
precedence: “[Tristram] did not look at the picture again. Hardcaster had 
taken its place in the centre of his consciousness. It was after all only a 
thing of paint and canvas. It had, as a matter of fact, shrunk into relative 
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unimportance the moment Hardcaster’s name had passed his lips” (89-90). 
Tristram, who is not from the “wilds” of Australia and is not associated 
with nature, feels that the social revolution is more important than art. 
Although they are friends and fellow painters, Victor and Tristram are 
differentiated in this way: Victor is associated with natural wildness and 
sentimentality; Tristram is associated with constructed civil law and 
revolution. Victor refuses to relinquish the freedom of expression that art 
can provide. However, it’s Tristram’s willingness to conform his free 
expression to social pressures that helps him get on the world. He can 
paint a toucan when he likes, but he can also succeed at Freddie Salmon’s 
forgery shop and draw lingerie ads when he must. This is the mask on 
which social living insists, the false bottom required to get on in the world. 
Tristram wears a mask, Victor won’t. Freddie Salmon himself, 
orchestrator of forgery, is described as having “a really enormous false 
bottom to his face” (253). Sean O’Hara throws lavish caviar parties from 
the profits gained by being “a thief and an informer” (140)34. The Fenians 
O’Hara betrayed are described as “a bunch of false-bottoms one and all if 
ever there were” (153). When Percy disabuses Tristram’s wife, Gillian, 
about the political realities of communism—the lies and propaganda he 
attaches to his escape are necessary, he tells her, to promote change—he is 
acknowledging the false bottom underlying all social formations, even the 
                                                 
34 Sean’s parties and his favorite sobriquet for his colleagues (“old man”) echo Gatsby’s lavish parties and favorite 
sobriquet (“old sport”). Gatsby, of course, is one of American literature’s most famous mask-wearers and false 
bottoms.  
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one to which he has dedicated his life. There is, Percy concludes, a “false 
bottom underlying the spectacle of this universe” (272). The spectacle of 
the universe, of course, is the social formations that have been created in 
the otherwise neutral universe. These formations require representations 
and masks; however, individualist art is the representation that doesn’t 
necessarily comply with the institutions. The false bottoms and masks are 
the representations designed for social compliance.   
The social mask becomes most explicit in the last two sections of 
the book, and it reveals itself in the growing awareness of Margot, who 
sees herself and Victor as the targets of the revenge for love. Margot is a 
romantic in two important senses of the word: she’s devoted to Victor, her 
common-law husband, and to Wordsworth and the powers of nature. She 
believes in fate—Victor’s inability to find success as an artist is fate’s 
revenge for the love she bestows on him—and in nature’s physical space 
as benevolent and restorative. She is by turns naïve and canny, losing a 
good deal of naiveté and her romantic view of nature in these last two 
sections. The penultimate section, “The Fakers,” begins not at Freddie 
Salmon’s forgery shop—where one might expect a section called “The 
Fakers” to begin, and where, in fact, the section ends—but at the manor of 
Agnes Irons35, Margot’s friend whom Margot is meeting for lunch. Agnes 
                                                 
35 The park next to Agnes’s home is described as “a well of perfect loneliness” (229), and the allusion is quite 
possibly to Radclyffe Hall’s The Well of Loneliness (1928), a novel of the lesbian Stephen Gordon’s struggles 
against a sexually repressive society. Agnes Irons is unmarried, masculine, and athletic. Revenge emphasizes her 
imperialist positions, but Agnes would also be a productive site for a study of gender in Lewis’s work. She appears 
and disappears in the novel so abruptly that she feels more like a statement than a character.   
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is practically British imperialism incarnate: she has just returned from 
British Malaya, where she participated in a golf tournament; she sprinkles 
Hindi phrases throughout her speech and is continually referenced in the 
context of a white man’s burden. She belongs to an old, wealthy family, is 
thoroughly self-absorbed, and steamrolls Margot with a relentless, forceful 
show of bonhomie. “The Fakers” makes clear that British colonialism is 
the false bottom writ large, the national manifestation of the false bottom. 
Discussing with Margot the fact that Agnes’s skin is brownish, made 
darker by golf in Malaya, Agnes sees this as a joke of nature. In an aside 
of free indirect discourse, the narrator identifies that the source of the joke 
is “that nature is, well, not exactly white—but a jolly old sportsman 
nevertheless” (237). Of course, saying nature is “not exactly white” is 
saying that it is white. The claim that social hierarchies of race are natural 
is the false bottom of imperialism. It takes the neutral, meaningless 
instances of nature and imbues them with the biases of social condition. 
Margot indulges Agnes’s imperialism, but doesn’t quite acquiesce. Margot 
identifies herself as more of a “cosmopolitan,” as opposed to an “Empire 
girl” (242). And when they discuss which nationalities make better 
artists—Agnes feels that “the Britisher can leave art to the foreigners, 
since they seem to be cut out for it”—Margot says, “I don’t think it 
matters, Agnes, really who are artists or who are not” (242-3). Margot 
demonstrates, here, a growing awareness of empire’s false bottoms. She’s 
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cowed by Agnes, as she’s cowed by most people, but she clearly senses a 
system built on a number of false assumptions and self-serving lies.  
The brief scene in Agnes’s manor—Agnes is introduced, 
presented, and exits the novel in fifteen pages—starkly contrasts Agnes’s 
imperialism with the natural setting of the park just outside her home. 
While she waits for Agnes to arrive, Margot gazes at the park below from 
an upstairs window. The park is partially occluded by the large houses, 
“the late Victorian terraces – irrelevantly vast, and of course sepulchrally-
basemented, for staffs of vanished domestics” (229). The park is the near-
vanished state of nature that has been steamrolled every bit as much as 
Margot is about to be, and the way the rigid social stratification was more 
slowly giving way. The park is described as the sacrificed state of nature 
with its “hecatombs of leaves” (229). From the window, Margot imagines 
an elaborate fantasy in which she’s under a park tree, reading A Room of 
One’s Own and then, with Virginia Woolf at her side, reading Tennyson 
(Woolf is doing the reading aloud) and discussing literature with the dons 
at Oxford, to where this imaginative scene shifts. This richly imaginative 
moment is spurred by nature and filled with art. Agnes ends the chapter by 
giving a cursory look out the same window and saying, “These mangy old 
trees give me the hump” (245). Agnes is so thoroughly inscribed by social 
strictures, rules, and empire that nature’s freedom is physically 
164 
unsettling36. The false bottom of imperialism is alienated from the 
freedom of artistic expression and nature and seeks to obliterate it. 
In Revenge’s last section, Margot has joined Victor on his gun-
running errand. She lies by a French river bank, near the French and 
Spanish border and gets disabused of the Wordsworthian sense of nature. 
Her London life had afforded her little contact with actual nature; she 
knew it only as she had read it in books. Now, though, she chooses “not to 
participate in its sunny dream” (305). She now recognizes nature as “a 
senseless agitation of unfeeling things” (305). Nature is no longer 
mysterious, spiritual, secretive. She sees nature, finally, as indifferent, a 
startling contrast to the business with which she and Victor are engaged: 
“all would have passed off quite differently had her mind not been 
obsessed with the actors, for whom these pastoral sets were the 
incongruous backgrounds, and if she had not been part of this agony of 
men” (305). She has long harbored suspicion at the men for whom Victor 
is working, and, of course, her suspicions are confirmed later: Unwitting 
Victor has been set-up as a decoy; he will draw the attention of the 
authorities so that the real gun shipment can be made into Spain. The 
duplicity and false bottom of the gun runners sharply contrasts with her 
newfound appreciation of neutral, disinterested nature. Victor and Percy, 
                                                 
36 Again, Revenge repeatedly alludes to Agnes’s masculine, possibly lesbian presence, yet she is presented as the 
voice of empire and the political and social status quo. There is no suggestion that she’s an outsider, which she 
would undoubtedly be.  
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who has come as the Spanish “expert,” are oblivious to the duplicity that 
Margot has early on suspected. 
From the riverbank Margot, as well as Victor, goes to an outdoor 
café in a plaza on the Spanish side of the border, where Margot explicitly 
wears a mask of social negotiation. Among the plaza patrons is a dwarf, 
and the dwarf is performing an impromptu public show. He’s stomping 
about, crying and whining loudly as though he were a toddler having a 
tantrum. It’s unclear if he is a busker, but the novel suggests that Spanish 
attitudes toward dwarfism are different from English attitudes. Spanish 
culture, the novel says, permits dwarfs to transgress social customs and 
conventions with impunity, even indulgence, a kind of compensation for 
the physical difficulties dwarfism occasions. When the dwarf targets 
Margot as part of his performance, attempting to draw her into the role of 
the toddler’s mother, Margot is horrified. She is unaware of the cultural 
sensibility that the dwarf and other patrons of the plaza expect, but she 
senses that she is completely alien to what’s happening, a humiliated 
target of the crowd. When the dwarf positions himself directly in front of 
Margot, she finds herself responding, maternally consoling him. 
Importantly, though, a grin has involuntarily fixed itself on her face, and 
she defiantly directs this grin at the café’s patrons. Margot grins “straight 
into their faces without a blink, but totally unaware of their presence” 
(296). The grin unsettles the other patrons because it “had acquired a 
malignant look” (296). Here, Margot has involuntarily been forced to wear 
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a mask, to become a representation of something she is not. The grin is an 
unconscious response to her situation. When the dwarf’s performance first 
targeted Margot, she made “an effort to be natural” (293), but that has 
become impossible. She has been forced to repress the natural and to 
adopt the malignant, vacuous mask. Margot has become a Tyro.  
The grimace implants itself on Margot’s face, an “idiot fixity” 
(296). Victor notices it and immediately becomes concerned. He no longer 
recognizes his “honey angel.” The narrator describes her condition thus: 
“She had passed out, poor darling, and just pushed down—or had had 
pushed down for her—her rational self, and allowed this evil Madonna to 
come up grinning to the surface of things, where we are all on our best 
behavior, and go about to smile and to be polite” (297). She hasn’t, of 
course, literally passed out, but she has lost her individuality, and it’s an 
involuntary reaction: it’s been “pushed down for her.” The reaction is the 
unavoidable repression and subsequent mask that social formations oblige. 
It’s the mask of good behavior and polite society, the substitution of 
vacuous social performance for individualist expression37. It’s not until 
she and Victor are well clear of the dwarf, the crowd, and the Spanish 
plaza that Margot’s stupefied trance is broken and she bursts into tears. 
Tellingly, though, the mask returns when suspicions first surface that 
Victor might be the dupe of the gunrunners. She, Percy, and Victor are 
                                                 
37 Lewis’s self-identification as “the enemy” is often characterized as persona. He, however, no doubt saw it as more 
authentic. Social life masks the authentic individual expression. To be the enemy of such a life is not 
persona. It’s authenticity.  
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looking at a forged letter, complete with Victor’s forged signature, in 
which “Victor” confesses to being the leader of the gunrunners: “Margot’s 
eyes were staring more than was natural for a person in a brown study, and 
her lips had got a smile on them that no joke, however much of a scream, 
would entirely account for. In fact, it was the identical grimace that Victor 
first had encountered at the café invested by the performing dwarf” (316). 
This is the moment when Margot, not Victor and not Percy, first connects 
this forgery to the gunrunners, Abershaw and Sean O’Hara. In order to 
catch them at their false bottom game, Margot must, after a fashion, 
become a false bottom herself. The mask is the involuntary representation 
that the social condition creates in order to negotiate the social condition. 
It takes the more malicious form of propaganda, forgeries, and lies and the 
more benign forms of manners, social customs, and the rules of polite 
society. 
Conclusion 
In Ian Patterson’s essay titled, simply, “The Revenge for Love” 
(2015), he says that Lewis “draws on the props and plots of popular 
fiction, whether parodically or seriously, and on the many forms of 
pretence and counterfeit to be encountered in social, artistic, and political 
life” (145). Patterson is arguing here that Lewis used the conventions of 
popular fiction and the dissimulations of social life to structure his novels. 
However, Patterson pushes this further to say that Lewis didn’t simply use 
“the many of forms of pretence and counterfeit” as plot devices or 
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narrative structure; he says also that Lewis saw real conspiracy directed 
toward himself. The counterfeits of social life were more than armature for 
a novel; they were Lewis’s reality, and he was the victim: “he also sees 
actual plots all around him, with people plotting against him, conspiring 
against him as a professional artist, and conspiring to obfuscate the true 
nature and aims of political interests” (Patterson 145). It may be that 
Lewis had paranoid ideas (or even well-founded ideas) of plots against 
him; but I think Revenge presents a condition that goes beyond personal 
suspicions of machinations, malfeasance, or bad actors. While Revenge 
certainly has its share of machinations and bad actors, the novel describes 
a social condition that transcends the values of unscrupulous people. It 
presents an unavoidable condition of repressed individuality and 
inauthentic, distorted artistic expression. Lewis may have felt excluded 
from the kind of success and acclaim that he felt other (lesser) artists were 
achieving, and he may have felt institutions were responsible. But Revenge 
doesn’t present the individual kicking down a door to be let in; it presents 
the individual kicking down the door to let others out. 
Revenge is satire, a genre Lewis seems unable to resist. Even his 
essays and philosophy (Time and Western Man, for instance) have many 
polemical moments, and polemic, too, has the hyperbolic tone of satire. 
He seems to have found absurdity everywhere, and this might be another 
way to think about the conspiracies that Patterson describes. It might be 
less paranoia and more absurdist philosophy. However, unlike the 
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absurdism of, say, Camus, Revenge doesn’t see suicide as the 
philosophical question, nor is it meaningless existence that is absurd. The 
absurdity seems to be our social condition, which is also the unavoidable 
condition. In Stephen Sicari’s Modernist Humanism and the Men of 1914: 
Joyce, Lewis, Pound, and Eliot (2011), Sicari quotes Tobin Siebers on the 
insufficiency of skepticism: “Skepticism can never be the philosophical 
basis of a politics, and when skeptics strip themselves of founding beliefs 
they deprive themselves of political direction” (xi). One could replace 
“skepticism” with “satire,” here, and come to a similar conclusion: 
humor/satire, like skepticism, is a “negative genre,” a negative position. It 
identifies flaws, shortcomings, lapses; it deals in exaggerations and 
distortions. But it doesn’t put forth anything positive. Revenge, though, 
places a site of resistance next to the absurd: individualist expression, as 
much as this is possible, should push against the influence of social 
formation. And this, again, might be a broader way to think about Lewis: 
positioning oneself as the “enemy,” calling everyone to account, is another 
way of asserting individualism, or at least attempting to. The individualist 
can tell him- or herself that incessant contradiction and combativeness is a 
result of not being coopted by the social norms  
The individualist’s position is reinforced toward Revenge’s end, 
when the novel works at completing a circle: It begins with jail, debate, 
and attempted escape, and it ends the same way. In the beginning, Percy is 
imprisoned in a Spanish jail, debating politics with Don Alvaro, and 
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attempting escape. It ends with Percy debating politics with Margot, being 
re-imprisoned in a Spanish jail, and reading about Victor and Margot’s 
attempted escape. Percy didn’t understand why Margot, out of her love for 
Victor, didn’t support communism more actively. “At present,” he tells 
her, “Victor stands outside of life altogether” (326). Victor’s ostracism is 
more than being unable to professionally succeed in the capitalist system; 
he is outside of life. He is, Percy says, “the perfect outcast—more than any 
tramp” (326). Why? It’s not because he’s an artist. It’s because Victor is 
the wild, natural individual. The tramp is a social failure, perhaps, but still 
social. The natural individual is asocial and, thus, thoroughly outcast. 
Social formations require representation—propaganda, masks, lies, 
dissimulations, rationalizations—and Victor pushes against this, retaining 
what the novel characterizes as authentic, natural. Victor’s representations 
are in his art. His lack of success is more than just his seemingly mediocre 
talent: his art won’t present what The People’s League wants or what 
Freddie Salmon’s forgery shop wants. It represents Victor’s free 
expression, and selling art means creating what someone else wants. Percy 
and Margot’s debate turns from nature’s wild individual outcast to artistic 
dessication in a capitalist system. When Percy tells Margot that art is dead, 
she asks, “Can art die?” (326). Percy concedes that it cannot, but that art 
today belongs to a “system that is in dissolution” (326). Margot holds her 
own in this colloquy, and Percy shows his surprise by accusing her of 
being a politician. “My politics are art,” she replies. (327). Here we see 
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Margot as more than just Victor’s devoted lover. She has developed from 
a naïve, imaginative romantic to a staunch defender of individual 
expression. She is defending her husband, yes, but she’s also a defender of 
art and a canny observer of the social forces working against Victor. When 
the subterfuge is revealed, Percy finds himself back in jail, where he 
adopts “the mask of the injured party” (377). It’s a role he plays as 
prisoner in order to negotiate better treatment and, perhaps, release. He 
reads in the paper about Margot’s and Victor’s deaths. In their attempt to 
escape through the mountains back to France, they fell from a precipice, a 
false bottom, as it were. The article falsely reports the forged letters that 
claim Victor was a gun-running ringleader. The novel ends with Percy 
crying, a tear “rolling down the front of the mask” (377). The layers of 
dissimulation are many, and the suggestion is that Percy is weeping for 
more than the deaths of Margot and Victor, whom he genuinely liked. 
We’re told early on that “Percy liked playing the artist,” indeed that 
“Percy the gunman insisted on Percy the artist” (40). And Percy’s final 
tear, as authentic as the laugh bursting from the Tyro, seems to be a 
recognition of the larger prison of social distortion that comprises Percy 
the artist.  
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                               Conclusion 
“We stand on the last promontory of the centuries!...Time and space died 
yesterday.” 
The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism (1909) 
 
“I appreciate an old work for its novelty. It is only contrast that links us to the 
past.” 
Dada Manifesto (1918) 
 
“Let us together desire, conceive and create the new building of the 
future…which will one day rise towards the heavens from the hands of a 
million workers as the crystalline symbol of a new and coming faith.” 
Manifesto of the Bauhaus (1919) 
 
“I believe in the future resolution of these two states, dream and reality, 
which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute reality, a 
surreality, if one may so speak.” 
Manifesto of Surrealism (1924) 
 
 Every modernist manifesto is a reckoning with the past. In the 
examples above, the Bauhaus and surrealism manifestos are less stridently 
“new” than are the futurist and dada manifestos, but even these propose, 
respectively, a stark shift into new forms and consciousness. Modernist 
manifestos don’t stake out positions that build on the past so much as 
assert a break with the past and propose invention of the new. In this way, 
the manifestos of the first decades of the twentieth century are tonally 
revolutionary. The change is foundational: the futurists announce the death 
of time and space; the Bauhaus proposes a new faith; the surrealists, a new 
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reality. These manifestos prescribe conditions for building, but they first 
insist on some level of rejection. The manifesto is, in many ways, the 
defining genre of the modernist period, a period defined by “isms.” In a 
moment when fundamental aesthetic conventions—linearity, 
representation, unity, for example—are being tested, manifestos serve as 
apologias. But the changes are more than formal. The late 
nineteenth/early-twentieth century, as noted above, was a time 
characterized by “the loss of belief in religion, the rise of our dependence 
on science and technology, the expansion of markets and the 
commodification brought about by capitalism, the growth of mass culture 
and its influence, the invasion of bureaucracy into private life, and 
changing beliefs about relationships between the sexes” (Butler 1-2). The 
unease and sense of loss created by these foundational cultural changes 
opened a space for manifestos to acknowledge the loss (sometimes 
celebrate it, as the futurists do) and then start anew. 
Manifestos were the medium for the moment. They were the 
expository genre that proposed and defined new concepts, perspectives, 
and rules. In Modernism, Race, and Manifestos (2008), Laura Winkiel 
says, “Straddling the boundary between theory and practice, the manifesto 
communicates an experience of crisis and a conceptual break with the 
past” (1). Winkiel’s description of the manifesto as both theory and 
practice is especially apt for a manifesto of a revolutionary moment. The 
manifesto is a call to action but also, for its creators, a performative 
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document of identity. In a revolutionary moment, a manifesto is always 
potentially determining the social context that creates action: 
This history-making self-consciousness reached its apogee in the first part 
of the twentieth century, when hundreds of political and aesthetic 
manifestos circulated throughout the world as part of an immense cultural 
and geopolitical shift. As these manifestos declare a series of breaks from 
traditional aesthetic, cultural, and political forms, they enact the 
quintessential gesture of modernity: they proclaim themselves the arbiters 
of the new and the ‘now’ and reject the past. (Winkiel 1) 
Winkiel’s book explores the manifesto and colonial literatures, but her 
assertion of the 
valence of the modernist manifesto suggests its potential influence on 
other genres: If the “quintessential gesture of modernity” is the manifesto, 
then one might expect to identify this gesture in other genres. Manifestos, 
she says, “provide a useful framework for rereading other modernist forms 
(anthologies, experimental literature, protest novels, and essays) in terms 
of their shared attempts to interrupt received meanings” (2). The 
modernist kunstlerroman, as a self-referential ekphrastic object of this 
period, would fit nicely on this list, perhaps somewhere between 
experimental literature and protest novels. 
 Regarding political and aesthetic (avant-garde) manifestos, Martin 
Puchner’s Poetry of the Revolution: Marx, Manifestos, and the Avant-
Gardes argues that all manifestos are informed by the twin characteristics 
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of performativity and theatricality (5). Puchner argues that political 
manifestos are “ideal instances of performative speech” because they are 
“invested in doing things with words” (5). While this overstates a bit the 
manifestos performative agency—performativity is doing things 
linguistically, not merely being invested in doing things—it identifies 
manifestos as being, as Winkiel says, poised “between theory and 
practice,” tending toward performativity. Puchner says that political 
manifestos will “frequently overcompensate for the actual powerlessness 
of their position with theatrical exaggerations,” and, likewise, avant-garde 
manifestos employ the same theatricality, which is often characterized by 
“over-the-top statements and shrill pronouncements” (5). The idea here is 
that both political and avant-garde manifestos are performative and 
theatrical, but in different proportions: the political are more performative, 
the avant-garde more theatrical. If we think of over-the-top theatricality as 
a kind of fiction—a persona, a role, a mask—that is employed as a 
rhetorical strategy, then we can see another opening for the modernist 
kunstlerroman to enter the discourse of the manifesto: it, too, is a fiction 
that employs its theatricality to theorize aesthetics.  Likewise, the 
modernist kunstlerroman’s ekphrastic essence—the artist-novel is the art 
object about art—is itself a rhetorical strategy. In “What Is Ekphrasis 
For?” (2007), Simon Goldhill emphasizes ekphrasis as an under-
acknowledged rhetorical strategy, specifically an appeal to emotion 
designed to persuade: “It seems to me that the connection between 
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ekphrasis, rhetoric, and the power of emotion needs underlining” (7). The 
modernist kunstlerroman’s affective quality contributes to its ability to 
persuade. The emotional appeal of the art object makes it, like the 
theatricality of the avant-garde manifesto, a productive site for aesthetic 
theorizing. Insofar as ekphrastic texts “speak out,” as the word’s 
etymology suggests, the kunstlerroman becomes not only a site of 
theorizing and speaking out, but a trope variously equipped for 
persuasively theorizing. 
 Situated in this context, The Tragic Muse, A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man, and The Revenge for Love can be read as novel-
manifestos, modernist texts that reckon with the past and propose aesthetic 
values going forward. These three novels span much of the modernist 
period—the first was published in 1890, the last in 1937—and like the 
manifestos of the period, each proposes a revolutionary aesthetic for the 
future. This is evident in the way that each novel attempts to reimagine the 
foundational aspect of aesthetics: perception. As mentioned above, 
revolution is a foundational upheaval—time, space, faith, and reality are 
all up for grabs—and perception is the foundation upon which 
representation and expression are built. Each of these three 
kunstlerromane, in its own way, reinterprets what it means to perceive the 
world in the modern moment. Muse, for example, opens at an art 
exhibition, at which the three artists of the novel are introduced. 
Importantly, they are at the exhibition as viewers, not as artists or 
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exhibitors. However, their acute perceptions are contrasted with the 
generalizing perceptions of others, and throughout the novel, such acute 
perception remains a hallmark of the artist. Portrait, too, reimagines 
perception, but here it is reimagined as just that: imagination. Portrait 
coalesces the ineluctable modalities of sight and sound with the 
imagination, creating a network of sense perception. By shutting his eyes, 
for example, on Sandymount strand, in Ulysses, Stephen engages his 
imagination and connects the imagination to sense perception: one sense 
(imagination) is more engaged when the other (vision) is blunted. In 
Ulysses, Stephen famously says that history is a nightmare from which he 
is trying to awaken, and Portrait presents the imagination as the site best 
suited for an attempted escape from history. Finally, Revenge, too, 
advocates for the recognition that the social condition is immanently 
distorted. The novel doesn’t promote a methodology of perception in the 
way Muse and Portrait do; rather, Revenge promotes a new consciousness, 
one that is aware of the invariable falseness of the social condition and 
recognizes the artistic instinct as the best defense against this condition. 
The title of Lewis’s The Art of Being Ruled (1926) should be read literally: 
Being ruled is inevitable, and art is how one resists. 
The inflections on perception that Muse, Portrait, and Revenge 
present trace two perceptive shifts in the modernist moment: the emphasis 
on reader-response interpretations of art, and the embodiment of 
perception more generally. Regarding reader-response criticism, Jane 
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Tompkins, in “The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of Literary 
Response” (1992), says that the significant shift toward reader-centered 
criticism did not occur in the 1960s and 1970s as is commonly held. 
Rather, it happened during the critical turn toward Formalism/New 
Criticism in the early part of the twentieth century. Reader-centered 
criticism, she says, is not, as is often claimed, a rejection of formalism; 
rather, it’s formalism in “a new key” (201).  An important first step in 
reader-centered criticism, she says, is Eliot’s definition of the objective 
correlative, first articulated 1919. Tompkins argues that in defining the 
objective correlative, Eliot expresses the first argument for what is today 
called reader-response criticism. Tompkins says that by Eliot’s insisting 
“that there is no one-to-one correlation between the emotions of the poet 
and the emotions of the poem he creates” (220), what Eliot did was to 
sever “the tie between the poem and its origins more completely than has 
ever been done before by denying that there is any direct relationship 
between the life of the work and the life of its maker” (220). The emotion 
of the poem, Eliot argues, is created in the text, either well (Macbeth) or 
poorly (Hamlet). It is not produced by an expression of the author’s 
emotions. Tompkins says that with this emphasis on the structure of the 
poem, “the issues that had occupied literary critics from Plato onwards 
simply drop from sight” (221). What the Formalists/New Critics began, 
and what was carried forth by Reader-Response critics, is to recast the 
critic’s project to one of interpretation. Until the emergence of the 
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Formalist/New Critic approach (“from Plato onwards”) critics concerned 
themselves with literary effect; now they were producing meaning. Effect 
became interpretation. 
The second perceptual was the relocation of perception from idea 
to the body. In Modernism, Tim Armstrong says that one “reason for the 
centrality of sensation to modernism is that the senses themselves are 
reconceived” (90). Armstrong argues that late-nineteenth/early twentieth-
century conceptions of time and space become embodied and, thus, a 
source of anxiety: “As a result, many fundamental categories—space, 
time—become physiological rather than ideal, analyzable in terms of the 
machinery of the body…rather than abstract categories” (91). The Futurist 
quotation at the above is instructive: “time and space died yesterday.” 
Armstrong’s suggestion seems to be that time and space as external 
concepts died yesterday, and time and space as felt sensations emerged. 
These twin developments in perception—the emergence of 
interpretation and embodied abstractions—are theorized by the three 
novel-manifestos. Muse, for example, was published in the period when 
post-impressionist painters were seeking “to rediscover the objects they 
[impressionists] had dissolved” (Jay 158). Post-impressionists reacted 
against the unmediated “impressions” of the impressionists and focused 
instead on the relationship between subject and object. This 
“rediscovered” mode of perception is presented throughout Muse by its 
three artists. To be, as James says, one of the people on whom nothing is 
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lost is to invigorate the relationship between subject and object and to 
interpret. In Timothy Vincent’s “From Sympathy to Empathy: Baudelaire, 
Vischer, and Early Modernism” (2012), Vincent argues that an important 
marker of the elision into what we call modernism can be seen in the shift 
in literary perception, a shift from sympathy to empathy. Vincent says that 
Baudelaire (1821-1867) is, rightly, judged to be one of the “fathers” of 
modernism, largely by turning his perception away from feeling about an 
object to feeling into the object: “Baudelaire and other early modernists 
had now created a loose but recognizable ethos that was consistently 
beginning to replace mimetic representation and idealism with expressive 
gestures of sensory and historical experience” (4). Throughout Muse we 
see the three artists repeatedly able to empathize with characters, to look 
into them—Nick into Julia, for example; Miriam into Madame Carre; and 
Nash into everyone. 
Portrait’s title, too, suggests a painterly perception, and in “The 
Portrait as Portrait: Joyce and Impressionism” (1980), Maurice Beebe 
suggests there are impressionistic descriptions throughout the novel, “the 
fusion of the observer with what he sees” (145). While this analysis seems 
apt for much of the description in Portrait, it misses the crucial notion of 
perception in the novel, which is to heighten the “sixth sense,” the 
imagination. In Garry Leonard’s “Soul Survivor: Stephen Dedalus as the 
Priest of the Eternal Imagination” (2015), Leonard argues that Joyce’s 
shift from a Roman Catholic belief system to a more secular one was less 
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a rejection of faith and more a transformation of Catholic concepts into a 
secular understanding: “To pick up on Taylor’s point, it is possible to ‘un-
believe’ in Religion, and still believe you have a soul. The soul you 
believe in, however, will not be the same one recognized by the faith that 
you have left, and yet it may still serve a similar function: that which 
allows you to generate meaning in your life such that you can achieve 
something imperishable beyond your individual life” (11). The secular 
soul described here is the imagination. It’s the perceptive sense that 
generates meaning. It is the artistic sense that Joyce describes in “Day of 
the Rabblement.” Like the concept of the religious soul, it exists in 
everyone. However, Portrait insists that for the artist this soul (the 
imagination) must do more than exist. It must be, as much as it can, 
outside of historical pressures in order to express itself. Stephen’s 
aesthetic theory, which we see more clearly in Ulysses, is largely about 
locating history (the author) inside the fiction (Shakespeare in Hamlet). 
Portrait turns this on its head. History, in this case an almost-
autobiography, gets called a novel. And instead of finding the history in 
the fiction, readers read the history as fiction. All the work, historical and 
fictional, is forged in the smithy of the imagination.  
If Portrait presents the imagination as the smithy of art and 
history, Revenge might see imagination as the weapon against the absurd. 
Neil Cornwell, in The Absurd in Literature (2006), defines the absurd as 
“a term derived from the existentialism of Albert Camus and often applied 
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to the modern sense of human purposelessness in a universe without 
meaning or value” (3). The usual suspects are adduced as examples—
Kierkegaard, Kafka, Becket, Ionesco, et al—and Cornwell provides 
moments of absurdity in otherwise non-absurdist texts (the colonial 
behavior in Heart of Darkness, for example.) Absurdity requires a context 
of meaninglessness, and the lengthy sequence of false bottoms in Revenge 
certainly creates a context of meaninglessness. Likewise, Revenge presents 
a universe without meaning or value, a disinterested universe. However, 
the novel divides these two concepts in a way that discourages an 
absurdist reading. Because the disinterested universe is a site of absolute 
freedom, the individual doesn’t experience it as absurd. The absurdity in 
Revenge emerges with social formation. Certainly, there are moments in 
the novel that can be read as absurdist, just as Cornwell reads the colonial 
guns firing on a deserted shoreline in Heart of Darkness as absurd: Don 
Alvaro’s unnecessary murder of Serafin, Jack’s assault on Percy, and 
Victor and Marge’s violent deaths over a load of bricks are a few. 
Revenge, though, lacks the hopelessness that absurdity requires. Purpose 
exists. It’s in Percy’s tear at the end; it is in the difficult but individualist 
life that Victor leads; it’s in Tristy’s painting of a toucan, which is not in 
his “professional” capacity as an artist; and it’s in the love that Margot has 
for Victor. These instances of individualist resistance to the oftentimes 
absurd quality of social life provide Revenge with a sense of purpose: the 
assertion of individuality. 
183 
Muse, Portrait, and Revenge reflect the modernist shift to 
interpretation and embodied perception. Muse, as mentioned earlier, 
presents many more scenes of viewership than scenes of art or 
performance. It’s the audience response that is emphasized. Portrait, too, 
in the gestation of an artist, shows little of Stephen’s writing (the villanelle 
is an exception) and more of his theory, his responses. He exiles himself at 
the end of Portrait, having published next to nothing. And in Revenge, the 
conversations about art—is Picasso bourgeois? did Van Gogh produce 
forgeries? Margot and Virginia Woolf in a scene of reading—are more 
central to the novel’s theme than is art production. Perhaps it’s not 
surprising that in a novel-manifesto—a work of art that declares aesthetic 
principles—one common principle would be perception. How the artist 
perceives is fundamental to what the artist does, and in this culturally 
turbulent time, with a host of changing foundational ideas, it follows that 
novel-manifestos would, on some level, address the recasting of 
perception.  
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